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—
Science education is strengthened, worldwide, to support technological innovation 
(OECD, 2015). Educational policies are being adjusted to improve science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and to attract more people to it at graduate 
level (OECD, 2015). In order to improve STEM education, the focus should be shifted from 
teaching static scientific knowledge via direct instruction towards a more balanced policy 
that also includes scientific activities that aim to support children’s’ scientific reasoning 
abilities (Osborne, 2013). Besides the beneficial effects of training these abilities in science 
education, hands-on scientific activities also lead towards more liking of science (Ornstein, 
2005). Therefore, the incorporation of scientific thinking in science education should lead 
towards more students and more proficient students in STEM education. Scientific thinking 
of primary school children has been studied extensively (Zimmerman, 2007), but only few 
have investigated kindergartners (aged four to six years), who are at the start of science 
education (e.g., Piekny & Maehler, 2013). The present dissertation provides an investigation 
of the capabilities and development of scientific thinking in kindergarten, and the 
individual differences therein.
Development of Scientific Thinking
One of the first to systematically study and document children’s scientific thinking 
was Jean Piaget (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). He challenged children to solve problems and 
understand the workings of various materials, such as a balance beam and a pendulum. One 
of his main findings was the progression of children through stages of understanding. He 
reported that young children, including kindergartners, fail to experiment systematically, 
and to draw proper conclusions or to provide correct explanations. The kindergartners 
appeared to vary multiple variables at once, failing to identify the effect of single variables. 
They also reported themselves as causing the observed effects, while in reality it was caused 
by one or multiple variables, such as the distance of a weight to the fulcrum of a balance 
beam. While his reports were not encouraging for researchers to study scientific thinking in 
kindergarten, more recent studies showed that kindergartners already have some scientific 
knowledge of various domains and that they possess various process skills to perform 
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9scientific investigations (Trundle & Saçkes, 2015). Research has only limitedly addressed the 
scientific abilities of these young children. While kindergartners might understand some 
aspects of scientific discourse, little is known about their scientific reasoning abilities, i.e. 
hypothesis generation, experimentation, and evidence evaluation, and how these might 
predict the acquisition of domain knowledge.
Both scientific knowledge and scientific reasoning are part of scientific thinking (see 
Figure 1.1). Scientific knowledge is the domain-specific content knowledge about various 
topics, such as physics. Scientific reasoning is the domain-general ability to generate 
hypotheses, design and conduct experiments, and to draw conclusion by evaluating 
evidence (Klahr, 2000). With respect to hypothesis generation, this appeared to be very 
difficult for kindergartners (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). When they were presented with 
accumulating evidence, they were unable to phrase a hypothesis that fit the evidence. 
Moreover, the kindergartners barely generated a hypothesis at all. This finding is in line 
with Piaget’s notion that kindergartners see themselves as causing an effect (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958). This might prevent them from correctly identifying the true cause and they 
thus fail to hypothesize such an effect. Further investigations of kindergartners’ hypothesis 
generation abilities have been absent for this reason.
Figure 1.1 An overview of scientific thinking. Light grey represents static knowledge. The box with the black border represents an 
ability that was not studied in the present dissertation as it was found to be too difficult for kindergartners. The figure is partly 
based on the scientific reasoning model proposed by Klahr (2000).
Regarding experimentation abilities, the Control of Variables Strategy (CVS) is essential 
to correctly design experiments with multiple variables (Chen & Klahr, 1999). It often 
happens in real life that a given effect is caused by various factors. To disentangle these 
effects and identify whether there is a single cause, the CVS has to be applied when designing 
experiments. The CVS is about controlling all variables that are not the topic of investigation 
by keeping them constant and studying only the variable that is under investigation by 
manipulating it. Interestingly, this ability to use the CVS has only been studied in children 
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aged 7 years and older (Chen & Klahr, 1999). When studying kindergartners it has been 
shown that they fail to set up a correct experiment when asked to find something out (Piekny 
& Maehler, 2013). However, the experiment in this study involved a single dichotomous 
variable, which means that the CVS did not have to be used. As an experiment with multiple 
variables might be a cognitive overload for these young children, a piecemeal procedure 
might help them understanding how to design experiments. A method that especially lends 
itself for this is dynamic assessment (Tzuriel, 2000). During dynamic assessment, feedback 
is given to the child based on its performance. This way, incorrect performance can be 
adjusted during assessment, while correct performance can be maintained. So far, research 
has not investigated dynamic assessment of the usage of CVS in experimentation.
Concerning evidence evaluation, the final core component of scientific reasoning, 
kindergartners have been shown to be able to evaluate various types of evidence correctly 
(Piekny & Maehler, 2013). The kindergartners were provided with evidence, which could be 
conclusive, suggestive, or inconclusive. Conclusive evidence directs the evaluator towards a 
single conclusion, while inconclusive evidence should direct the evaluator to the conclusion 
that no conclusion can be drawn, because half of the evidence contradicts the other half. 
Suggestive evidence mostly points towards a single conclusion, but there is also a little bit 
of evidence that contradicts it. Kindergartners performed well on conclusive and suggestive 
evidence, but they performed at chance on inconclusive evidence. This means that most 
kindergartners proposed a cause for the observed pattern of evidence. While kindergartners 
can effectively evaluate evidence, no research has been conducted on the relation of evidence 
evaluation to other aspect of scientific thinking.
Finally, scientific thinking also includes specific knowledge, i.e. domain knowledge. 
It has been shown that kindergartners have some naïve knowledge of physics, which 
sometimes is not in accordance with the actual laws of physics (Vosniadou, 2002). An 
example is the difficulty children have in identifying volume as they pay more attention 
to the length than the width of objects. This way they incorrectly identify a long glass as 
having more lemonade in it, even when they see the experimenter pour the lemonade in 
a shorter, but wider glass (Piaget’s conservation of volume task; Piaget & Inhelder, 1971). 
Still, kindergartners already possess some scientific knowledge, which they bring to the 
class. Older children have also been shown to possess more knowledge than kindergartners, 
indicating that their domain knowledge accumulates over time (Vosniadou, 2002). However, 
these results are based on cross-sectional studies, the development of scientific knowledge 
has not been studied. In addition, it has not been studied how domain knowledge might 
relate to scientific reasoning abilities.
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Individual Differences in Scientific Thinking
Besides investigating children’s scientific thinking, individual differences in scientific 
thinking have been identified, although not in young children, see Figure 1.1 for a schematic 
overview. Some cognitive factors have been identified in a group of 10-12 year-olds, which 
might also be relevant in kindergartners’ scientific thinking. The usage of CVS was related to 
verbal reasoning, vocabulary, and reading comprehension (Wagensveld, Segers, Kleemans, 
& Verhoeven, 2014). Another study of 10-year-olds on individual differences found inhibitory 
control, spatial abilities, and problem-solving skills to be related to scientific reasoning, 
as assessed with a questionnaire (Mayer, Sodian, Koerber, & Schwippert, 2014). Whether 
these cognitive factors appear as relevant in kindergartners remains to be investigated. 
One cognitive factor that has received extensive attention in kindergartners’ learning is 
executive functioning (Diamond, 2013). Actually, it is a construct that consists of three 
different components, namely working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. 
Inhibition is the ability to ignore interfering thoughts (internal) or sensory stimuli 
(external). It allows us to stop and act differently. Working memory is the mental ability to 
maintain and manipulate information, either verbal or visuospatial. Cognitive flexibility is 
the ability to switch between rules, tasks, thoughts, strategies, etc. Whether the executive 
functions also play a key role in scientific thinking is yet unknown.
Scientific activities might be approached differently by children, where some might use 
an effective strategy and others might be more explorative. These strategies of exploration 
and efficiency (also called explanation) can foster causal learning (Legare, 2014). Causality 
is a concept that is essential to understand in order to participate in scientific investigations 
(Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). Therefore, exploration and efficiency might foster scientific 
reasoning as well. However, little is known about these two strategies and their underlying 
mechanisms, especially in young childhood (Legare, 2014). Individual differences in the 
strategy use can provide indications about the underlying mechanisms of the strategies. 
Serious games can be used to investigate strategy use, as it provides an informal learning 
environment (Legare, 2014) and because serious games have unique strengths that can 
be used augment science education (Morris, Croker, Zimmerman, Gill, & Romig, 2013). 
However, such an investigation of individual differences in strategy use using a serious 
game in kindergarten is missing.
General Introduction
12
The present dissertation
The aim of the present dissertation was to examine scientific thinking in kindergarten. 
Both the domain-specific knowledge and the domain-general abilities of scientific thinking 
were studied. The following research questions were addressed:
1. What are kindergartners’ capabilities in scientific thinking and how does it 
develop?
2. What are the individual differences in kindergartners’ scientific thinking and in 
their discovery of the laws of physics using a serious game?
The research presented in the present dissertation was carried out in the Netherlands. 
Dutch children typically start education at four years of age. The first two year of education 
consist of kindergarten after which formal education start. The children start formal 
education when they are six years old. There are two main topics in Dutch primary 
education, which are language and mathematics. More recently, science and technology has 
been given more attention. There is a need for graduated students of science, technology, 
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) to stimulate the Dutch economy. Therefore, school 
programs have changed to attract more students towards STEM education and to prepare 
them for STEM education. Thus far, it has been studied how STEM education might look 
in the Netherlands (Techniekpact [Technology Pact], 2016). However, little is known about 
kindergartners’ scientific reasoning abilities or their domain knowledge., In addition, how 
STEM might be taught to the youngest children in school, i.e. the kindergarteners, has not 
been studied. 
The outline of the dissertation
The present dissertation consists of a series of five research articles. They have 
been published in international journals or submitted for publication. The start of 
the dissertation is the development of an assessment of experimentation abilities 
in kindergarten (Chapter 2). To be able to assess experimentation, as one of the core 
components of scientific reasoning, a tool had to be develop, which could be used for 
subsequent studies. The other core components have been studied in kindergarten, where 
hypothesis generation appeared to be too difficult, but kindergartners could evaluate 
various types of evidence (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). Then, individual variation in this 
experimentation component of scientific reasoning, as well as the evidence evaluation 
components was studied (Chapter 3). When relevant abilities that support scientific 
reasoning have been identified these can be used to predict the growth of kindergartners 
in scientific reasoning and possibly domain knowledge. Next, the development of 
experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain knowledge was studied, in combination 
with individual differences therein (Chapter 4). To investigate whether all kindergartners 
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can learn to think scientifically, we investigated individual differences in experimentation 
abilities in kindergartners with learning problems (Chapter 5). These kindergartners 
are enrolled in special education schools, because they have learning problems, due to a 
sensory, physical and/or mental impairment, or a prolonged illness or behavioral problems 
(Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur, en Wetenschap [Ministry of Education, Culture, 
and Science], 2016). Experimentation seems to be a good start in this investigation as it 
is the central core component, which relates to both hypothesis generation and evidence 
evaluation (Klahr, 2000). How the children approach scientific activities and try to learn 
from it, might differ between children. To study this, the strategy use in a physics game was 
identified, as well as the individual differences in strategy use (Chapter 6). Finally, there is 
a general discussion in which the findings of the various research articles are linked to each 
other and limitations and suggestions are offered (Chapter 7).
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abstract
–
A dynamic assessment tool was developed and validated using Mokken scale analysis to 
assess the extent to which kindergartners are able to construct unconfounded experiments, 
an essential part of scientific reasoning. Scientific reasoning is one of the learning processes 
happening within science education. A commonly used, hands-on, experimentation task 
was adapted to dynamically assess the use of the so-called Control of Variables Strategy 
(CVS) by children 4 to 6 years of age. In this task, the children were challenged to design 
experiments using two ramps with up to four independent variables: weight of the ball, 
steepness of the slope, place of the starting gate, and surface texture of the slope. There 
were two scores of CVS use: experiment and variable correct score. The analysis showed it 
was possible to assess CVS use in a reliable and valid manner with the new assessment tool. 
Irrespective of the number of variables children were allowed to set, experiments validly 
measured CVS use. Given that the number of variables to be set increased the difficulty of 
the experiment, this can be used to scale children’s CVS use. In other words, it is possible 
to differentiate between children on the basis of their CVS use. The children’s use of CVS 
positively related to both their age and nonverbal reasoning ability. The present results thus 
show that it is feasible to evaluate the ability of kindergartners to construct unconfounded 
experiments using dynamic assessment. This means that kindergartners can use the CVS 
and might be seen as natural scientists, who can and will try to unravel the physical world 
around them. Their explorations appear to need sufficient guidance (i.e. within their zone of 
proximal development) to design multivariable experiments. 
Key words: control of variables strategy, CVS, scientific reasoning, kindergarten,  
dynamic assessment
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scientific reasoning 
abilities in 
kindergarten:
dynamic assessment 
of the control of 
variables strategy
–
Scientific reasoning is at the heart of science and technology education, which is 
becoming more and more important from both international and economic perspectives, 
because world-wide expenditures on science and science education are increasing (OECD, 
2013). Young children are curious by nature (Engel, 2009) and science and technology 
are gradually taking their place in kindergarten education where young children are 
recognized as “natural scientists” (Gopnik, 2012). Kindergartners already have some 
basic understanding of experimentation (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). However, when asked 
how to successively accumulate evidence (Piekny & Maehler, 2013) or to predict and 
explain the outcome of an experiment (Siegler, 1976), they do not perform better than 
predicted by chance. Letting children design experiments themselves also does not 
improve their understanding of experimentation, which remains low for both 7-year-olds 
(Chen & Klahr, 1999), and 10-year-olds (Schauble, 1996). This low performance appears 
to be due, in part, to a tendency to change multiple variables at once and thereby make 
it impossible to identify which change has caused an effect (Wilkening & Huber, 2004). 
A more fine-grained analysis of the ability of young children to design unconfounded 
experiments using multiple variables is thus needed. In the present study, we therefore 
adapted the so-called “ramp task” of Chen and Klahr (1999) for the dynamic, i.e. 
interactive, hands-on assessment of young children’s ability to design unconfounded 
experiments. The aim of the present study was to assess the validity of this assessment 
and to investigate whether kindergartners can use the CVS. Dynamic assessment was 
chosen, as such assessment provides optimal information on the learning potential of 
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a child (Tzuriel, 2000). Tzuriel (2000) refers to dynamic assessment as “an assessment 
of thinking, perception, learning, and problem solving by an active teaching process 
aimed at modifying cognitive functioning” (p. 386). This is an instructional method 
based on the so-called zone of proximal development, which states that under sufficient 
guidance children can do many things they fail in individually (Vygotsky, 1978).
Scientific reasoning
According to Klahr’s “Scientific Discovery as Dual Search” model, scientific 
reasoning can be seen to consist of three cognitive components: hypothesis generation, 
experimentation, and evidence evaluation (Klahr, 2000; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). With respect 
to the first component, namely hypothesis generation, children appear to develop this 
capacity around the age of 7 years (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). Piekny and Maehler presented 
cards with depictions of fantasy animals for identification by children. After presenting 
some examples of a family of animals, the child had to determine whether the last card in 
the series belonged to that family or not. The examples provided information on what body 
parts of the animal could be relevant for belonging to a certain family. This appeared to be 
extremely difficult for 4- to 6-year-olds, and performance increased around the age of 7 years, 
but significantly more correct hypotheses were only generated around the age of 11 years. 
To gain insight into children’s capacity for experimentation or the second component 
of scientific reasoning, they have asked children how to design an experiment. This was 
done in a task with a single, dichotomous variable by Piekny and Maehler (2013), who 
asked 4- to 12-year-old children which mouse house (i.e. either one with a small or one 
with a large opening) they should pick to (a) feed both a small mouse and a large mouse, 
or (b) find out whether the mouse that went inside to eat was big or small. More than half 
of the 5-year-olds correctly chose the house with a large opening for problem (a), while for 
problem (b) most children incorrectly chose the house with a large opening, because both 
mice could get in the house with a large opening. This revealed that their investigation in 
the experimental context, problem (b), was incorrect, but that most kindergartners were 
nevertheless able to choose the correct setting in a non-experimental context, problem (a).
In other research on children’s experimentation, Siegler and Chen (1998) used a balance 
beam to explore the scientific reasoning of 4- and 5-year-olds. Using actual materials, 
the children were asked what they thought would happen to the balance beam. Most of 
the children could predict and explain which side of the balance beam would go down 
when only the variable weight was investigated. The 4-year-olds performed equally 
well to the 5-year-olds after 16 trials accompanied by feedback (i.e. showing the child 
which side of the balance beam goes down when different weights are on the two sides). 
However when the children had to incorporate a second variable into their predictions 
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and explanations, namely distance, performance dropped sharply. The 4-year-olds 
generally could not comprehend the combined effects of weight and distance, while a 
considerable number of the 5-year-olds could not do this even after 16 trials with feedback. 
These findings show kindergartners to experience difficulties with the identification 
and encoding of variables in a multivariable experiment. Siegler and Chen (1998) further 
showed the kindergartners to have problems reproducing the configuration of a balance 
beam with weights arranged at different distances. When shown a balance beam for 10 
seconds and then asked to reproduce the configuration of the balance beam using an 
identical balance beam, the children often reproduced the correct numbers of weights 
per side of the balance beam, but with the incorrect distance from the fulcrum.
For the third and final component of scientific reasoning, namely evidence evaluation, 
experimental outcomes have to be interpreted. Kindergartners already show a capacity to 
detect patterns and draw generalizations as revealed by their ability to categorize numerous 
plants, animals, and artifacts according to their life status (Opfer & Siegler, 2004). The 
kindergartners were asked questions whether the target item was (a) alive, (b) could move 
towards goals, (c) grew, or (d) needed water. The questions about moving towards a goal, 
i.e. goal-directed behavior, led the children to infer that both animals and plants are 
living things, but artifacts are not. Children in this condition, condition b, performed 
almost equally to those that were explicitly told this fact, condition a, while the children 
in conditions c and d were less likely to make this inference. These findings suggest that 
when relevant variables are emphasized, children can detect the effects of the variables 
and generalize these to other objects. Children can thus evaluate evidence when it forms 
a pattern that can be detected and used to consider what caused the patterns (i.e. outcome 
of an experiment). Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer, and Nett (2005) have also documented 
the ability of children as young as 4 years of age to evaluate evidence. The children were 
asked about a single, dichotomous variable, namely which of the two colors of chewing 
gum caused bad teeth. No instruction or feedback was provided. Cards depicted children 
with either bad or good teeth and either color of chewing gum. The number of cards 
with children with bad teeth varied per color, which led to a conclusive, suggestive, and 
inconclusive condition. Kindergartners correctly interpreted conclusive and suggestive 
evidence, but not inconclusive evidence. In other research, Klahr and Chen (2003) showed 
that kindergartners can even learn to interpret inconclusive evidence correctly when 
explicit feedback is given on their evaluation of evidence. Explicit feedback, involving 
explanations of whether the child’s response and explanation were correct and why, was 
compared to implicit feedback, which involved no direct feedback by the experimenters, 
but – just as in the explicit condition – the full evidence was presented after the response.
Converging evidence thus suggests that young children can learn to generate 
Scientific Reasoning Abilities in Kindergarten:  
Dynamic Assessment of the Control of Variables Strategy
23
hypotheses and to evaluate evidence, but that they have difficulties with 
experimentation. Studies have shown that children can understand some parts 
of the process of experimentation, but not others. Performance can be low in 
experimental contexts and when there are multiple variables in the experiment.
Control of Variables Strategy
In a multivariable experiment one must keep all but the variable of interest constant 
and thus manipulate a single variable to determine this effect. Inhelder and Piaget 
(1958) showed “the method of varying a single factor while holding all other things 
equal” (p. 75) to be present in children’s hands-on experimentation with factors possibly 
affecting the frequency of a pendulum’s oscillations. Chen and Klahr (1999) introduced 
the term “Control of Variables Strategy” (CVS) to refer to this fact that it is not possible 
to design a multivariable experiment without controlling for the multiplicity of 
variables. They defined the CVS in procedural and logical terms. Procedurally, it is a 
method for creating experiments and distinguishing between unconfounded and 
confounded experiments. In logical terms, CVS includes the ability to make appropriate 
inferences from outcomes and the understanding of the inherent indeterminacy of 
confounded experiments. The CVS can, thus, also be used in situations outside the 
direct experimental context, such as in the process of engineering (Klahr, Triona, & 
Williams, 2007), and problem-solving and decision-making (Mayer, Sodian, Koerber, 
& Swippert, 2014). The CVS is one of various learning processes happening within 
science education, besides other processes such as statistical learning (Saffran, 
2002) and knowledge acquisition via explicit instruction (Matlen & Klahr, 2013).
Chen and Klahr (1999) studied 7 to 10-year-old children’s CVS use with hands-on 
experimentation. Experiments were designed with three types of materials: springs, 
ramps, and objects that could sink or float (i.e. sinking). Each consisted of four dichotomous 
variables. Four phases were followed in their intervention study: exploration, training, 
assessment, and transfer. During the exploration phase, the child was introduced to the task 
and made two comparisons. Per comparison the child could set all variables, but was asked 
to investigate the effect of one. Then, children were probed about the comparisons that they 
made and what they could tell from the outcome. Three training conditions then followed: 
explicit instruction with probe questions, only probe questions, or no explicit instruction 
and no probe questions. The explicit instruction involved the explanation of CVS and the 
rationale underlying it in addition to giving examples of how to make what are commonly 
called “unconfounded comparisons”. The probe questions consisted of asking the child why 
they made the comparison the way they did and, after the comparison was conducted, if they 
could tell for sure whether the variable being investigated had made a difference. During 
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the assessment phase, the children designed experiments using the same materials as in the 
exploration and training phases, with one familiar and one unfamiliar variable. Transfer 
was assessed one week later by having the children perform comparisons with unfamiliar 
types of materials. The results showed no improvement in CVS use when no instruction 
was provided. When probe questions were provided, only the CVS use of the 10-year-olds 
improved slightly between initial exploration and the transfer task. Explicit instruction 
proved effective. During the assessment phase and thus directly following explicit 
instruction, all age groups showed improved CVS use compared to initial exploration. For 
the 9- and 10-year-olds, moreover, this improvement remained during transfer. The 7-year-
olds showed no improvement in CVS use at transfer compared to initial exploration. They 
performed worse than the older children directly following instruction. Taken together, 
these results show the youngest group of children, the 7-year-olds, to have difficulties 
in designing unconfounded experiments with multiple variables. They were capable of 
learning to use the CVS correctly, but this learning effect was small and short-lived.
In sum, the results of studies of CVS use appear to be inconclusive with regard to 
young children’s ability to use it. These inconclusive findings appear to be related to 
the design of the studies to date but, nevertheless in light of these studies, four factors 
can be seen to affect young children’s ability to design unconfounded experiments. The 
first factor is whether the design of the experiment has to be implemented, hands-on, or 
simply communicated. Although this comparison has not been conducted for one and the 
same design, it appears that actually having to build the experiment hands-on is more 
challenging, but also a better approximation of real life situations (e.g., Chen & Klahr, 
1999) than simply being asked about the design of the experiment (e.g., Piekny & Maehler, 
2013). A second factor is the identification and encoding of the relevant variables for an 
experiment, which can be troublesome for young children. When children as old as 7 years 
are explicitly introduced to the relevant variables, they still show difficulties using CVS 
(Chen & Klahr, 1999). Following a period of feedback, kindergartners still cannot incorporate 
all variable into their strategy for creating an unconfounded experiment (Siegler & 
Chen, 1998). The third factor affecting their reasoning and design ability is the number 
of variables that might affect the outcome of the experiment. When kindergartners are 
asked to set one variable to be able to draw conclusions from the experiment, performance 
is good (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). When they are asked to do this for multiple variables, 
performance declines (Wilkening & Huber, 2004). The fourth factor is instruction. For 
10-year-olds, explicit instruction on the CVS in the classroom has been shown to be more 
effective than having the children design and run their own experiments to study the 
effect of the variables on the outcome (Lorch et al., 2010). When no explicit instruction is 
provided, no improvement in the use of CVS is found for 7- to 10-year-olds (Chen & Klahr, 
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1999). Also even explicit instruction has been found to produce only a small but, short-
lived improvement in CVS usage among the 7-year-olds (Chen & Klahr, 1999). Explicit 
instruction thus appears to be effective for teaching the CVS to children 10 and older; it 
does not induce extensive or long-lasting conceptual change in younger children. Younger 
children might therefore benefit from more dynamic assessment (Tzuriel, 2000). 
The present study
To help fill some of the gaps in previous research on scientific reasoning in young 
children, we developed and validated a measure of CVS use by kindergarten children. 
The aims of the present study were to develop and validate a measure of CVS use and to 
investigate whether kindergartners can use the CVS. Education tries to incorporate science 
and technology (OECD, 2013), which can be learned via scientific reasoning. Young children 
are curious (Engel, 2009), and they might learn from their exploration when they know 
the CVS and how to use it. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have been conducted 
on the hands-on use of the CVS in multivariable experiments with kindergartners. They 
might nevertheless be able to design multivariable experiments when the four factors 
outlined above are clearly taken into consideration and an adequate measure of CVS use 
is employed. To examine CVS use, we therefore adapted one of the experimentation tasks 
employed by Chen and Klahr (1999) for hand-on use by children aged 4 to 6 years old.
The four factors that are known to influence the ability to design unconfounded 
experiments were taken into account in the following manner. First, our version of the ramp 
task was made hands-on for use with younger children. In such a manner, the design of the 
task presumably approximates the actual explorations of the natural world by the children. 
Potential problems with the verbalization of the planned design were also minimized by 
having the children actually build the experiment. Second, it is known that identification 
and encoding of relevant variables for purposes of experimentation can be difficult four 
young children. We therefore explicitly introduced the variables at the start of the dynamic 
assessment task. This was done by having children interact with them and the experimenter 
providing the names of the variables. The children were also asked to reproduce the name 
of the variables. Third, the number of variables might affect performance and we therefore 
explicitly examined this in the present study. In our version of the ramp task, we started 
with only one experimental variable to be set. When the children showed an understanding 
of this in their performance, the number of variables to be set was increased by one. This 
resulted in a total of four possible levels of experimentation in the end. It also makes the 
task dynamic. Fourth, explicit instruction of young children has been shown to induce 
small but short-lived understanding. Feedback was therefore provided following each 
experiment. When the child’s design of an experiment was correct, they were told that it 
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was correct and that they had thus set the relevant variable(s) correctly. When the child’s 
design of an experiment was incorrect, it was explained why the design was incorrect 
and how it could be done correctly, while the experimenter correctly set the variables.
To validate the dynamic assessment of the children, the content validity was 
determined in a Mokken scale analysis (MSA) (Mokken, 1971). Prior to this validation, 
the reliability estimates were calculated for the performance measures. The dynamic 
assessment resulted in four levels, which increased in difficulty, because the number 
of variables increased. To validate performance on individual levels and over all levels, 
it had to be indicative of the same underlying trait. MSA validates this by scaling 
individual levels and forming one total scale of performance across all levels. When the 
levels are found to be scalable, they can be assumed to measure the same construct, in 
this case CVS use. The increased difficulty of the levels can also be validated, which the 
MSA does by ordering the levels along the scale. At the end of the scale levels were more 
difficult, because more skill was needed to respond correctly. Convergent validity was 
investigated in terms of nonverbal reasoning, which involves inductive and deductive 
reasoning. Reasoning has been suggested to be an integral part of scientific reasoning 
(Zimmerman, 2000). According to Dunbar and Klahr (2012) scientific discourse “includes 
the set of reasoning processes that permeate the field of science: induction, deduction, 
experimental design, causal reasoning, concept formation, hypothesis testing, and so 
on”. Various types of reasoning seem to be relevant in scientific reasoning. Both nonverbal 
reasoning and scientific reasoning have been shown to improve with age and relate to 
each other throughout elementary and middle school (Zimmerman, 2007). Following 
validation, the relations between CVS use, and age and gender were further explored.
Methods
Participants
A total of 46 children from an elementary school in the Netherlands participated. 
One of them did not perform the ramp task, due to illness. All of the children were 
in kindergarten, which is a two year program in the Netherlands after which formal 
education starts. There were 14 girls and 9 boys in the first year (K1), 9 girls and 14 
boys in the second year (K2). The average age was 5;3 years, with a range from 4;6 to 6;3 
years. The school was a so-called “talent hotbed school”, which means – among other 
things – extra attention to science and technology during the children’s education.
Active consent was given by the parents/caretakers of the children who participated. 
Upon completion of the study, children received a small reward. Of the parents, 18.5 % had 
attained an elementary education, 50 % had attained no more than a secondary education, 
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25 % had attained a tertiary education, and 6.5 % did not report their highest level of 
education. This indicates that the socioeconomic status of the study participants was 
slightly above the Dutch averages of 33.8 %, 39.3 % and 17 %, respectively (Eurostat, 2013). 
Materials
Experimental ramp task. 
To assess knowledge and use of CVS, we made use of two wooden ramps similar to 
those used in the study by Chen and Klahr (1999), see Figure 2.1. The ramps consisted of 
a slope and a stepped area. Balls could thus roll down the slope and stop in the stepped 
area. Four variables could be manipulated to influence how far the ball will roll: ball 
type (i.e. weight)1, steepness of the slope (i.e. incline), starting gate (i.e. distance), and 
surface texture (i.e. friction). Per ramp, thus: a heavy or light ball could be selected; the 
slope could be made steep or less steep by placing a wooden block under the ramp; the 
starting gate could be positioned near the top of the slope or further down the slope; 
and the surface of the slope could be made smooth or rough depending on the choice of 
plank placed on top of the slope. All variables could affect how far the ball would roll.
Procedure.
The ramp task was administered in a single session with an average duration of about 
45 minutes. All children first received instruction and then went on with designing 
experiments. The children’s nonverbal reasoning was assessed in a second session. All of the 
children were tested individually in a quiet place in the school by the same experimenter, i.e. 
the first author of this paper.
Introduction of the ramp task. To introduce the task at hand, the children were told 
that they were going to play a little professor for a while and do some experiments. This 
was told, because a professor generally is viewed as an authority in science, and thus in 
experimenting. An example, unrelated to the current experiment, was provided of an 
experiment. Two drawings of two different pairs of shoes were presented. The children were 
told that if they wanted to find out which pair of shoes would let them run faster, they could 
compare the shoes by first running with one pair and then with the other.
The experimenter next introduced the task by setting it up similarly for each child and 
showing each child how it worked. The child was shown how the ball would roll when the 
starting gate was opened. The child was then invited to open the gate him/herself to see how 
the ball rolled. The experimenter pointed out that it could be determined just how far the 
ball had rolled by counting the number of steps that the ball had travelled and then did this 
1 The correct term for weight here is mass.
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out loud. The children were further told that the ramps were special, because they could be 
changed in a number of ways and experiments thus could be done to investigate how far the 
balls will roll when things have been changed.
Figure 2.1 Photograph of two ramps used in present study side-by-side. The stepped surface to measure how far the ball rolls is 
depicted on the far side of the table. Both of the ramps depicted here have a rough surface, and steep slopes. One of the starting 
gates is set near the top of the slope; the other set further down. The balls have yet to be selected. They look the same, but have 
different weights.
Dynamic assessment of CVS. The dynamic assessment of the children’s use of CVS 
consisted of four experiments to be set up by the child, see Figure 2.2. To start with the child 
was asked to experiment with one variable in each of four experiments (Level 1). In each of 
the Level 1 experiments, a single variable was thus investigated (i.e. one of the four possible 
variables).
The individual variable was introduced. The children were invited to play around with 
the variable – for example, by weighing the balls when this was the variable of interest, or 
touching the different surfaces when this was the variable of interest. The children were 
asked if they could show which of the balls – the heavier of the lighter – would roll further. 
For each ramp, a heavy or light ball could be chosen by the child. The effect of the variable 
was then visually inspected by comparing how far the balls went on the respective ramps.  
In this example, only the ball was the variable of interest and therefore allowed to be set by 
the children. The experimenter had already set the other three variables in the same manner 
for the two ramps.
Once the children had built the ramps the way they wanted to, the experimenter asked 
them why they had built the ramps the way they did. If they built the ramps correctly, the 
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experimenter told them that they had done this correctly and why. The experimenter might 
point out, for example, that the variables, that had to be controlled, were correctly set up 
similarly for the two ramps, while the variable of interest was correctly set up differently. In 
addition, it might be said that the child’s set up was a good set up to study the effects of the 
variable being investigated. If the child designed the experiment incorrectly, they were told 
that the design was not yet completely correct and that they should try doing it again, but 
differently. If, after two tries, the solution was still incorrect, the experimenter explained 
how the experiment should be designed and meanwhile set up the ramps correctly. The child 
then let the balls roll and was asked why one ball had rolled further than the other.
Figure 2.2 Schematic overview of the ramp procedure.
Levels 2 through 4 were similar to Level 1, except that the variables were not introduced 
again. In Level 2, the children were asked to set two variables; in Level 3, three variables; 
and in Level 4, all four variables. The child could only proceed to the next level when at least 
one of the four experiments at the current level was designed correctly, either on the first 
or second try. When all four experiments at one level were designed incorrectly, testing was 
discontinued. The children could thus be asked to design a total of 16 experiments when 
at least one experiment was designed correctly at Level 1, 2, and 3. Each child in our study 
designed a minimum of four experiments (i.e. the four experiments in Level 1).
The administration of the ramp task was arranged to reduce potential confounding and 
control for possible differences in saliency of the variables. To start with, the order of the 
variables of investigation was randomized per level. In addition, the first experiment at a 
level could not investigate the same variable as the last experiment at the previous level.
Scoring of CVS use. Two measures of CVS use were obtained: experiment correct score and 
variable correct score.
The experiment correct score was defined as the total number of experiments 
designed correctly, with a maximum of 16 possible points indicating correct design of 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Try 1 Try 2
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
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each experiment on either the first or second try. Each correct design was assigned a score 
of 1; each incorrect design a score of 0. When testing was discontinued, the unconducted 
experiments were judged to be incorrect and thus assigned a score of 0. The sum of the 
correct responses constituted the experiment correct score.
The variable correct score was defined as the total number of variables correctly set for all 
experiments with a maximum possible score of 40. One point was assigned per correctly set 
variable (i.e. when the variable of interest was set differently for the two ramps). Additional 
points were obviously assigned as the number of variables to be set increased at Level 2, 3 
and 4. For each variable that was not under investigation, 1 point could be scored when it 
was kept constant. Only those tries that were correctly set up by the children were used to 
determine their variable correct scores. When a correct response was not obtained on either 
of the children’s two tries, the setting of the variables on the second try was scored for the 
children.
Nonverbal reasoning. 
The children’s nonverbal reasoning was measured using an exclusion task (Bleichrodt, 
Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1987). This test was included to help us establish the convergent 
validity of our dynamic assessment of the children’s use of the CVS. They were presented 
four abstract figures and asked to select the one that differed from the other three. 
Inductive reasoning was needed to determine the underlying category and distinguish 
category members from non-members. Deductive reasoning was needed to determine 
the non-member, based on the category. When four consecutive items were responded to 
incorrectly, testing was discontinued. The child’s score was then their correct responses 
with a total possible score of 30 items (i.e. the total number of items sets presented).
Data analysis
Reliability coefficients were calculated using the Mokken package (Van der Ark, 2012) 
in R (R core team, 2013). Reliability was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951), 
Guttman’s lambda.2 (Guttman, 1945), the Molenaar Sijtsma statistic (Molenaar and Sijtsma, 
1988), and the latent class reliability statistic (LCRC; Van der Ark, Van der Palm, & Sijtsma, 
2011). The coefficients were estimates of internal consistency, with values between .60 and 
.70 judged as acceptable, values between .70 and .80 judged as good, and values larger than 
.80 judged as excellent in dealing with psychological constructs (Kline, 1993).
To assess the content validity of our assessment of CVS use, we employed Mokken scale 
analysis (MSA) (Mokken, 1971). Performance on individual levels and total performance on 
the ramp task were all scaled. Performance was analyzed in terms of the number of correctly 
designed experiments per level, because the experiments within a single level could be 
Scientific Reasoning Abilities in Kindergarten:  
Dynamic Assessment of the Control of Variables Strategy
31
assumed to be of comparable difficulty. For his analysis, Mokken (1971) proposed the double 
monotonicity model, which describes relations between and within participants and items. 
Double refers to the monotony that should manifest itself for both participants and items. 
Participants were scaled according to their underlying skill (i.e. their CVS use in the present 
task). Monotony implied that the higher the skillfulness of the CVS use of a participant, the 
higher the probability of a correct response on an item. In addition to monotony of CVS use, 
there should also be monotony of item difficulties. The higher the difficulty of an item, the 
smaller the probability that any given participant will be able to give the correct response. 
This model dictates four assumptions. The first is unidimensionality, or the assumption 
that only a single underlying skill is needed to explain the associations between item scores. 
When this underlying skill is controlled for, the responses to different items should be 
unrelated, since these relations should be explained by the underlying skill. This is the 
second assumption of local independence. The third assumption is latent monotonicity, 
which implies that the item rest functions are globally increasing and not decreasing 
functions of the underlying skill. Item rest functions reflect the probability of a correct 
response on an item being a function of the underlying skill. Finally, nonintersection is 
assumed and thus that the item rest functions should not cross each other. MSA provides 
four measures, which can be used to determine if the double monotonicity model should be 
rejected or not. When these assumptions are met, it can be concluded that the model holds 
and that the present ramp task validly measures CVS use.
MSA was performed in R, version 3.1.0 (R core team, 2014), using the Mokken package 
(Van der Ark, 2007; Van der Ark, 2012). This package provides four coefficients that relate 
to aspects of the double monotonicity model and thus indicate whether the model and its 
underlying assumptions hold. First, the item-pair scalability coefficient, Hij, should be 
positive for items that belong to the same scale (Mokken, 1971). This value was the normed 
covariance between two item scores when their variances were both positive. It reflects the 
degree to which the two items vary together and thus can be seen as a measure of the degree 
to which the items do not overlap in their item step functions. Second, the item scalability 
coefficient, Hj, should be larger than .30 (Mokken, 1971). This cut-off is most often used in 
software (Van der Ark, 2012). The item scalability coefficient, Hj, measured the association 
between an individual item and the underlying trait. This coefficient can be interpreted as 
a discrimination parameter. Third, the test-scalability coefficient, H, should be between 
.30 and .40 for a weak scale, between .40 and .50 for a moderate scale, and larger than .50 for 
a strong scale (Mokken, 1971). This coefficient refers to the degree to which the ordering of 
participants according to their test scores accurately reflects their ordering according to 
the underlying trait. Fourth, an item-ordering coefficient, Ht, should be between .30 and .40 
for weak ordering, between .40 and .50 for moderate ordering, and larger than .50 for strong 
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ordering (Ligtvoet, Van der Ark, Te Marvelde, & Sijtsma, 2010). This value indicated whether 
the items were ordered on the basis of their difficulty with Level 1 being easiest and Level 4 
being most difficult.
Additional analyses were performed in SPSS, Version 19. Children from K1 and K2 
were compared using independent samples t-tests. Effect size of potential differences 
was calculated with Cohen s´ d, which is small when between 0.20 and 0.50, medium when 
between 0.50 and 0.80, and large when above 0.80 (Cohen, 1988). Item ordering by MSA 
was confirmed with a repeated-measures ANOVA with level as a within-subjects factor 
and gender as a between-subjects factor. Correlations were calculated between nonverbal 
reasoning and CVS use, with a Pearson’s r between .10 and .30 being small, between .30 and 
.50 being medium, and above .50 being large (Cohen, 1992). Finally, linear regressions were 
performed with age and gender entered simultaneously to determine their relation to  
CVS use.
Results
Reliability
The reliability of the experiment and variable correct scores across 16 experiments 
and four levels was found to be acceptable to excellent, see Table 2.1. The Molenaar Sijtsma 
statistic and the LCRC provided suitable estimates given current data, lambda.2 is a good 
alternative, while Cronbach’s alpha can be less accurate and more biased (Van der Ark, Van 
der Palm, & Sijtsma, 2011). The Molenaar Sijtsma statistic and the LCRC showed reliability 
to be good to excellent, Lambda.2 showed it to be good and Cronbach’s alpha showed it to be 
acceptable (Kline, 1993).
Table 2.1
Reliability Coefficients
Variable Scale Molenaar  
Sijtsma statistic
LCRC Cronbach’s 
alpha
Lambda.2
Experiment 
correct score
Levels .79 .75 .68 .74
Experiments .87 .93 .70 .76
Variable correct 
score
Levels .83 * .74 .79
Experiments .75 * .73 .78
Note. * Latent class reliability statistic (LCRC) was not calculated for variable correct score. The Mokken model did not hold for 
the variable correct score, as the maximum score increased with Level.
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Content validity
For MSA levels were taken as items. The total number of correctly designed experiments 
per Level was averaged across participants, see Table 2.2 This score per level was then plotted 
against the number of correctly designed experiments for the other levels considered 
together and referred to as the experiment correct rest score; see Figure 2.3. As can be seen, 
the slope of Level 1 increased first, followed by the slope of Level 2. The slopes of Levels 3 
and 4 were found to be comparable. These findings show Level 1 to be easiest, followed by 
Level 2, and then by the more difficult Level 3 and 4. The item rest functions appeared to be 
generally increasing, which means that when someone showed more skilled CVS use, they 
also correctly designed more experiments at each level.
Figure 2.3. The item rest functions per level (i.e. average experiment correct score per level as a function of experiment  
correct rest score).
The general increase in the item-rest functions was further investigated by checking 
if the double monotonicity model held with its four assumptions. This was done with the 
four coefficients provided by the MSA. The first coefficient was the item-pair scalability 
coefficient, Hij. Confidence intervals were calculated, see Table 2.2 The confidence interval 
should not include zero for the coefficient to be significantly larger than zero. Given that 
this was a one-tailed test, as recommended by Mokken (1971), a confidence interval of 90% 
was used. Three out of six item-pair coefficients showed a lower bound around zero, which 
suggests nonsignificance. There was one violation between the pair of Levels 1 and 4. The 
item-pair coefficient was larger than zero, Hij = .34, but the standard error was also large,  
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SE = .32, which can be due to two factors. The standard errors of Hij coefficients are generally 
quite large (Van der Ark, 2012). The relatively small sample size of 45 participants and/or 
the relatively changeable covariance between participants, due to the large difference in 
difficulty between the levels, could have contributed to the large standard error. For these 
reasons, all of the item-pair coefficients were assumed to be larger than zero.
Table 2.2
Item-pair coefficient, Hij, Between the Levels
Level 1 2 3
Hij 90% CI Hij 90% CI Hij 90% CI
1 -
2 .48 [.24, .71] -
3 .30 [.00, .61] .26 [-.02, .54] -
4 .34 [-.19, .87] .29 [-.01, .57] .91 [.84, .97]
Second, the item scalability coefficient, Hj, was investigated per Level and should be 
larger than .30. The value of .30 has been proposed as the cut-off point for the absolute value 
of the item scalability coefficient for the item to provide information on the underlying 
skill by discriminating between participants (Mokken, 1971). In addition, 90% confidence 
intervals were calculated. The item scalability coefficients per Level showed the levels to 
discriminate between participants according to their CVS use, see Table 2.3. Level 2 showed 
the lowest discrimination parameter and Levels 3 and 4 the highest. Although Levels 1 and 2 
included .30 in their confidence intervals, the item scalability coefficients were larger than 
.30 and significantly larger than zero. All of the levels therefore provided satisfactory item 
scalability coefficients.
Table 2.3
Mean Experiment Correct Score, Item Scalability Coefficient, Hj, as a Function of Level
Level M (SD) Hj 90% CI
1 3.36 (0.83) .38 [.11, .65]
2 1.84 (1.07) .33 [.10, .56]
3 0.89 (1.21) .57 [.43, .71]
4 0.73 (1.26) .60 [.44, .76]
Total 6.82 (3.17) .48 [.32, .65]
The third coefficient, namely the test-scalability coefficient, H, showed the ordering of 
the participants according to their test score (i.e. experiment correct score), to accurately 
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reflect the ordering of participants on the underlying skill (i.e. CVS use). It was assumed that 
CVS use was reflected by the experiment correct score, which was the sum of all correctly 
designed experiments, and that all of the levels measured the same skill and thus form a 
single scale. Levels were partitioned into a single Mokken scale with an automated item 
selection procedure used to do this. The genetic algorithm was used because it has been 
claimed to be a better algorithm than the hierarchical clustering algorithm (for details, 
see Straat, Van der Ark, & Sijtsma, 2013). The test-scalability coefficient, H = .48, was in the 
moderate range, which shows the ordering of the participants by test score to accurately 
reflect their ordering according to the underlying trait. The lower bound of the 90% 
confidence interval was .32, which shows the scale to be weak at minimum.
Finally, the item-ordering coefficient, Ht, showed the levels to be ordered accurately 
and difficulty thus to increase with Level. The Ht indicates weak ordering between .30 and 
.40, moderate ordering when between .40 and .50, and strong ordering when larger than .50 
(Mokken, 1971). When the order of the levels was investigated using the manifest invariant 
item ordering (MIIO) method, which is a method for analyzing polytomous items, the levels 
were shown to be ordered accurately and subsequent levels to be more difficult, Ht = .84. 
The item-ordering coefficient indicated strong ordering. Whether performance dropped 
as difficulty, expressed in Level, increased was further investigated. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Level as within-subjects factor and gender as between-subjects factor was 
conducted. Gender was added to detect potential interactions with Level, but it had no 
effect. There was a significant main effect of Level, F(2.07, 89.05) = 80.46, p < .001. Note that 
sphericity could not be assumed, Mauchly’s W(5) = .40, p < .001. Therefore, the Huyhn-Feldt 
correction was applied (Huyhn & Feldt, 1976). The number of correctly designed experiments 
decreased linearly with level, F(1,43) = 127.27, p < .001, see Table 2.3. Post-hoc analyses revealed 
that performance was higher on Level 1 than on any other level; and performance was higher 
on Level 2 than on Levels 3 and 4, p < .001, while performance on Levels 3 and 4 did not differ 
significantly. This latter finding is in keeping with the comparable slopes for the item rest 
functions of Levels 3 and 4, see Figure 2.3.
The values of the four MSA coefficients were sufficient to justify the conclusion that the 
model’s assumptions were met. This means that the double monotonicity model held for the 
data collected and that content validity has been established for our version of the ramp task.
CVS use as a function of nonverbal reasoning, age, and gender
Having shown the children’s CVS use to be measured reliably and validly, their 
performance on the ramp task was further analyzed. All of the kindergartners designed 
at least one experiment correctly at Level 1 and were thus able to proceed to Level 2. Out of 
the total of 45 children, 40 were able to correctly design at least one experiment with two 
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variables (i.e. at Level 2) and thus proceeded to Level 3. All 23 children from K2 (i.e. the second 
year of kindergarten) were able to do this, while 18 out of 23 children from K1 (i.e. the first 
year of kindergarten) were able to do this. At Level 3, 21 of the children were able to correctly 
design an experiment with three variables and thus proceeded to Level 4, where 14 out of 21 
children correctly designed at least one experiment with four variables and 7 designed all of 
the experiments with four variables incorrectly. 
We next compared the different years of kindergarten (i.e. K1 vs. K2). The children in 
K2 showed better CVS scores (i.e. experiment and variable correct score) and nonverbal 
reasoning scores than the children in K1, see Table 2.4. The differences in the K1 versus K2 
children’s CVS scores were large, as indicated by a Cohen’s d of 1.21 for experiment correct 
scores and a Cohen’s d of 1.22 for variable correct scores, while nonverbal reasoning scores 
showed a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988).
Table 2.4
Descriptives and Contrasts Between K1 and K2.
K1 K2
M SD M SD p Cohen’s d
Nonverbal reasoning 17.43 4.93 20.35 4.81 .049 0.60
CVS scores
Experiment correct 5.14 2.51 8.44 2.92 < .001 1.21
Variable correct 14.68 8.12 24.65 8.18 < .001 1.22
Convergent validity of the children’s CVS scores was assessed by relating these to their 
nonverbal reasoning scores. Positive, medium correlations (Cohen, 1992) were found for the 
children’s nonverbal reasoning scores with their experiment correct scores, r(43) = .47,  
p = .001, and with their variable correct scores, r(43) = .42, p = .004. The extent to which 
children’s performance related to their age and/or gender was also explored. Linear 
regression models were built with gender and age in months simultaneously entered as 
independent variables and the experiment or variable correct scores used as dependent 
variable. Age related positively to both the experiment correct scores, β = 0.51, p < .001, and 
the variable correct scores, β = 0.47, p = .002. Gender did not relate to either the experiment 
correct scores, p = .469, or variable correct scores, p = .314.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to validate a newly developed, dynamic 
assessment approach to the measurement of CVS use by kindergartners’ ages four to 
six years, and to investigate whether kindergartners can use the CVS. According to 
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different procedural measures, the assessment was found to be reliable. To address 
its content validity, we examined the scalability of the participants and items in a 
Mokken scale analysis (MSA; Mokken, 1971). The MSA coefficients were sufficient to 
conclude that the double monotonicity model held, which is fully commensurate 
with a unidimensional interpretation of the dynamic assessment of CVS.
The four levels indeed formed a single scale with the levels accurately ordered according 
to difficulty (i.e. Level 1 easiest, Level 4 most difficult). The order confirmed the aims and 
design of the task as the number of variables that the children had to set increased per level. 
Using CVS thus became more difficult as the number of variables increased. This is in line 
with the results of previous research (e.g., Siegler & Chen, 1986) and shows that the number 
of variables that the children are required to set can be used to scale them according to their 
CVS use. The most skilled children should respond correctly on all levels, while the least 
skilled children should respond correctly on only Levels 1 and 2, but not on Levels 3 and 4. 
The individual levels also had satisfactory discrimination parameters, which 
means that the children could be differentiated according to their CVS use on a single 
level. While the discriminatory parameters could not be compared statistically, visual 
inspection of them showed Levels 3 and 4 to have larger discrimination parameters 
than Levels 1 and 2. Experiments with three or four variables to be manipulated 
are thus good indicators of CVS use by kindergartners (i.e. 4 to 6 years of age).
To demonstrate the validity of our dynamic assessment of CVS use, we examined 
its association with the nonverbal reasoning of the children. We found nonverbal 
reasoning to be positively related to CVS use, which indicates that nonverbal 
reasoning is involved in learning and applying CVS at the kindergarten level. 
Given that nonverbal reasoning can be considered part of scientific reasoning 
(Klahr, 2000; Zimmerman, 2000), the present positive correlation is taken to be 
an indicator of the convergent validity of our dynamic assessment method.
CVS use was further found to be related to age but not gender. The positive relation 
to age can be interpreted in terms of development. Usually children’s performance 
increases with age, such as on cognitive tasks (Steinberg, 2005) and scientific reasoning 
tasks (Zimmerman, 2007). Therefore this relation was assumed to support the validity 
of present ramp task. In line with this result, children in K2 scored higher than children 
in K1, which was a large difference. It is therefore possible that age and/or year in school 
underlies the development in scientific reasoning. In other words, improvements in 
scientific reasoning might be due to biological development and/or due to the amount 
of education given at school. The present study showed that both affect the use of 
CVS, but to disentangle the underlying factor of the development, future research 
can investigate possible moderation of age effects by grade. It might be possible that 
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age effects are larger in K1 than in K2, because K1 is the first year of education.
The finding of no relation of gender with CVS use may be due to young age of the 
children in the present study. In older children, gender has been shown to relate to aspects 
of scientific reasoning, including the following: nonverbal reasoning and science school 
grades (Kuhn & Holling, 2009), experience with science, interest in science, and attitudes 
towards science (Jones, Howe, & Rua, 2000). Boys have been found to score generally 
higher on these aspects than girls. A different explanation might be that possible gender 
differences were attenuated by the dynamic assessment. Dynamic assessment has been 
shown to eliminate differences on test performance, for example between children with low 
and high SES on a complex problem-solving task with abstract problems (Tzuriel, 2000).
The present results show that CVS use can be measured in kindergarten. 
As the number of variables to be manipulated increased, the difficulty of the 
experiments increased. The number of variables to be manipulated can thus be used 
to scale children’s CVS use with different items. The total number of experiments 
designed correctly demonstrated an early capacity for CVS use and thus show 
scientific reasoning to already be present in kindergarten. Its development, 
moreover, can be reliably measured using the dynamic assessment method.
Of course, several limitations apply to the present study. To begin with, the sample 
size was relatively small, which can be troublesome for MSA. This can be revealed by the 
calculation of standard errors for the coefficients, which is part of the Mokken package 
(Van der Ark, 2012). The present results showed all of the coefficients to be larger than 
the cut-off points proposed by Mokken (1971) but, in a few cases, not significantly larger 
than the cut-off. The results of the MSA should therefore be interpreted with caution 
and replication should be sought in the future. Another limitation is the ecological 
validity, because the experimental conditions differ from school settings. While 
the present study assessed children in an individual setting, it would be valuable to 
observe children’s scientific discourse in an open scientific learning environment. It 
would furthermore be interesting to investigate the saliency of experimental variables, 
by allowing children to choose freely between variables, and how that might affect 
the design of the experiment and/or the conclusions drawn from the evidence.
It can be suggested that the dynamic assessment of the CVS can be expanded to younger 
and older samples, because all children were successful at Level 1 and some failed at Level 
4. It also remains to be investigated whether age and/or grade underlies the development 
in CVS use. The effects of age were investigated cross-sectionally in this study. Additional 
longitudinal study can shed light on the course of development for CVS use. It would be 
interesting to study individual differences in the course of development in relation to other 
skills kindergartners already possess. Nonverbal reasoning, as a critical part of scientific 
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reasoning, should certainly be assessed in any longitudinal study (Zimmerman, 2007). 
Other skills might be included to gain insight into their role in CVS use and the development 
of scientific reasoning. Working memory is a good candidate due to its role in learning 
potential (Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2003) and the limitations that it is known to impose on 
young children’s learning (Gathercole, Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004). Other candidates for 
inclusion as variables in relation to CVS use in future studies are other aspects of scientific 
reasoning such as hypothesis generation (Van Joolingen & De Jong, 1991) and evidence 
evaluation (Metz, 2011). And other topics for consideration are the role of science education 
and the development of scientific knowledge (Driver, Asoko, Leach, Mortimer, & Scott, 1994), 
a science vocabulary (Leung, 2008), and attitudes towards science (Kuhn & Holling, 2009).
With respect to actual educational practice, note should be taken of the feasibility 
demonstrated in present study of dynamically assessing kindergartners’ CVS use. This 
finding is in line with the work of Vygotsky (1978) who has shown that children can 
do many things that fall within their so-called zone of proximal development when 
given sufficient guidance – things that they will be able to do on their own a few years 
later. Kindergartners can thus be exposed to hands-on, multivariable experiments 
and helped to explore them with the guidance of a teacher or other students. When 
they are older, they can presumably do this on their own. Given that the dynamic 
assessment task used in this study showed the children to be capable of correctly 
designing multivariable experiments with up to four variables manipulated at times, 
it can be recommended that kindergartners be exposed to such multivariable tasks 
and experiments. This can nicely prepare them for their further science education 
in which knowledge often is based on experiments with multiple variables. 
The CVS can presumably be taught, and we have shown that dynamic assessment 
can be used, as an instructional method, to teach it in a single session. Research on CVS 
use has further shown that direct, explicit instruction results in better knowledge and 
use of the strategy than unstructured exploration and learning (Klahr, Zimmerman & 
Jirout, 2011; Lorch et al., 2010). Simply structuring a task has been shown to help children’s 
experimentation and inferencing, but have little effect on their mastery of the CVS 
(Lazonder & Egberink, 2014). In the present study we therefore introduced a new procedure 
for structuring a task that measures CVS use, and this was found to be effective for teaching 
the CVS. For the teaching of the CVS and perhaps scientific reasoning in general, the 
structure of a task, thus, appears to be critical. Teaching with only invalid CVS experiments 
has recently been shown to be more effective than with only valid experiments (Lorch et 
al., 2014). While these findings still need to be confirmed, previous research has shown 
preschoolers to engage in more exploratory play when exposed to confounded as opposed to 
unconfounded evidence (Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007). Or, stated differently, what Schulz and 
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Bonawitz refer to as “serious fun” often entails a search for the causal structure underlying 
observed evidence (i.e. scientific discovery). The CVS can help in this scientific discovery 
and it appears to be involved in scientific topics in education, such as biology and chemistry. 
The CVS can also be applied in many more life situations that involve changes in multiple 
variables, such as understanding social phenomena and in the process of decision-making.
Taken together, these results suggest that science education programs can 
now be evaluated with regard to their capacity to produce an understanding of 
the CVS and its correct usage. This aspect of scientific reasoning is particularly 
relevant when scientific reasoning is conceptualized as involving the intentional 
seeking of knowledge via application of the methods of scientific inquiry (Kuhn, 
2004). Children can gain knowledge from their own exploration and experiments 
with the application of the CVS as part of these. Together with the knowledge that 
young children are curious by nature (Engel, 2009) and the knowledge that hands-
on experimentation in the classroom can foster interest in science both inside and 
outside the school (Ornstein, 2005), we can conclude that even young children can and 
should, thus, be encouraged by schools to explore how the physical world works.
To conclude, the present dynamic assessment of CVS use by kindergartners was valid 
and reliable. In addition, this method proved to be effective in teaching young children to 
use CVS. In this regard, the present study is one of the first to show that children as young 
as kindergartners can use the CVS and design unconfounded experiments correctly.
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Abstract
—
The aim of the present study was to investigate the role of cognitive factors in two core 
components of scientific reasoning: experimentation and evidence evaluation. Measures 
of visuospatial and verbal working memory, inhibition, cognitive flexibility, vocabulary, 
grammatical ability, and spatial visualization were related to experimentation and evidence 
evaluation results in 100 kindergartners. Using mediation analyses, results revealed that 
both inhibition and verbal working memory (as part of the executive functions) related 
indirectly to experimentation and evidence evaluation through grammatical ability, 
instead of through vocabulary. Visuospatial working memory did not relate to either 
components of scientific reasoning, and spatial visualization did not mediate the relation 
between executive functioning and scientific reasoning. The present results highlight the 
importance of verbal abilities in explaining individual differences in scientific reasoning  
in kindergarten.
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Scientific Reasoning in 
Kindergarten:
Cognitive Factors in 
Experimentation and 
Evidence Evaluation
—
Science education involves both learning scientific concepts (i.e. content) and 
scientific reasoning (i.e. processes) (Klahr, Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011). Focus in school-
taught science has been on the content, where knowledge dominates reasoning (Osborne, 
2013). Focus can be directed more towards scientific reasoning (Bricker & Bell, 2008). 
Scientific reasoning is conceptualized as the intentional seeking of knowledge through 
the application of scientific methods (Kuhn, 2004). It consists of three core components: 
hypothesis generation, experimentation, and evidence evaluation (Klahr, 2000; Klahr & 
Dunbar, 1988). Scientific reasoning is relevant for participation in the knowledge society as 
an autonomic, critical thinker and is a key part of so-called ‘21st century skills’ (Fischer, et 
al., 2014; Osborne, 2013). Scientific reasoning activities have already been receiving increased 
attention, as they are increasingly becoming part of science education standards (Next 
Generation Science Standards Lead States, 2013). In recent studies, individual differences 
in scientific reasoning have been investigated in primary school children (e.g. Mayer, 
Sodian, Koerber, & Schwippert, 2014; Wagensveld, Segers, Kleemans, & Verhoeven, 2014), 
but not in kindergarten, even though these individual differences can provide validations 
and/or implications for theories about scientific reasoning (e.g. Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). In 
addition, once it is known how children conduct scientific activities, they can be used to 
design teaching materials for science education. Scientific reasoning in kindergarten should 
receive more attention, because young children seem curious by nature (Engel, 2009) and 
they have been called “natural scientists” (Gopnik, 2012). Another advantage of kindergarten 
(i.e. children of four to six) is that it is at the very start of science education. This early 
experience can lead to more motivated and knowledgeable students of science, because 
(hands-on) experience with science can lead to greater interest and self-confidence in science 
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(Ornstein, 2005). According to Piekny and Maehler (2013), kindergartners are able to evaluate 
evidence, but fail in the other two core components of scientific reasoning. However, Van 
der Graaf, Segers, and Verhoeven (2015) proved that kindergartners do have the ability for 
experimentation to a certain extent, as they were able to design unconfounded experiments 
with up to four variables. Therefore, in the present study, the focus was on cognitive factors 
explaining the variation in experimentation and evidence evaluation in kindergartners.
Scientific reasoning in kindergarten
The view of what kindergartners are capable of in terms of hypothesis generation, 
experimentation, and evidence evaluation as core components of scientific reasoning 
appears to have shifted from underestimation of their capabilities towards more 
recognition. Inhelder and Piaget (1958) revealed flaws in the logic of young children, such as 
the failure to distinguish between effects caused by their own actions and those caused by 
an external variable. Later research has revealed that young children have some scientific 
reasoning capabilities, but there is still debate on the exact potential of young children 
in scientific reasoning (Klahr, Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011). However, more recent studies 
revealed that kindergartners show at least partial understanding of scientific reasoning 
(Piekny & Maehler, 2013; Van der Graaf, et al., 2015).
With respect to the generation of hypotheses, kindergartners have been shown 
to experience difficulties. When presented with accumulated evidence about which 
hypotheses can be generated, most kindergartners are able to develop only one correct 
hypothesis, whereas children at around 11 years of age show the ability to develop multiple 
hypotheses in accordance with the evidence presented (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). It appears 
that the generation process is difficult for young children, as well as understanding what 
a hypothesis is. While kindergartners often fail to set a dichotomous variable (i.e. small 
versus large door) to find out whether a small or a large mouse lives in the house, they fail to 
choose the small door. This is a test that produces conclusive evidence (Piekny & Maehler, 
2013). When children are slightly older, i.e. 7 to 9 years old, they can generate a conclusive 
test, when asked to determine something (Sodian, Zaitchik, & Carey, 1991). When a 
hypothesis is given, these children were able to use the hypothesis to design a test. However, 
the generation part seems more difficult. It has been termed a search through hypothesis 
space (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). Individuals search for observable features that support the 
generation of hypothesis and they attempt to develop mechanisms and models that account 
for the observed data (Schauble, 1996). It has been found that young children have extreme 
difficulty with this, as they tend to see themselves as causing an effect, rather than the 
variable under investigation (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Even when the correct observation has 
been made, the problem of confirmation bias still remains. Confirmation bias is a general 
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human tendency to design experiments to confirm the favored hypothesis and ignore 
alternative hypotheses (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). This makes the generation of hypotheses a 
difficult component of scientific reasoning.
With regard to experimentation, a critical variable concerns the Control of Variables 
Strategy (CVS) which is relevant for correctly designing experiments with multiple 
variables. CVS is about manipulating the variable in which one is interested, while keeping 
all other variables constant (Chen & Klahr, 1999). This way, something can be learned from 
the outcome of the experiment, since its design was unconfounded. Most kindergartners 
understand monovariable experiments when asked how to generate an effect (Piekny & 
Maehler, 2013) or predict the outcome of an experiment (Siegler & Chen, 1998), but have 
difficulties when the number of variables increases (Siegler & Chen, 1998). This effect has 
also been found in slightly older children (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Wilkening & Huber, 2004). 
However, it is important to take the task design into account. When dynamic assessment 
is used, kindergartners can design unconfounded experiments with up to four variables 
(Van der Graaf, et al., 2015). This means that the children were given feedback based on their 
own performance, which is in line with the zone of proximal development proposed by 
Vygotsky (1978). Another approach to learn experimentation is through instruction, which 
is often contrasted with some type of discovery (or inquiry). Children aged 7 years old can 
already learn CVS from direct instruction, but this effect is small and short-lived (Chen & 
Klahr, 1999). In contrast, the 10 year olds in their study did show improved understanding 
of CVS after instruction, which stuck until transfer, one week later. When compared with 
self-discovery, direct instruction appears more effective, but all children (10 and 12 years 
old) improved their understanding of CVS, as shown by their design of multivariable 
experiments (Wagensveld, et al., 2014). Experimentation also involves investigation of 
interacting variables, which is something that happens in daily-life. CVS cannot be used 
to investigate these interactions. The next step would be to develop multivariable thinkers 
(Kuhn, Ramsey, & Arvidsson, 2015). This is something in which even lay adults show less 
than optimal competency, but it is also something that students can learn during an 
intervention (Kuhn, et al., 2015).
With reference to evidence evaluation, the critical issue is evaluating the evidence 
obtained after having conducted an experiment (Klahr, 2000). This evidence has to be 
evaluated correctly to draw the conclusion that fits the evidence. There are various kinds 
of evidence. Inconclusive evidence is evidence from which a conclusion cannot be drawn, 
given that half of the evidence contradicts the other half. For example, the conclusion that 
one cannot determine whether a certain color of chewing gums causes bad teeth, because 
two children with that color of chewing gum have bad teeth and two children with that 
color of chewing gum do not. This type of evidence is usually evaluated incorrectly by 
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kindergartners (Piekny, Grube, & Maehler, 2014). Other kinds of evidence include conclusive 
and partial evidence. Conclusive evidence is evidence that irrefutably points to a single 
conclusion. Partial evidence provides a suggestion to what caused the effect, but it is not 
conclusive. It might be that 80 % of the evidence points to the conclusion that red chewing 
gum causes bad teeth, while 20 % of the evidence does not. Piekny et al. (2014) found that 
kindergartners can evaluate conclusive and partial evidence correctly, which indicates 
that they have a basic understanding of evidence evaluation. Their understanding can be 
improved with explicit feedback on their evaluation of evidence. When the experimenter 
explains why the child’s conclusion was correct, kindergartners are better able to learn how 
to interpret inconclusive evidence correctly, compared to when no direct feedback is given 
(Klahr & Chen, 2003). Another aspect is pre-existing beliefs, which affect performance on 
evidence evaluation. The performance of kindergartners suffered when their prior beliefs 
conflicted with the data (Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer, & Nett, 2005).
Cognitive factors in scientific reasoning
Kindergartners, thus, show a basic understanding of experimentation and evidence 
evaluation. However, it is unknown which cognitive factors are able to explain the variation 
in scientific reasoning among kindergartners. Studies on older children show that verbal 
reasoning, vocabulary, and reading comprehension relate to scientific reasoning in 10- and 
12-year-olds (Wagensveld, et al., 2014), as well as inhibitory control, spatial abilities, and 
problem-solving skills in 10-year-olds (Mayer, et al., 2014). In addition to these studies on 
individual differences, the memory model introduced by Baddeley (2000) will be used 
as a framework to select cognitive factors which can account for individual variation in 
kindergarten. The relevancy of the framework lies in the distinction between two main 
routes: a spatial and verbal route. The third route allows for the interaction between the 
two main routes. This third route is episodic and supports the integration and reflection of 
information (Baddeley, 2000). While the episodic route has been studied less extensively, 
there is clear evidence that the verbal and spatial route work independently (Baddeley, 2012). 
The routes are all controlled by the central executive. Information can be temporarily stored 
and manipulated at the working memory level. Information from working memory can be 
stored in and retrieved from the long-term memory. Broad categories of skills and knowledge 
are represented in long-term memory (Baddeley, 2012), including the skills and knowledge 
required for scientific reasoning.
With respect to working memory, three components can be identified, namely verbal and 
visuospatial working memory, and the central executive (Baddeley, 2000). The visuospatial 
sketchpad, referred to as visuospatial working memory, allows one to maintain and 
manipulate visual and spatial information. Visuospatial working memory has been shown 
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to help kindergartners use mental models (Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005). It has been proposed 
that kindergartners solve nonverbal problems using a mental model (Huttenlocher, Jordan, 
& Levine, 1994). Scientific reasoning is a problem-solving activity as well (Dunbar & Klahr, 
2012), which could be done nonverbally. To solve problems, a mental model can be built 
with the relevant information. The relevant information during experimentation is the 
presented variables and how they should be set to design an unconfounded experiment. 
During evidence evaluation, the relevant information is the amount of evidence supporting 
or contradicting a hypothesis, as well as the possible conclusions that can be drawn. The 
visuospatial working memory can encode this information. A related example is the 
estimation of where a number should be placed on a number line (Geary, Hoard, Byrd-
Craven, Nugent, & Numtee, 2007). They found visuospatial working memory to support 
this estimation in a sample of kindergartners. It is estimation, because the exact numbers 
are not given, only the numbers at the start and at the end of the line. Therefore, the number 
to be placed has to be compared to the starting and ending number, which can be seen as a 
coarse comparison, since the exact location cannot be known. It might be this type of coarse 
comparison that children use to evaluate the evidence, namely a rough comparison of the 
amount of evidence in favor of a hypothesis versus the amount of evidence contradicting the 
hypothesis. With respect to experimentation with the ramps, such a rough comparison can 
be used to compare the end positions of the balls that have rolled down the hill. This way, 
the kindergartners can determine, for example, whether the heavy or light ball has rolled 
further.
The other component of working memory is the phonological loop, referred to as verbal 
working memory. It allows one to maintain and manipulate verbal information. There is 
evidence that verbal working memory is involved in scientific reasoning. Verbal working 
memory supports verbal reasoning (Daneman & Merikle, 1996), which has been linked to 
scientific reasoning (Mayer, et al., 2014). With regard to experimentation, verbal working 
memory can aid in designing the experiment by maintaining and applying the correct 
strategy, i.e. CVS. Application of CVS requires children to remember what variable was 
under investigation and which variables were not, and set all variables accordingly. It is 
therefore likely that the memorization and manipulation of the variables is facilitated by 
verbal working memory. Second, vocal self-instruction, which taps into verbal working 
memory (Baddeley, 2012), allows children to control their actions (Luria & Yudovich, 1966). 
This way, children can act in accordance with CVS. With regard to evidence evaluation, 
verbalization might aid the mental representation and comparison of the evidence. As the 
evidence in favor of a hypothesis must be compared with the evidence contradicting it, 
so must the similarities and differences be compared mentally. Linguistic representation 
allows for more complex and abstract representations (Luria & Yudovich, 1966) and it can 
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draw attention to these similarities and differences (Clark, 2004).
The two components of working memory are controlled by the central executive, which 
is an attentional control system (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Its function is broad and at least 
four functions were proposed by Baddeley (2012). These include focused attention, divided 
attention, switching between tasks, and interfacing with long-term memory (Baddeley, 
1996). The central executive is difficult to measure, as it controls verbal, episodic, and spatial 
processing. It strongly connects to the executive functions (EFs). The EFs consists of three 
components, namely working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. Both inhibition 
and cognitive flexibility are top-down control processes (Diamond, 2013), which make them 
the best candidates for the homunculus-like functions of the central executive proposed by 
Baddeley (2012). Inhibition consists of the ability to sit still and listen, but it also strengthens 
concentration by diminishing the effect of interfering stimuli or thoughts (or focusing and 
dividing attention). Cognitive flexibility is assumed to build upon working memory and 
inhibition (Diamond, 2013). It is the ability to switch between perspectives, rules, or other 
mental processes (or switching between tasks). Moreover, the EFs are assumed to be a basis 
on which children acquire new skills, such as reasoning, problem-solving, and planning 
(Diamond, 2013). This notion is in line with the control function of the central executive 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Interestingly, reasoning, problem-solving, and planning are also 
assumed to be used in scientific reasoning (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). The EFs seem especially 
relevant in young children, as it supports learning (StClair-Thompson & Gathercole, 2006) 
and acquisition of new skills (Lefevre, et al., 2013). Control has been shown to be relevant 
for scientific reasoning, because the rejection of intuitively derived misconceptions (Kwon 
& Lawson, 2000) or prior beliefs (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006) aids in the process of designing 
an experiment and objectively evaluating the evidence. Another way in which control can 
be involved is by supporting working memory. The executive control can keep the mental 
workspace from becoming too cluttered (Hasher & Zacks, 1988). This way, attention can 
be directed to the relevant aspects of the task. Given these findings, it is likely that other 
cognitive factors built upon the EFs (working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility) 
to support scientific reasoning.
Besides components of working memory, Baddeley’s model also includes long-term 
components: language and spatial semantics. Long-term memory is conceptualized as a 
crystallized system, in which information is stored, and supports thinking and reasoning 
with its bidirectional interaction with working memory (Baddeley, 2000). Language is the 
long-term store that links with verbal working memory, while spatial semantics connects to 
visuospatial working memory (Baddeley, 2000).
With regards to the spatial route in the model, spatial semantics has been proposed as 
an equivalent of the long-term memory of language (Baddeley, 2000). In the spatial domain, 
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spatial visualization appears to be involved in scientific reasoning, given that it relates to 
achievements and success in science, technology, engineering, and math (Uttal & Cohen, 
2012). Spatial visualization is defined as “complicated, multistep manipulations of spatially 
presented information” (Linn & Peterson, 1985, p. 1484). The hands-on design of experiments 
also seems to involve complicated, multistep manipulations. These can be required to 
design an experiment in line with a strategy, such as CVS. It is less clear what role spatial 
visualization plays in evidence evaluation, because the evidence is presented spatially, but it 
can be verbalized to assess the evidence and draw the proper conclusion.
With respect to the verbal route, vocabulary and grammar can be seen as long-term 
memory of language. Vocabulary is a part of language that has been shown to be involved in 
scientific thinking. Understanding scientific concepts appears to depend on the words used 
to talk about them (Snow, 2010). Vocabulary is also involved in experimentation, because it 
relates to the transfer of CVS in 10- and 12-year-olds. The transfer was from applying CVS in a 
single context to investigate one of multiple variables, to three new situations, in which CVS 
had to be applied, such as what factors affect how many lemonades are sold (Wagensveld, et 
al., 2014). Its relation to evidence evaluation is less clear, as argumentation about evidence 
does involve new scientific concepts (Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997), but these argumentations 
are about qualitative data, while kindergartners’ ability to evaluate evidence has been 
identified using quantitative data (Piekny, et al., 2014). It remains to be investigated what 
role vocabulary plays in kindergartners’ evidence evaluation.
Another aspect of language is grammatical ability. Grammatical ability has been 
theorized to depend on an underlying mechanism, which grammar shares with other 
cognitions (Jackendoff, 2002). Grammar is recursive, which allows us to create endlessly 
long sentences, and grammar is a transitional layer between phonology and semantics, 
and vice versa (Jackendoff, 2002). Recursion and transition can also be found in the process 
of scientific reasoning. In experimentation, CVS is applied recursively on the multiple 
variables of the experiment, which makes it a transitional layer between strategy and 
design of the experiment. In evidence evaluation, evidence is recursively weighted on 
whether it favors or contradicts the current hypothesis, which makes it a transitional layer 
between evidence and conclusion. Another way in which grammar is involved in scientific 
reasoning is how grammar relates to syntactic unification. Syntactic unification is the 
process of assembling pieces of memory into larger structures, with contributions of the 
context (Hagoort, 2013). The syntactic structure of a sentence determines the meaning 
that can be associated with it by specifying the contributions of specific (parts of) words 
to the sentence. An example is: “He follows her” versus “She follows him”. In this example 
the sequence of words in the sentence is combined with the meaning of the verb, which 
can result in different mental images. To design a multivariable experiment correctly, 
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the knowledge of CVS should be combined with the knowledge of which variable is under 
investigation, so that the correct variables can be controlled. The evaluation of evidence is 
about combining the presented evidence with the rules of evaluation, so that the correct 
conclusion can be drawn from the evidence.
The present study
In summary, young children are able reason scientifically. In addition, individual 
differences in scientific reasoning have been studied and they could be related to verbal 
and/or spatial abilities. However, individual differences have not been investigated at 
kindergarten age. The present study explored these differences based on two different 
components of scientific reasoning: experimentation and evidence evaluation. Following 
Baddeley’s (2000) multi-component model, various cognitive factors have been proposed, 
which could relate to scientific reasoning. An important distinction in the model is between 
the verbal and the spatial route, which is also reflected in the present study. Two alternative 
models were investigated for each component of scientific reasoning: a verbal and a spatial 
model. In both the verbal and spatial models, the EFs were included. In the verbal and spatial 
models, verbal and visuospatial working memory were investigated separately. Due to 
EFs fundamental role in guiding performance (top-down control processes that regulate 
thoughts and behaviors), their role in the models was as independent variables. Vocabulary 
and grammatical ability were included as mediators in the verbal models. Spatial 
visualization was included as the mediator in the spatial models.
Methods
Participants
One-hundred-and-one children from four elementary schools participated in the present 
study. They were all in the first year of kindergarten, which is a two-year program in the 
Netherlands, before formal education begins in the first grade. Most children were Dutch 
and less than 5% of the children were from a different cultural background. One child was 
excluded from the analyses, because she was an age-related outlier. The difference with the 
mean age was more than three SDs. The children’s average age was 4 years and 6 months, 
with a range from 4 years to 5 years and 2 months. The current sample scored slightly 
above a norm population on nonverbal reasoning, t(247) = 3.01, p = .003, d = 0.39. Active 
consent was given by the parents/caretakers of the children who participated, except for 
the children from one school. This school chose to approach the parents/caretakers using 
passive consent, meaning that the parents had to indicate if they did not want their child to 
participate. They could do this by responding to a letter they received through school. If they 
did not respond, the child participated in the study.
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Materials
Scientific reasoning.
Experimentation. To assess experimentation (i.e. knowledge and use of CVS), we made use 
of two wooden ramps similar to those used in the study by Chen and Klahr (1999), see Figure 
3.1. We followed the procedure described in Van der Graaf, et al. (2015), with one difference. 
The present assessment was not dynamic: no probe questions on the children’s design of 
the experiment were asked and no feedback was given on whether the design was correct. 
The test was an assessment of current experimentation skills, and not a test of the learning 
potential of experimentation skills. The children were not instructed on CVS; they were 
simply asked to design an experiment to investigate a single variable.
Figure 3.1. A schematic overview of two ramps used for the experimentation task. Each ramp has four different variables with 
two possible settings. In the top-side of the picture, the ball is heavy, the slope is very steep, the starting gate is placed further 
downhill, and the surface of the slope is rough. In the bottom-side of the picture (b), the ball is light, the slope is less steep, the 
starting gate is placed near the top, and the surface of the slope is smooth.
The children’s task was to design experiments with both ramps to investigate the effect 
of only one of the four dichotomous variables. In other words, they were challenged to apply 
CVS in order to design unconfounded experiments. The four variables were: the weight of 
the ball (heavy or light), the steepness of the slope (very steep or less steep), the surface of 
the ramp (rough or smooth), and the starting location of the ball (near the top or further 
downhill). When the children were asked to investigate the weight of the ball, the correct 
response would be to manipulate the weight of the ball by placing a light ball on one slope 
and a heavy ball on the other slope, while controlling the other variables by keeping them 
constant between the two ramps.
There were four levels and four experiments per level. Each experiment at each 
level investigated a different variable. The number of variables children were allowed 
to set increased per level from one to four variables. Whenever the kindergartners were 
not allowed to set all variables, i.e. Level 1, 2, and 3, the other variables were set by the 
experimenter using predetermined settings for those variables. If the first try to design 
Scientific Reasoning Abilities in Kindergarten:  
Cognitive Factors in Experimentation and Evidence Evaluation
57
an experiment was incorrect, children were allowed to design the experiment once more. 
When at least one experiment was designed correctly at a level, children proceeded to the 
next level. Testing was discontinued when all experiments were designed incorrectly at 
a particular level. Two CVS scores were obtained, the experiment correct score and the 
variable correct score. The experiment correct score consisted of the number of correctly 
designed experiments, with a maximum of 16. The variable correct score consisted of the 
number of correctly set variables, with a maximum of 4 at Level 1, 8 at Level 2, 12 at Level 3, 
16 at Level 4, and 40 in total. Testing was discontinued prematurely for nine participants. 
They did not proceed to the subsequent level, even though, based on their performance, 
they should have. We adjusted their scores by adding points for the subsequent levels. The 
amount of extra points was based on the random chance of designing the variables and 
experiments of the subsequent levels correctly. The experiment correct and variable correct 
score varied over the levels, see Table 3.1. The performance was relatively low in Level 4, due 
to the discontinuation rule. The experiment and variable correct scores correlated highly,  
r (98) = .92, p < .001.
Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics of the Experiment and Variable Correct Score per Level and in Total
Experiment Correct Variable Correct
Level M SD M SD
1 2.74 1.31 2.74 1.31
2 1.33 1.22 4.52 2.07
3 0.53 0.96 4.63 3.81
4 0.19 0.80 2.70 4.71
Total 4.79 3.24 14.55 9.94
Similar to Van der Graaf et al. (2015), the content validity of the ramp task was assessed 
by applying the Mokken scale analysis to the experiment correct score (MSA; Mokken, 1971) 
using the Mokken package (Van der Ark, 2012) in R (R core team, 2014). The experiment 
correct score was analyzed and not the variable correct score, because the variable correct 
score increased with each level, which would affect the scales. Mokken (1971) proposed that 
the item-pair coefficients should be larger than .30 and the item scalability coefficients 
should be larger than zero. MSA revealed that all item-pair coefficients and item scalability 
coefficients were significantly larger than .30. The test scalability coefficient showed that the 
items formed a strong scale, H = .67, 90% CI = [.55 to .79]. A scale is considered strong when H is 
.50 or larger (Mokken, 1971). Levels were ordered accurately (i.e. subsequent levels were more 
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difficult), Ht = .94. Ordering is considered strong when Ht, an item-ordering coefficient, is .50 
or larger. In addition, the reliability of the experiment correct score and the variable correct 
score of the current version of the ramp task was found to be good (Kline, 1993), Molenaar 
Sijtsma statistic was .79 and .82, Cronbach’s alpha was .72 and .76, Lambda 2 was .74 and .81 
respectively. In addition, the latent class reliability statistic (LCRC) was calculated for the 
experiment correct score, because it is an accurate estimate of reliability for Mokken items 
(Van der Ark, Van der Palm, & Sijtsma, 2011). The LCRC indicated good reliability, LCRC = .74. 
The variable correct score was used as the measure of experimentation in the analyses. All in 
all, it can be concluded that the current ramp task was valid.
Evidence evaluation. Evidence evaluation was assessed using the chewing gum task 
from Koerber and colleagues (2005). Children were asked to evaluate evidence by drawing 
conclusions based on cards that were presented to them. The cards depicted children with 
either bad or healthy teeth, and holding a chewing gum, which could be one of two colors. 
The task was to determine which color of chewing gum caused bad teeth. Two stuffed 
animals were also introduced. One of them, Leon, was introduced first. He had to revise his 
prior belief given the evidence. If children did not comprehend what his prior belief was, 
even after explaining it up to three times, testing was discontinued. Next, evidence was 
presented by spreading the cards out on the table. This involved conclusive evidence, which 
contradicted Leon’s prior belief. If children did not comprehend that Leon had to revise his 
prior belief after presented with the new evidence or if children answered the third question 
incorrectly, which again checked what Leon’s prior belief was, testing was discontinued. 
There were five more questions, three concerning partial evidence, one concerning 
conclusive evidence, and one concerning inconclusive evidence. Children could score up to 
eight points, one per question.
Nonverbal reasoning. These experimentation and evidence evaluation tasks are relatively 
new and therefore the proposed involvement of various reasoning processes has been 
investigated. The processes involved are indicative, abductive, and deductive reasoning 
(Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). Nonverbal reasoning and scientific reasoning have been shown to 
be related throughout elementary and middle school (Zimmerman, 2007). Because of this, 
both experimentation and evidence evaluation should relate to a measure of reasoning. The 
exclusion task (Resing, Bleichrodt, Drenth, & Zaal, 2012) was used to assess the children’s 
nonverbal reasoning. Four abstract figures were presented. Three of them belonged to a 
single category. The category was based on the general similarity of the figures, such as 
an extra dot in the figure. To identify this category, inductive reasoning was required. To 
identify the non-member based on the category, deductive reasoning was needed. If four of 
five consecutive items were answered incorrectly, the test was discontinued. There were 30 
items. The score was the sum of all correct responses. Nonverbal reasoning correlated with 
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the variable correct score of experimentation, r(98) = .29, p = .004, and with the number of 
correct responses on the evidence evaluation task, r(98) = .29, p = .003.
Working memory.
Visuospatial working memory. The Corsi blocks were used to measure visuospatial 
working memory. This task was developed by Corsi (as cited in Kessels, Van Zandvoort, 
Postma, Kappelle, & De Haan, 2000). The materials consisted of nine blocks placed on 
a wooden board, which we built as recommended in Kessels, et al. (2000). The task was 
to reproduce the sequence in which the experimenter tapped the blocks. The task was 
explained as described by Rasmussen and Bisanz (2005). The experimenter told the child 
that their hands were frogs and that the frogs could jump from stone to stone in a pond. 
The experimenter first jumped, after which the child should jump on the same stones in 
the same sequence. There were 14 sequences. The sequences recommended by Kessels, et 
al. (2000) were used. The first two sequences consisted of two blocks and were regarded as 
practice. The sequence of blocks increased by one per two sequences. The final sequence 
consisted of nine blocks. When two sequences were repeated incorrectly, the task was 
discontinued. For each correct response, one point was given. A response was correct when 
all blocks were tapped in the correct order. The maximum score was 12.
Verbal working memory. A word repetition task was used to measure verbal working 
memory (Verhoeven, Keuning, Horsels, & Van Boxtel, 2013). A total of 12 sequences of words 
were presented, after which the child repeated the words in the same order. The first two 
sequences consisted of two words. The length increased by one word every two sequences. 
The final item was a sequence of seven words. If four sequences were repeated incorrectly, 
the task was discontinued. For each correct response, one point was given. A response was 
correct when all words were repeated in the correct order. The maximum score was 12. The 
task was reliable, greatest lower bound (GLB) = .76 (Verhoeven, Keuning, & Van Boxtel, 2013).
Control.
Inhibition. To measure inhibition, the ‘Head Toes Knees and Shoulders’ task was used 
(Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews, & Morrison, 2009; Wanless, et al., 2011). The first 10 items 
consisted of touching one’s head and toes. The experimenter asked the child to touch his/her 
head or toes and the child’s task was to do the opposite. This continued in the second block, 
which also consisted of 10 items, but the child also touched his/her knees and shoulders. 
When the correct (opposite) response was produced, two points were scored. When the child 
corrected himself/herself, one point was scored. When the child produced the incorrect 
(requested) response, no points were scored. A total of 40 points could be scored. 
Scientific Reasoning Abilities in Kindergarten: 
Cognitive Factors in Experimentation and Evidence Evaluation
60
Card Sorting. A card sorting task was used to measure executive functions. The task 
was an adapted, paper version of the digital task by Van der Ven, Kroesbergen, Boom, and 
Leseman (2013). The task consisted of three blocks. Block 1 measured working memory, block 
2 measured inhibition, and block 3 measured cognitive flexibility. Children were instructed 
to sort cards. There were 20 cards with either blue or orange stars or squares. There were two 
stuffed animals, a dog and a hippo. The dog was introduced in the first block. He liked blue 
figures and disliked orange figures. The blue figures had to be placed in front of the dog and 
the orange figures had to be discarded in the trash bin. The cards were shuffled and given to 
the child. The child then placed the card either in front of the dog or in the trash bin. When 
the card was placed correctly, one point was scored. When all 20 cards were placed, the 
second block started. In the second block the hippo was introduced. The hippo liked stars 
and disliked squares. The procedure was the same as in the first block. Again 20 points could 
be scored. In the third block the child had to switch between sorting rules. The experimenter 
provided the cue about which animal should be focused on by asking “Does the dog/hippo 
want this card?” Then the child placed the card in front of the dog/hippo or in the trash bin. 
Again the 20 cards were shuffled before presenting them to the child. The order in which the 
dog and hippo had to be focused on was the same for everyone. This order was randomized 
and each animal was focused on 10 times. The maximum score per block was 20 and the 
maximum score in total was 60 correct.
Structure of the executive functions. The structure of the executive functions (EFs) was 
analyzed to determine the number of EF components. Each EF was measured verbally. 
The scores on the verbal working memory task, both blocks of the inhibition task, and 
the three blocks of the card sorting task were included in a principal component analysis 
(PCA). Oblimin rotation was used to improve the interpretability of the components. The 
PCA revealed two components with medium to high loadings, as revealed by the unique 
contributions in the pattern matrix (.43 –.79). The first component was labeled inhibition, 
because block 1 (M = 14.48, SD = 6.39) and block 2 (M = 10.00, SD = 6.95) of the inhibition task 
loaded on that component, as well as the second block of the card sorting task (M = 19.64, 
SD = 1.53). The second component was labeled verbal working memory, because the verbal 
working memory task (M = 4.07, SD = 1.20) loaded on that component as well as the first block 
of the card sorting task (M = 19.49, SD = 2.32). The block of the card sorting task that measured 
cognitive flexibility (M = 15.66, SD = 3.34) loaded on both factors. The cross-loading of 
cognitive flexibility was in line with Diamond’s (2013) proposition that cognitive flexibility 
builds upon working memory and inhibition. The first component, inhibition, explained 
37.36 % of the variance and the second component, verbal working memory, explained 19.43 % 
of the variance. The Pearson’s r correlation between the two components was not significant, 
r(94) = .17, p = .090. Given the loadings on the components, the component scores were 
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considered good indicators of inhibition and verbal working memory. These component 
scores were used for further analyses.
Spatial abilities.
Spatial visualization. The disks test was used to measure spatial visualization (Resing, et 
al., 2012). Pattern recognition, matching, speed in combination with accuracy, and hand-eye 
coordination were important aspects in this test. The children were asked to place 12 disks 
on a board with six different locations. The children were also instructed to work as fast 
and accurate as possible. There were six different types of disks and two disks of each type. 
Each type of disk fit only at one location on the board. The time the children needed to place 
all the disks on their correct locations was recorded with a stopwatch. When a disk was not 
correctly placed within 60 seconds, the experimenter paused the stopwatch and helped the 
child to place the disk. The time required to complete all 12 disks (measured in seconds) was 
the measure used for the analyses. The maximum amount of time spent on this task was 720 
seconds.
Language.
Vocabulary. Vocabulary was assessed using the verbal meaning test (Resing, et al., 2012). 
Words were read aloud by the experimenter. From four figures, the child then chose the one 
which resembled the word which she/he had just heard. When four of five consecutive items 
were answered incorrectly, the test was discontinued. There were 40 items. The score was the 
sum of correct responses. The test was reliable, Cronbach’s α = .91, Guttman’s λ2 = .92 (Resing, 
et al., 2012).
Grammar. To assess grammar, a sentence repetition task was used (Verhoeven, et al., 2013). 
A total of 12 spoken sentences were presented, after which the child repeated the sentence. 
The first and shortest sentence was: “The old man sits on the bench”. The sentences increased 
in length. When four sentences were repeated incorrectly, the task was discontinued. Two 
points were given for each sentence if it was repeated correctly, one point was given if one 
error was made, and no points were given if there were two or more errors. An error was 
made when words were omitted or added, when a word was inflected incorrectly, or when 
there was a deviation in the ordering of words. The maximum score was 24. Sentence 
repetition tasks, such as this one, often do rely on short-term memory to some extent, but 
it has been shown that performance also depends on conceptual representations, such as 
syntactic knowledge (Willis & Gathercole, 2001). In line with their experiments, we find a 
correlation of r(95) = .50, p < .001. This indicated that 25% of the variance in the grammar task 
was explained by verbal working memory. As the sentences were longer than the amount 
of words the children could retain in their working memory, the other 75% of the variance 
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was likely to be related to skills other than verbal working memory. Other studies have also 
found the link between sentence repetitions and knowledge of grammar (for a classical 
study with multiple age groups and multiple languages, see Gallimore & Tharp, 1981).
Procedure
The tests were administered individually in three sessions, which lasted 40 minutes on 
average. Per participant, testing was completed within 2 months. During each session, one 
or more tasks were administered. Tasks within a session were administered in a fixed order. 
The order of the sessions varied between schools. Data was collected individually at a quiet 
place in the school. Children were picked up from their classrooms. After every session, 
children were given a coloring page. Seven experimenters were involved and each child was 
tested by a single experimenter. 
Data Analysis
Multiple mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) was conducted to investigate the proposed 
mediation models. Mediation was analyzed using the process-plugin (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS 
19. Direct effects were tested using ordinary least squares regression, resulting in a t-test per 
effect. Indirect effects (i.e. mediation effects) were estimated with bootstrapping, because 
the indirect effect is rarely normal (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The number of samples used for 
bootstrapping was 50000. Confidence intervals of 95% were calculated for the indirect effect. 
The bias-correct and accelerated confidence intervals were used. Whenever the interval did 
not include zero, the mediator was regarded significant. Model fit was evaluated using the F 
statistic, and R-squared.
Results
The raw scores of the tasks were analyzed with the exception of the principal 
components, inhibition and verbal working memory. Table 3.2 provides an overview 
of the descriptive statistics and the correlations of the components of scientific 
reasoning, the executive functions (EFs), and the mediators. The EFs correlated with 
scientific reasoning, except for visuospatial working memory. Of the EFs, inhibition 
correlated with all three proposed mediators, which were grammar, vocabulary and 
spatial visualization, while verbal working memory correlated only with the verbal 
mediators of grammar and vocabulary. Visuospatial working memory did not correlate 
with any of the proposed mediators. The proposed mediators, in turn, did not relate to 
scientific reasoning, except for grammar. The two components of scientific reasoning, 
experimentation and evidence evaluation, did not correlate significantly, r(98) = .12, p = .222.
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Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s r Correlations of the Components of Scientific Reasoning, Executive Functions,  
and the Mediators.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Scientific reasoning
1 Experimentation 14.55 9.94 1
2 Evidence evaluation 3.45 2.29 .12 1
Executive functions
3 Inhibition 0 1 .23* .27** 1
4 Verbal WM 0 1 .18 .27** .18 1
5 Visuospatial WM 2.13 1.25 -.04 .10 .24* .07 1
Mediators
6 Spatial visualization 256.12 79.87 -.08 -.02 -.31** -.09 -.16 1
7 Grammar 7.49 4.37 .28** .46** .33** .50** .02 -.11 1
8 Vocabulary 26.45 6.05 .08 .06 .26* .38** .15 .21* -.10 1
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05. WM stands for working memory.
Second, the mediation models were tested. There were four models: one verbal  
and one spatial model of experimentation and one verbal and one spatial model of  
evidence evaluation.
Experimentation
The spatial model of experimentation was tested first. Visuospatial working memory 
and inhibition were the independent variables, and spatial visualization was the mediator. 
The relations between the variables in the spatial model were not significant, p > .05, except 
for the effect of inhibition on experimentation, both its total (c = 2.71, t(91) = 2.57, p = .0.12) as 
well as its direct effect (c’ = 2.62, t(90) = 2.38, p = .020) were significant. Direct effects control 
for the mediator(s) in the model. As a result of the non-significant effects, the mediation 
model was not significant (F(3, 90) = 2.26, p = .087, R2 = 0.07). The near significance of the 
model can be explained by the effect of inhibition.
The second mediation model of experimentation was the verbal model, see Figure 3.2. 
Verbal working memory and inhibition were the independent variables. First, the total 
effects were investigated. Verbal working memory did not relate to experimentation  
(c = 1.32, t(91) = 1.28, p = .210), but inhibition did (c = 2.20, t(91) = 2.12, p = .036). Both relations 
were partly explained by adding indirect effects through grammar, while indirect effects via 
vocabulary were not significant. This means that scores on verbal working memory  
(a = 2.06) and inhibition (a = 1.02) were positively related to scores on grammar and that 
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the scores on grammar were positively related to scores on experimentation (b = 0.50). The 
confidence interval of the indirect effect via grammar (ab = 0.51) was completely above 
zero (CI = [0.003, 1.453]). There was no evidence that verbal working memory influenced 
experimentation independent of its effect through grammar (c’ = 0.34, t(89) = 0.28, p = .780). 
The remaining direct effect of inhibition was also not significant (c’ = 1.74, t(89) = 1.59, p = .115).
Figure 3.2. Mediation model of executive functions, language measures, and experimentation. Total effects (i.e. c) are between 
brackets. F(4, 89) = 2.70, p = .035, R2 = 0.11. Note. * p < .05, † p < .10. 
Because verbal working memory did not directly relate to experimentation in 
the mediation model, it was investigated whether verbal working memory can affect 
experimentation through grammar, independent of inhibition being included in the model. 
The mediation analysis again revealed that the direct effect of verbal working memory was 
not significant (c = 1.74, t(93) = 1.68, p = .096), however, the indirect effect on experimentation 
through grammar was (ab = 1.38, CI = [0.099, 3.234]). Again, the indirect effect via vocabulary 
was not significant.
Evidence evaluation
Individual differences in evidence evaluation were also investigated in two models. The 
spatial mediation model of evidence evaluation consisted of the same variables as the spatial 
mediation model of experimentation. The relations between the variables in the spatial 
model were not significant, p > .05, except for the effect of inhibition on evidence evaluation, 
which was significant in both its total (c = 0.58, t(91) = 2.48, p = .015) and its direct effect  
(c’ = 0.65, t(90) = 2.64, p = .010). As a result, the mediation model was not significant  
(F(3, 90) = 2.63, p = .055, R2 = 0.08). The near significance of the model can be explained by the 
effect of inhibition.
The verbal mediation model is depicted in Figure 3.3. A similar pattern of results was 
discovered when compared with the verbal model of experimentation. Verbal working 
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Grammar
Vocabulary
Inhibition
Experimentation
0.50†
-0.03
0.34(1.32)
1.74(2.20*)
2.06*
1.02*
1.32*
1.40*
Scientific Reasoning Abilities in Kindergarten:  
Cognitive Factors in Experimentation and Evidence Evaluation
65
memory and inhibition positively related to evidence evaluation, (c = 0.54, t(91) = 2.42, p = .018 
and c = 0.50, t(91) = 2.21, p = .030, respectively). These total effects were mediated by grammar, 
but not by vocabulary. This means that scores on verbal working memory (a = 2.06) or 
inhibition (a = 1.02) positively related to scores on grammar. Scores on grammar, in turn, 
positively related to scores on evidence evaluation (b = 0.20). The confidence interval for the 
indirect effects (ab = 0.201) was above zero (CI = [0.066, 0.39]). There was no evidence that 
inhibition influenced evidence evaluation, independent of its effect through grammar  
(c’ = 0.33, t(89) = 1.47, p = .146). The remaining direct effect of verbal working memory on 
evidence evaluation was also not significant (c’ = 0.18, t(89) = 0.71, p = .482).
Figure 3.3. Mediation model of executive functions, language measures, and evidence evaluation. Total effects (i.e. c’) are between 
brackets. F(4, 89) = 6.70, p < .001, R2 = 0.23. Note. * p < .05, † p < .10. 
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate which individual differences are related 
to variation in scientific reasoning in kindergarten. Both variation in experimentation 
and evidence evaluation could be explained in verbal mediation models. In these verbal 
models, both inhibition and verbal working memory related to both experimentation and 
evidence evaluation. These relations were mediated by grammar, but not by vocabulary. In 
contrast, the spatial mediation models of both components of scientific reasoning were not 
significant.
The present study showed that the components of scientific reasoning were not related, 
which is commensurate with the theory. Experimentation and evidence evaluation were 
proposed as different core components (Klahr, 2000). The present results show that the two 
components do not correlate significantly. Although proposed as different components, 
Dunbar and Klahr (2012) acknowledge that similar abilities might be involved, such as 
induction and deduction. We found inhibition and verbal abilities, namely verbal working 
memory and grammar, to be involved in both components. However, it should be noted 
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that when questionnaires are used in a sample of slightly older children, namely 10-year-
old children (Mayer et al., 2014) or eight to 10-year-old children (Koerber, Mayer, Osterhaus, 
& Sodian, 2015), scientific reasoning emerges as a unitary construct. Whether the result 
differences are derived from the assessment and/or the age group used is a topic for further 
investigation. With reference to the multicomponent working memory model (Baddeley, 
2000), the verbal route, but not the spatial route, was involved in scientific reasoning. Also, 
executive control was needed, as indicated by the effect of inhibition on scientific reasoning.
The link between verbal abilities and scientific reasoning in kindergarten can be 
explained by the way young children use language. They induce ways to use language 
to structure their reasoning (Mercer, 2013). Verbalization also seems to aid the mental 
representation and comparison of the presented experiment and evidence. Language 
can enable analogies that allow for greater complexity of thought, given that linguistic 
representations can draw attention to similarities and differences across categories (Clark, 
2004).
The visuospatial component of working memory was not related to scientific reasoning. 
We hypothesized that the spatially presented information could be internally presented 
in a mental model through the visuospatial working memory. While this was found 
for nonverbal problems with spatial information (Huttenlocher et al., 1994), scientific 
reasoning seems to require more complex and abstract representations, which depend 
on a child’s linguistic abilities (Clark, 2004; Luria & Yudovich, 1966; Mercer, 2013). It also 
indicates that the relevant spatial information, such as the variables and their settings 
during experimentation and the evidence presented during evidence evaluation, 
was not represented in a mental model, but was rather verbalized through the verbal 
working memory (Baddeley, 2012). However, when stimuli are used that cannot be easily 
verbalized, it could be that visuospatial working memory is involved in scientific thinking. 
Its involvement has been demonstrated in the process of mechanical reasoning and 
engineering (Hegarty, 2004).
In contrast with visuospatial working memory, verbal working memory was indirectly 
involved in the process of experimentation and evidence evaluation via grammatical ability. 
With respect to experimentation, verbal working memory can aid in applying the correct 
strategy, i.e. CVS. The activation of CVS in working memory might have led the children 
to memorize CVS, because verbal working memory has a direct link to long-term memory 
(Baddeley, 2012). Another explanation for the involvement of verbal working memory is 
vocal self-instruction. Vocal self-instruction taps into verbal working memory (Baddeley, 
2012), and allows children to control their actions (Luria & Yudovich, 1966). With reference 
to evidence evaluation, the results suggest that verbalization of evidence aids mental 
representation (Luria & Yudovich, 1966) and comparison (Clark, 2004) of the evidence. This 
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seems to be so regardless whether the evidence contradicts or supports a hypothesis and the 
amount of evidence which might be verbalized. The evidence only had two dichotomous 
properties to be encoded, the cause (i.e. color of chewing gum) and the effect (i.e. good or bad 
teeth), and there were no more than ten pieces of evidence with the same cause and effect.
Just as language seems especially relevant at a young age, so does inhibition. The 
involvement of inhibition in scientific reasoning might be explained by the control it can 
exert, which consists of the deliberate impairment of an automatic response in order to 
exhibit a different behavior (Ponitz, McClelland, Jewkes, Connor, Farris, & Morrison, 2008), 
such as the rejection of intuitively derived misconceptions (Kwon & Lawson, 2000) during 
scientific reasoning or prior beliefs (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006).
Both verbal working memory and inhibition are part of the executive functions 
(Diamond, 2013). The present results suggest that, at kindergarten age, executive functions 
are relevant in acquiring new skills, such as scientific reasoning and grammar. This is in 
line with other studies that demonstrate the importance of executive functions in cognitive 
performance at a young age (Diamond, 2013). A secondary result was the structure of the 
executive functions. The executive functions, inhibition and cognitive flexibility, were 
assessed as a proxy of the central executive. The results showed that cognitive flexibility 
was inseparable from inhibition and working memory, given as it cross-loaded on those 
components, which is in line with other studies on young children’s EFs (e.g. Van der Ven, et 
al., 2013). The structure of the EFs has been shown to change with age. Cognitive flexibility 
emerges later as a component when the underlying structure of the EFs is analyzed (Senn, 
Espy, & Kaufman, 2004).
The other spatial ability that was investigated was spatial visualization. The present 
results showed that spatial visualization was not related to experimentation or evidence 
evaluation. While for evidence evaluation, the process did not involve active manipulation 
of spatial information, experimentation did require the hands-on manipulation of variables 
to design an experiment. However, during experimentation, the problem was creating a 
design in accordance with CVS, and not how to manipulate spatial information mentally 
to solve a problem, such as the hidden figures or paper folding tasks (Linn & Petersen, 
1985). The absence of relations with spatial abilities runs contrary to the study by Mayer 
et al. (2014). They showed that mental rotation was related to children’s performance 
on a scientific reasoning questionnaire. Their explanation was that “spatial thinking 
is important for representing ideas about relationships mentally, schematically and 
graphically in graphs and diagrams” (p. 49). The difference in the present study is the task 
that was used to assess scientific reasoning. While Mayer et al. (2014) included schematically 
and graphically presented information, we did not, which could explain the difference in 
how spatial abilities are involved. Because of this, different spatial abilities appear to relate 
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differently to different types of assessment of scientific reasoning. The results of Branoff 
and Dobelis (2012) support this notion. They showed that spatial perception relates to scores 
on a 3D-modeling test used with university students.
The only verbal ability that was not significantly related to scientific reasoning was 
vocabulary. Vocabulary was one of the verbal abilities suggested to be involved in scientific 
reasoning, because vocabulary predicted performance on a CVS measure (Wagensveld, 
et al., 2014). Since this was true for the instruction group and not the discovery group 
in that study, it is likely that vocabulary is involved in the acquisition of new scientific 
concepts (Snow, 2010). A key difference with the present study is that scientific reasoning, 
as measured in the present study, does not involve the acquisition of new words or 
concepts. Also, vocabulary might be differently related to scientific reasoning than to 
scientific knowledge. Scientific reasoning is required in scientific discourse, which, if done 
correctly, is a process that results in scientific knowledge (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). Therefore, 
vocabulary might relate to science learning through instruction as well as to scientific 
knowledge, but not to the process of scientific discourse.
Grammatical ability was the second component of the verbal route that related to 
scientific reasoning, besides verbal working memory. The effects of inhibition and verbal 
working memory on scientific reasoning were mediated by grammar. Its involvement in 
both components of scientific reasoning can be explained by an underlying mechanism, 
which grammar is suggested to share with other cognitions (Jackendoff, 2002). Grammar 
is recursive and is a transitional layer between phonology and semantics, and vice versa 
(Jackendoff, 2002). Recursion and transition can also be found in the process of scientific 
reasoning. Another explanation for grammar’s involvement in scientific reasoning is that as 
a syntactic unifier it combines pieces of stored in memory (Hagoort, 2013). Both the research 
question and CVS should be used to correctly design a multivariable experiment. For 
evidence evaluation, the evidence should be combined with the rules of evaluation, so that 
the correct conclusion can be drawn. The present study is not the first to show grammar’s 
involvement in science education. In 5 to 6-year-old children, grammar has also been related 
to logical operations in the domain of mathematics, which consisted of comparing, linking, 
and arranging items based on their quantity (Kleemans, Segers, & Verhoeven, 2011).
The present study is limited in its lack of causality. Causality was implied, because 
mediation was analyzed. Although the order of the variables was supported by previous 
studies, we cannot claim causality. This could be resolved with a longitudinal study, 
which can confirm whether the executive functions are the building blocks for young 
children’s scientific reasoning and whether grammar mediates this effect. A restriction 
of the models was that the cognitive factors included were only able to explain 11% of the 
variance in experimentation and 23% of the variance in evidence evaluation. The explained 
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variance could have been greater if more cognitive factors had been included. Other factors 
that could be involved in scientific reasoning are spatial perception (Branoff and Dobelis, 
2012), explorative behavior (Van Schijndel & Raijmakers, 2015), false-belief understanding 
and theory of mind (Astington, Pelletier, & Homer, 2002; Piekny, Grube, & Maehler, 2013), 
abductive reasoning (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012), and developing explanations (Koslowski, 
Marasia, Chelenza, & Dublin, 2008). Another limitation is that scientific reasoning 
was limited to two tasks, which measured two core components of scientific reasoning. 
Experimentation can also be assessed using CVS in combination with various other 
materials (Chen & Klahr, 1999). Another approach to assess experimentation is to ask the 
children to find out which variable affects the oscillation frequency of a pendulum (Inhelder 
& Piaget, 1958; Siegler, Liebert & Liebert, 1973), or to study interacting variables (Kuhn, 
Ramsey, & Arvidsson, 2015). Evidence evaluation can also be assessed by the quality of 
children’s epistemic reasoning (Metz, 2011). Hypothesis generation is a component that was 
not assessed, but for which a task might be developed, that kindergartners could perform. 
Besides these three core components, various other processes are involved in science, such as 
developing explanations and solutions (Osborne, 2013).
Given the role of grammatical ability in scientific reasoning, it can be investigated 
more specifically how grammar is involved and if other types of grammar are also related 
to scientific reasoning. Hagoort (2005) distinguishes three types of grammar: syntactic, 
semantic, and phonological unification, which all concern the combination and integration 
of information. The result showing that grammar is involved in scientific reasoning 
suggests that syntactic unification is involved in the process of scientific discourse. Two 
implications for science education can be formulated based on the present results. First, 
teachers can experience difficulties in incorporating science activities into the curriculum 
for various reasons (Van Aalderen-Smeets, Walma van der Molen, & Asma, 2011). The 
suggestion is based on the relations of mostly verbal skills to scientific reasoning. It is 
possible that education activities involving scientific reasoning and language fostering 
can be combined. An example of what teachers might do is asking children to verbalize 
the strategy that they use in designing experiments. This activity requires the children to 
formulate their mental representation of an experiment, which taps into the mechanism 
that grammar does as well. During such activities, the teacher can teach certain words and 
concepts involved in the process of scientific discourse, such as “what is experimenting?” 
and concepts involved in the scientific domain, such as “what causes the ball to go slower 
downhill on the slope with a rough surface compared to the smooth surface (friction)?”. 
It has already been shown that preschoolers acquire a larger scientific vocabulary when 
participating in a training, intervention, or particular technique for teaching science in 
order to promote vocabulary learning compared to control (see Guo, Wang, Hall, Breit-
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Smith, & Busch, 2015 for a review). Second, kindergartners show the ability to participate 
in scientific discourse. It can be profitable for science education to start in kindergarten, 
because young children are curious (Engel, 2009). Scientific reasoning is essential to 21st 
century skills, which modern education seeks to train (Fischer et al., 2014; Osborne, 2013). 
Children can independently master scientific concepts if they use their scientific reasoning 
correctly in the process of scientific discourse (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012).
To conclude, inhibition and verbal working memory were related to two components of 
scientific reasoning, namely experimentation and evidence evaluation. These relations were 
mediated by grammar. The present results highlight the importance of verbal abilities in 
explaining individual differences in scientific reasoning in kindergarten.
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Abstract
—
The present study examined the individual differences in the development of scientific 
thinking . Scientific thinking was conceptualized as scientific reasoning (experimentation 
and evidence evaluation) and domain knowledge. One hundred kindergartners were 
assessed two times in senior kindergarten (T1 and T2). To explain individual differences, 
executive functions and linguistic abilities (grammar and vocabulary) were assessed 
in junior kindergarten (T0). The executive functions predicted linguistic abilities, 
which in turn predicted scientific thinking at both assessments in senior kindergarten. 
The kindergartners grew in scientific thinking with evidence evaluation predicting 
the growth in domain knowledge and executive functions predicting the growth in 
evidence evaluation. These results showed that evidence evaluation is important to 
acquire domain knowledge. Also linguistic abilities predict scientific thinking. It is 
recommended that in early science education language should be taught in concurrence 
with scientific thinking in order to structure children’s thoughts and guide their actions.
Key words: scientific thinking, individual differences, longitudinal/development, kindergarten
Highlights:
• Children grew in scientific thinking during kindergartner
• Evidence evaluation predicted the acquisition of domain knowledge
•  Executive functions and linguistic abilities explained 
individual variation in scientific thinking
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Individual Differences 
in the Development of 
Scientific Thinking in 
Kindergarten
The primary goal of science education is to teach children to think scientifically, which 
includes domain-general reasoning processes and domain-specific content knowledge 
(Klahr, Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011). Domain-general reasoning processes consist of three 
core components: hypothesis generation, experimentation, and evidence evaluation (Klahr, 
2000). Domain-specific content knowledge includes knowledge about domain-specific 
topics, such as physics and mathematics (Klahr, et al., 2011). One of the key attributes of 
science education is the ability to generate and test hypotheses (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). 
Hypotheses can be tested by designing and conducting experiments, and subsequently 
evaluating the evidence to draw conclusions. In science education, the instructional method 
is often to have children gain knowledge about scientific domains via scientific inquiry 
(Zimmerman, 2007), but this is only feasible when children know how to generate and test 
hypotheses (National Research Council, 2012). It has recently been shown that children as 
young as 4 to 6 years old (i.e., kindergartners) already can design unconfounded experiments 
with multiple variables (Van der Graaf, Segers, & Verhoeven, 2015) and are able to evaluate 
various types of evidence (Piekny, Grube, & Maehler, 2014). Concerning individual 
differences, executive functions and linguistic abilities appear to predict experimentation 
and evidence evaluation in kindergartners (Van der Graaf, Segers, & Verhoeven, 2016). 
Furthermore, young children’s experimentation abilities (age 6 to 13) predict their domain 
knowledge about floating and sinking after a teacher-guided, inquiry-based intervention 
(Edelsbrunner, Schalk, Schumacher, & Stern, 2015). A similar role of evidence evaluation 
in predicting domain knowledge has not been evidenced yet. Furthermore, a longitudinal 
perspective on the individual variation in the development of scientific thinking in 
kindergarten is missing. In the present study, we therefore followed a cohort of 100 
kindergartners across a period of two years, in an attempt to model the developmental 
path to scientific reasoning and domain knowledge, while taking into account individual 
differences in cognitive and linguistic ability.
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Development of scientific reasoning and domain knowledge
Scientific reasoning consists of three core components: hypothesis generation, 
experimentation, and evidence evaluation (Klahr, 2000). These components have been 
studied in children throughout primary and secondary school (see Zimmerman, 2007 for 
a review). The developmental perspective in Zimmerman’s review is derived from cross-
sectional studies with only few studies investigating scientific reasoning abilities in 
children at kindergarten age. After the 2007 review, little research on scientific reasoning 
has been conducted, and it is mostly aimed at older children, such as the development from 9 
to 13 years (Kuhn & Pease, 2008). 
With respect to the first component of scientific reasoning, hypothesis generation, 
Zimmerman (2007) concluded that 10-year-olds often conduct experiments without explicit 
hypotheses, in contrast to 12-14-year-olds. Recently, kindergartners’ ability to generate 
hypotheses was examined (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). It was found that these young children 
were not able to generate hypotheses in accordance with accumulating evidence that was 
presented. In addition, their performance did not increase from the first (age 4-5 years) to 
the second year (age 5-6 years) of kindergarten. Another cross-sectional study did show 
that there is improvement from kindergarten to first grade (age 6-7 years) on a question 
generation task (Jirout & Klahr, 2015, as cited in Jirout & Zimmerman, 2015). There was an 
improvement in recognizing what is unknown and generating a question to request  
that information.
Regarding the second component of scientific reasoning, experimentation, it has been 
shown that children aged 10 to 12 years old search less for possible experiments and produce 
less informative experiments than adults (Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Schauble, 1996). To 
produce an informative experiment, one variable needs to be studied at a time. When there 
are multiple variables, the Control of Variables Strategy (CVS) has to be applied. The CVS 
states that to investigate a single variable, one should design an experiment that controls all 
other variables, while manipulating the variable that is under investigation (Chen & Klahr, 
1999). It has been found that children aged 10 years and older show understanding of the CVS 
and they can learn to use it more often (Chen & Klahr, 1999). Zimmerman (2007) notes that 
the CVS is slowly incorporated into the set of experimentation strategies as children become 
dissatisfied with the ambiguous evidence produced from non-informative experiments. 
This means that multiple experimentation strategies can coexist at one time. Recently, it has 
been shown that also kindergartners can understand the CVS (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015). In 
this study, a dynamic assessment was used that consisted of providing feedback after each 
experiment based on the kindergartner’s performance, so that they could learn during this 
task. The kindergartners were challenged to design an experiment with up to four different 
dichotomous variables in order to determine the effect of one of the variables. Almost half of 
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the kindergartners designed experiments with three different variables correctly, indicating 
that they knew how to apply the CVS to design experiments. The difference in performance 
between junior and senior kindergarten in experimentation abilities, however, was large, 
which suggests that the children develop their experimentation skills in kindergarten. A 
longitudinal study of experimentation and evidence evaluation abilities indeed showed that 
these abilities improve in kindergarten (Piekny, et al., 2014). Experimentation abilities were 
measured by asking the kindergartners about a single, dichotomous variable. The results 
revealed that kindergartners had problems choosing the correct setting in an experimental 
context, as their performance was around chance level at three points of measurement 
throughout kindergarten. 
The final core component of scientific reasoning is evidence evaluation. Piekny and 
colleagues (2014) measured kindergartners’ ability to evaluate various types of evidence. The 
evidence consisted of cards with a picture of a child on it. The child had either good or bad 
teeth, and was holding one of two colors of chewing gum. Multiple cards were presented to 
the kindergartners. The evidence could be conclusive (all cards point in the same direction), 
suggestive (most cards point in one direction) or inconclusive (when a conclusion cannot be 
drawn). The kindergartners’ performance indicated that they understood how to evaluate 
the various types of evidence. The performance also increased when the children got older. 
Only the inconclusive evidence appeared difficult to evaluate, because even at the end of 
kindergarten, performance was around chance level. While Piekny and colleagues (2014) 
followed the kindergartners longitudinally, associations between experimentation and 
evidence evaluation abilities were not reported.
With respect to domain knowledge, various topics are introduced in kindergarten. 
Four domains appear to be common in early childhood education as these were the topic 
of scientific research: plants and growth (Hickling & Gelman, 1995), floating and sinking 
(Hadzigeorgiou, 2015), sun and shadows (Chen, 2009), and paper planes (Guzey, Tank, Wang, 
Roehrig, & Moore, 2014). Kindergartners know that natural mechanisms underlie the 
growth of seeds and plants (Hickling & Gelman, 1995). They can also explain why objects 
float or sink based on the objects properties, such as weight, size, and material, but they have 
only an intuitive idea of density, which is needed to fully understand floating and sinking 
(Hadzigeorgiou, 2015). They can identify the moon and the sun and know what planets are 
(Vosniadou, 1991). Kindergartners also understand how to create shadows and most five-
year-olds could predict shadows and their orientation correctly (Chen, 2009). They can also 
learn this in an exploratory way during a museum visit (Van Schijndel & Raijmakers, 2015). 
Young children can also identify variables that affect how straight a paper plane can fly 
(Guzey, et al., 2014). 
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Associations between scientific reasoning and domain knowledge
An important issue in science education is the co-development of domain-general 
scientific reasoning skills and domain-specific knowledge (Klahr, et al., 2011). There can 
be associations between the core components of scientific reasoning, i.e. hypothesis 
generation, experimentation, and evidence evaluation, and those core components may 
relate to domain knowledge. Concerning the core components of scientific reasoning, 
experimentation and evidence evaluation appear to be unrelated in kindergarten (Van der 
Graaf, et al., 2016). However, in another study scientific reasoning was found to be a unitary 
construct (Koerber, Mayer, Osterhaus, Schwippert, & Sodian, 2015). This latter study was 
conducted in an older age group (eight to 10-year-old children) and the authors used a 
questionnaire to measure scientific reasoning. 
With regard to the relations of scientific reasoning with domain knowledge, scientific 
reasoning can be applied in order to acquire domain-specific knowledge (Zimmerman, 
2007). A recent study investigated this assumption that scientific reasoning is applied to 
acquire scientific knowledge in a sample of six to 13 years old children (Edelsbrunner, et al., 
2015). Edelsbrunner and colleagues used a questionnaire to assess experimentation skills 
(i.e., CVS). In the study, the children were assessed on their knowledge about the floating 
ability of objects in water, before and after instruction. The instruction was teacher-guided 
and inquiry-based and it consisted of 15 lessons. The authors found that the experimentation 
skills predicted the proficiency and consistency of children’s knowledge about floating and 
sinking (Edelsbrunner, et al., 2015).
The other way around is that domain knowledge could affect the quality of scientific 
reasoning. One consistent finding is that children bring their own ideas and preconceptions 
to the scientific activities. The instruction of how to use an object limited kindergartners’ 
explorations of possible other functions of the object compared to naïve instruction or 
baseline (Bonawitz, et al., 2011). Children, aged around 11 years old, showed a tendency to 
investigate the variables that were most consistent with their prior beliefs compared to 
adults (Schauble, 1996). This tendency has been shown to decrease from 10-years to 12-years-
old, and even more so in 14-years-olds (Penner & Klahr, 1996). Because prior knowledge can 
affect scientific reasoning in different ways for different children, it is difficult to identify 
the effect of domain knowledge on scientific reasoning. As scientific reasoning is seen as a 
domain-general ability, which could affect domain knowledge acquisition, regardless of the 
domain, different domains should be used for investigating this effect. When the  
knowledge domain is different from the domain in which an experiment is carried out, the 
prior beliefs or preconceptions from the knowledge domain probably will not affect the 
scientific discourse.
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Individual differences in experimentation, evidence evaluation,  
and domain knowledge
One final issue is the individual variation in scientific reasoning and domain knowledge. 
It has been shown that executive functions, grammar and vocabulary relate to both 
experimentation and evidence evaluation in kindergarten (Van der Graaf, et al., 2016). 
The effects of executive functions were indirect via grammatical abilities. In a similar 
vein, studies with older children showed the involvement of verbal reasoning, reading 
comprehension, and vocabulary in experimentation (Wagensveld, Segers, Kleemans, & 
Verhoeven, 2014., 2014) and the relation of inhibitory control, problem-solving, and spatial 
abilities to performance in a questionnaire tapping into all core components of scientific 
reasoning (Mayer, Sodian, Koerber, & Schwippert, 2014).
With respect to domain knowledge, there have been studies on individual differences. 
However, domain knowledge concerns knowledge about specialized disciplines, which 
can range from astronomy to arts. Therefore, it is hard to identify what factors explain 
performance in domain knowledge tasks Verbal abilities, however, are also relevant in 
domain knowledge, as it relates to knowledge of biology, physics, and technology in 
undergraduates (Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999). 
Present study
To sum up, longitudinal studies on scientific reasoning have been performed, but not at 
kindergarten age. There is one exception (Piekny, et al., 2014) that studied experimentation 
and evidence evaluation abilities. Hypothesis generation was the only core component that 
was not studied, as it is very hard for kindergartners to do (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). Piekny 
and colleagues (2014) did not assess usage of CVS, as their assessment of experimentation 
included a single, dichotomous variable. A longitudinal study of understanding of the 
CVS, as an experimental ability, in kindergarten is yet to be conducted. In addition, 
the associations between experimentation and evidence evaluation abilities were not 
studied during development. It can be assumed that the domain knowledge of children in 
kindergarten accumulates as they grow older. Vosniadou (1991) concluded that the process 
of knowledge acquisition is gradual, but she also noted that this conclusion is mostly based 
on cross-sectional studies, and that a longitudinal study on the development of domain 
knowledge in kindergarten is missing. While understanding of the CVS can stimulate the 
acquisition of domain knowledge (Edelsbrunner, et al., 2015), it is yet unclear what the effect 
of evidence evaluation is on domain knowledge acquisition, how domain knowledge might 
stimulate development of experimentation and/or evidence evaluation., how the individual 
variation in development can be explained. Associations between the core components 
of scientific reasoning are also possible, and scientific reasoning might be considered as a 
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unitary construct. It remains to be investigated whether age has an effect on the structure of 
scientific reasoning in kindergarten. 
In the present study the two core components of scientific reasoning, experimentation 
and evidence evaluation, as well as scientific domain knowledge were investigated in Dutch 
kindergarten, while individual differences in executive functioning and linguistic ability 
were taken into account. Three research questions were addressed in the present study:
1. What is the growth of experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain 
knowledge in kindergarten?
2. How do experimentation and evidence evaluation, as core components of scientific 
reasoning, relate to each other and to domain knowledge?
3. To what extent can individual differences in experimentation, evidence evaluation, 
domain-specific knowledge, and their development be explained by executive 
functions, grammar, and vocabulary?
In order to answer these questions, experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain 
knowledge were assessed twice: halfway and at the end of senior kindergarten. Also 
predictive factors were assessed prior to these measurements in junior kindergarten, so that 
their causal relations with the various aspects of scientific thinking could be examined. 
Method
Participants
One-hundred kindergartners from 12 classes of four elementary schools participated in 
this study. They were tested three times during kindergarten, which is a two-year-program 
before formal education starts in the Netherlands. Predictor measures were taken when the 
children were halfway their first year of kindergarten and their age was 4 years and 6 months 
on average, with an SD of 3.46 months (see Authors, 2016). Scientific reasoning and domain 
knowledge were assessed twice in the second year of kindergarten: halfway the school year, 
and at the end of the second year of kindergarten. Parents and/or caretakers were approached 
via the schools and they were informed about the present research. Children participated 
when their parents did not object.
Most schools in the Netherlands are increasingly supporting STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) education (Techniekpact [Technology Pact], 
2016). One of the schools participated in an intervention carried out to improve scientific 
reasoning and domain knowledge. However, as the other schools turned out to have 
a rather strong STEM curriculum as well, there were no effects of the intervention on 
experimentations, evidence evaluation, or domain knowledge (all p’s > .100). We therefore 
collapsed the data in the analysis for the current study.
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Materials
Scientific reasoning.
Experimentation. Experimentation abilities were assessed using two wooden ramps, 
which each had four different dichotomous variables (cf. Chen & Klahr, 1999). The ramps 
consisted of a slope, which continued in a flat area with bumps that was used to slow down 
the ball. The kindergartners could use these two ramps to design experiments. Their task 
was to investigate one of the variables. The variables were the steepness of the slope (steep/
less steep), the starting position of the ball on the slope (high/low), the surface of the slope 
(rough/smooth), and the mass of the ball (large/small).
At time 1, only correctional feedback was provided to the kindergartners, while at time 
2, also feedback on their performance was given in order to be able to also assess the zone 
of proximal development (following Van der Graaf et al., 2015). The procedures shared the 
gradual built-up in difficulty. Kindergartners started at Level 1 and they proceeded to the 
next level when their performance was good. There were four experiments per level, each 
investigating a different variable. The kindergartners were given a second try when the first 
try of an experiment was incorrect. Although it was not stated explicitly that the answer 
was incorrect, the feedback was regarded correctional, because only when the first try was 
incorrect, a second try was given. The kindergartners advanced to the next level when they 
designed at least one experiment correctly. At Level 1, the kindergartners were allowed to set 
one variable, at Level 2, two variables, at Level 3 three, and at Level 4 all four variables. This 
resulted in a maximum of 16 experiments.
Evidence evaluation. We used the chewing gum task (Koerber, Sodian, Thoermer, & Nett, 
2005) to measure kindergartners’ evidence evaluation abilities. The materials consisted 
of various cards with children printed on them who held a chewing gum in their hand, 
which could be one of two colors. The children on the cards had either good or bad teeth. 
The kindergartners were asked which color of chewing gum causes bad teeth based on 
the cards presented to them. Rather than asking the kindergartners directly, two stuffed 
animals were presented, Leon and Martin. First, the kindergartners were told that one 
stuffed animal was named Leon and that he thinks that one color of chewing gum causes 
bad teeth, namely green chewing gum. The first question was about what Leon believes: 
which color of chewing causes bad teeth. When the kindergartners did not answer “green’, 
Leon’s believe was explained up to three times. If the kindergartners still did not answer the 
question correctly, testing was discontinued. Next, cards were presented. The evidence was 
conclusive, in that all cards pointed to the conclusion that red but not green chewing gum 
causes bad teeth. The second question was “What do you think, what does Leon believe now, 
when he looks carefully at these cards? What does Leon think, which color chewing gum 
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causes bad teeth?”. The third question was to recall what Leon originally thought. When 
one or both of these questions were answered incorrectly, testing was discontinued. When 
testing continued, the kindergartners were asked five more questions based on different 
evidence. Three questions about partial evidence were alternated with one question about 
conclusive evidence and one question about inconclusive evidence. When the evidence 
was partial, 16 out of the 20 cards pointed towards one conclusion. When the evidence was 
inconclusive, four cards pointed to one conclusion and four cards pointed to a different 
conclusion. This resulted in eight questions in total. One point was given per correct answer, 
which resulted in a maximum of eight correct.
Domain knowledge. A booklet was designed to measure domain-specific knowledge. Four 
domains were identified: 1) plants and growth, 2) floating and sinking, 3) sun and shadows, 
and 4) paper planes. The task consisted of 40 questions, which required children to name 
(parts of) objects. A figure of an object was shown to the children and a question was read 
out loud by the experimenter. An example is a picture of an airplane with a highlighted 
wing. The question was: “How do you call this part of the plane?”. The experimenter pointed 
out the wing when the question was formulated. Next 22 questions were asked, which 
required children to apply their knowledge. The items consisted of three graphical response 
options. An example was a picture of a small raft, a medium sized raft, and a large raft. The 
experimenter told that they wanted to sail with a lot of people. The question was: “Which 
raft will float the best?”. There were 62 items in total, one point was given for each correct 
answer. Both measurements of the domain knowledge were used to analyze the reliability. 
The questionnaire was reliable, Cronbach α = .66, and Guttman’s λ2 = .69 for time 1 and 
Cronbach α = .70, and Guttman’s λ2 = .73 for time 2.
Executive functions.
Verbal working memory. Verbal working memory was assessed using a word-repetition 
task (Verhoeven, Keuning, Horsels, & Van Boxtel, 2013). Sequences of words were read out 
loud by the experimenter. The child had to reproduce the words in the same order. The task 
started with two sequences of two words. The length of the sequence increased with one 
word per two sequences. The task ended with two sequences of seven words. Testing stopped 
when four consecutive sequences were reproduced incorrectly. The response was correct 
when the words were reproduced in the correct order. There were 12 items in total and one 
point could be scored per correct response.
Inhibition. The Head Toes Knees and Shoulders task measured inhibition (Ponitz, 
McClelland, Matthews, & Morrison, 2008). The kindergartner was asked to touch his/
her head or ties, but their task was to produce the opposite response. There were 10 such 
questions in the first block. Then, the knees and shoulders were introduced. There were 10 
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more questions about touching one’s head, toes, knees, and shoulders in the second block. It 
was still the kindergartner’s task to produce the opposite response. This resulted in 20 items 
in total. A maximum of 2 points could be scored per item, namely when the correct response 
was produced. When the kindergartner corrected his/her own action, one point was scored. 
When the incorrect (requested) response was produced, no points were given.
Card sorting. The card sorting task was designed to measure all three core components of 
the executive functions, i.e. working memory, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility (Van der 
Ven, Kroesbergen, Boom, & Leseman, 2013). We used an adapted, paper version of this digital 
task. The materials were 20 cards with stars or squares, either blue or orange, on them, and 
two stuffed animals, a dog and a hippo. The first block measured working memory. The 
kindergartners were told that the dog liked blue figures and disliked orange figures. The task 
for the kindergartner was to place the blue figures in front of the dog and the orange figures 
in a small trash bin. The second block measured inhibition, because now the sorting rule 
was changed. The task was to provide the hippo with stars and to place the squares in the 
trash bin. The third block measured cognitive flexibility, because both sorting rules were 
used in this block. The experimenter told the children when to focus on the dog and when 
on the hippo. The order of on which animal to focus was the same for everyone. This order 
was predetermined to be random. The task was to provide the dog with blue figures, while 
throwing the orange figures away, when the focus was on the dog. When the focus was on the 
hippo, the squares were put in the trash bin and the stars were given to the hippo. Each block 
had 20 items and the cards were shuffled before each block. An item was scored as correct 
when the kindergartner placed the card in the correct location, based on the sorting rule. 
The kindergartners could score 20 points per block and 60 points in total.
Language.
Grammar. A sentence repetition task was used to measure grammatical abilities 
(Verhoeven, et al., 2013). The experimenter read a sentence out loud and the kindergartner 
had to repeat the sentence. There were 12 sentences that increased in length. Testing was 
discontinued when four consecutive sentences were reproduced incorrectly. Per sentence 
two points could be scored when the sentence was reproduced correctly. When one error 
was made in a sentence, one point was given. When two or more errors were made, no points 
were given. Errors could be incorrect inflections, adding or omitting words, and an incorrect 
ordering of the words. A total of 24 points could be scored.
Vocabulary. The verbal meaning task was used to measure vocabulary (Resing, 
Bleichrodt, Drenth, & Zaal, 2012). The kindergartner was instructed to point out one of 
four figures, which depicted the word that was read out loud by the experimenter. The task 
stopped when four out of five consecutive items were answered incorrectly. An incorrect 
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response would be pointing to a figure that did not resemble the presented word. The task 
consisted of 40 items in total.
Procedure
The first assessment (time 0) consisted of the predictor measures in junior kindergarten; 
next experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain knowledge were assessed two times 
in senior kindergarten. The predictor measures were obtained in two sessions, each lasting 
30 minutes on average. The first measurement of experimentation, evidence evaluation, and 
domain knowledge was regarded as time 1, and the second measurement of those abilities 
as time 2. These measurements were done in two sessions of approximately 30 minutes. 
The predictors at time 0 were obtained 11 months prior to the first assessment of scientific 
thinking (time 1). The second assessment of scientific thinking (time 2) took place 4.5 
months after time 1. All sessions had a fixed order of tasks. All assessments were conducted 
at a quiet place inside the school.
Data Analysis
For executive functioning component scores were used, as an EFA revealed two 
underlying components: inhibition and verbal working memory (see Authors, 2016). For all 
other measures, the raw scores were entered into the SEM analysis.
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to analyze the data in R (R core team, 
2016) using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). The parameters of the model were estimated 
using the method of maximum likelihood. Some data was missing, which was due to one 
of the sessions that the kindergartners did not perform. There were no further indications 
of patterning in the missing data. Therefore, missing values were imputed using the Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure.
The SEM analysis can imply indirect effects. These indirect effects were tested explicitly 
by calculating the product of the involved paths. Indirect effects often are not normally 
distributed (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Therefore, to evaluate the significance, the p-values 
were calculated based on a bootstrapped SE (10,000 bootstrap samples). When we do not 
bootstrap the SE, the relevant mediation effects were also significant.
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Results
Development of Experimentation, Evidence Evaluation,  
and Domain Knowledge
Regarding the development of experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain 
knowledge, we first conducted paired samples t-tests. These showed that children improved 
on all scores: experimentation, t(92) = 10.64, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.34, evidence evaluation, 
t(91) = 2.18, p = .032, Cohen’s d = 0.27, and domain-specific knowledge, t(83) = 8.18, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.73. The large increase of the experimentation score, see Table 4.1, was due to 
the feedback that was given at the final measurement. The kindergartners showed a small to 
medium increase (Cohen, 1988) on the other scores.
Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Between Experimentation, Evidence Evaluation, Domain Knowledge,  
and the Predictor Measures.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Scientific reasoning
1 Experimentation 1 12.90 8.90 1
2 Experimentation 2 28.15 13.42 .29** 1
3 Evidence evaluation 1 4.61 2.41 .24* .29** 1
4 Evidence evaluation 2 5.25 2.37 .10 .25* .30** 1
Domain knowledge
5 Domain knowledge 1 32.47 5.06 -.06 .25* .26* .26* 1
6 Domain knowledge 2 36.15 5.15 -.01 .20† .37** .37** .67** 1
Predictors
7 Inhibition 0 1 -.09 .15 .18† .30** .24* .22† 1
8 Verbal WM 0 1 -.08 .14 .15 .32** .20† .23* .17† 1
9 Grammar 7.49 4.37 .02 .32** .26** .27* .32** .30** .33** .50** 1
10 Vocabulary 26.45 6.05 -.01 .31** .18† .23* .20† .14 .26* .28** .21* 1
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10. WM: working memory.
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Associations Between Experimentation, Evidence Evaluation,  
and Domain Knowledge
To address the second research question, a SEM model was built with experimentation 
and evidence evaluation, as measures of scientific reasoning, and the measure of domain-
specific knowledge at Times 1 and 2. First, paths were specified between the subsequent 
measures of the same construct. Second, the variables at Time 1 were allowed to covary. 
Finally, additional paths were specified based on the correlations, see Table 4.1.  
This resulted in a good-fitting model, χ2 (6, N = 96) = 6.97, p = .324, CFI = 0.990, RMSEA = .041, 
SRMR = .039, see Figure 4.1. The completely standardized path coefficients are presented.
Figure 4.1. SEM model of scientific reasoning, experimentation and evidence evaluation, and domain-specific knowledge  
(solid black border). Note. The dashed line represents a non-significant path. ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10.
Individual Differences in Scientific Reasoning, Domain Knowledge  
and Their Development
With respect to the third research question, additional variables were added to the model 
as predictors of performance at Times 1 and 2. Paths were added based on the correlations. 
Whenever, the significance of a path was above a p-value of .10, the path was omitted, 
including the paths from the previous model. The predictors were allowed to correlate. This 
resulted in the model depicted in Figure 4.2. It was a good-fitting model, χ2 (29, N = 100) = 
22.44, p = .802, CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.064, RMSEA < .001, SRMR = .076. We also tested mediation 
effects in this model. The combined effect of verbal working memory via grammar on 
evidence evaluation at Time 1 was significant, ab = .182, p = .016, as well as on domain 
knowledge at Time 1, ab = .226, p = .005, and experimentation at Time 2, ab = .203, p =.009. 
Experimentation T1 Experimentation T2
Evidence evaluation T1 Evidence evaluation T2
Domain knowledge T1 Domain knowledge T2
.26*
.27*
.25**
.17†
.26*
.20*
.21*
.23**
.61**
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Figure 4.2. SEM model of scientific reasoning, experimentation and evidence evaluation, domain-specific knowledge (solid black 
border), and their predictors. Note. The covariance between experimentation T1 and evidence evaluation T1 (.262, p = .012) and 
between evidence evaluation T1 and domain knowledge T1 (.208, p = .042) were still in the model, but they were omitted from the 
figure. ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10. WM stands for working memory.
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Discussion
The goal of the present study was threefold: 1) to investigate the development of 
scientific reasoning (experimentation and evidence evaluation) and domain knowledge, 
2) to study how experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain knowledge associate 
during development, and 3) to study individual differences in experimentation, evidence 
evaluation, domain knowledge, and their development in kindergarten. In a half-year 
period, the kindergartners improved on experimentation, evidence evaluation, and 
domain knowledge. In addition, there were longitudinal effects: the first measurement was 
predictive of the second, supporting the reliability of the measurements. The acquisition of 
domain knowledge was supported by evidence evaluation abilities. There were no relations 
between experimentation and evidence evaluation or domain knowledge. The individual 
differences in experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain knowledge could be 
explained by predictor measures taken the year before: executive functions (inhibition  
and verbal working memory) and grammatical abilities. Vocabulary predicted 
experimentation abilities.
Kindergartners improved on experimentation and evidence evaluation. The increase 
in experimentation abilities was large, which of course is largely due to the fact that in the 
second measurement extensive feedback (i.e. dynamic feedback) on the kindergartners’ 
performance was given, while the first measurement involved only correctional feedback. 
We did not provide extensive feedback at Time 1 to not interfere with natural development. 
Although the size of the improvement is difficult to interpret, it is in line with a previous 
cross-sectional study on experimentation abilities of junior and senior kindergartners (Van 
der Graaf, et al., 2015). Furthermore, the increase in evidence evaluation was a small-sized 
effect. On average, the kindergartners scored about 8% higher on the second measurement. 
This result is in line with a previous, longitudinal investigation in kindergarten (Piekny, et 
al., 2014).
The final longitudinal measure was domain knowledge. The kindergartners’ domain-
specific knowledge about plants and growth, sun and shadows, paper planes, and floating 
and sinking, increased from over a half-year-period in senior kindergarten. The effect 
size of the increase was medium. This means that the kindergartners acquired domain 
knowledge during kindergarten, as expected. This result, in combination with the progress 
on scientific reasoning abilities, is in line with the finding that children improve on a 
science achievement test from the beginning to the end of kindergarten (Saçkes, Trundle, 
Bell, & O’Connell, 2011). This science achievement test included conceptual knowledge of the 
natural and social world, as well as scientific reasoning abilities.
There were no significant associations between experimentation and evidence 
evaluation during development in kindergarten, but they did correlate, except for 
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experimentation at Time 1 with evidence evaluation at Time 2. Experimentation and 
evidence evaluation were proposed as separate, but related components of scientific 
reasoning (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). The fact that experimentation did not predict the 
development of evidence evaluation abilities and vice versa suggests that experimentation 
and evidence evaluation develop independently. Another reason why these core components 
should be considered as independent is that evidence evaluation, but not experimentation 
predicted domain knowledge acquisition. This does not exclude the possibility that with age 
(and increased proficiency) the components might form a unitary construct (see for example 
Koerber, et al., 2015), because a deeper understanding of scientific reasoning might increase 
awareness of the relations between the components. An example is that in order to draw 
conclusions based on the generated evidence, a proper experiment has to be designed, which 
can only be informative when the proposed hypothesis is testable.
A main finding of the present study is that evidence evaluation predicts acquisition of 
domain knowledge. The process of evaluating evidence allows one to construct domain-
specific knowledge of the natural world, as scientists do (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). The current 
study confirmed this notion and showed that children as young as 4- to 5-years old acquire 
more scientific knowledge when they know how to draw proper conclusions based on the 
provided evidence. Evidence evaluation is a domain-general skill, which we did not assess 
in a specific scientific domain, but the kindergartners drew conclusion about which color 
of chewing gum causes bad teeth. As the domain-specific knowledge was about scientific 
domains, this result is a strong indicator that the ability to interpret results allows one to 
acquire (more) domain-specific knowledge. 
In contrast with the study of Edelsbrunner and colleagues (2015), no effect of 
experimentation abilities on domain knowledge was found. There could be multiple reasons 
for this difference, such as the age of the children, and the assessment that was used. The 
participants in our study were all kindergartners, while Edelsbrunner and colleagues (2015) 
studied children from six to 13 years of age. Furthermore, the assessment differed; while we 
used a hands-on assessment of the designing of multivariable experiments (for which the 
CVS is required), they used a questionnaire to assess the understanding of the CVS. Hands-
on assessment is a more direct measure, while answering questions about experiment 
designs is more at metacognition-level. A more important difference is that we controlled for 
evidence evaluation abilities. The present results show that evidence evaluation abilities are 
more relevant in explaining the development of domain knowledge than experimentation 
abilities. In other words, when kindergartners know how to draw the proper conclusion 
based on the provided evidence, they are more likely to acquire domain-specific knowledge. 
As scientific reasoning is a cyclic process (Kuhn, 2004), the preceding core components 
should not be disregarded for learning domain-specific knowledge via self-discovery. In 
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order to generate evidence, an experiment should be designed and conducted.
With respect to the individual differences, a distinction was made between individual 
differences in specific abilities, such as experimentation, and the development of those 
abilities. In line with a previous study (Van der Graaf, et al., 2016), executive functions 
(inhibition and verbal working memory) and grammar explained individual differences in 
evidence evaluation and experimentation abilities. The effects of executive functions on 
scientific reasoning were indirect, via grammar. It has previously been shown that executive 
functions are especially important in young children in order to organize their thoughts 
and behavior (Diamond, 2013). That is why they can be seen as building blocks for other skills 
and abilities, such as grammar and scientific reasoning. The role of grammar in scientific 
reasoning can be explained by an underlying mechanism that grammar shares with other 
cognitions, as proposed by Jackendoff (2002). The properties of recursion and transition 
are shared with experimentation and evidence evaluation. The executive functions also 
had a direct effect on evidence evaluation at time 2, which indicated that the development 
of evidence evaluation can partly be explained by executive functions. The executive 
functions can be seen as a foundation for learning of abilities and knowledge. The present 
results showed that the importance of executive functioning in acquisition of abilities 
can be extended to a core component of scientific reasoning, namely evidence evaluation. 
Interestingly, this component was the only predictor of domain knowledge acquisition. 
Therefore, it can be stated that the executive functions boost knowledge acquisition 
indirectly via other abilities.
An interesting final point on the individual differences in scientific reasoning is the 
absence of significant predictors of experimentation abilities at time 1. There was only a 
correlation with evidence evaluation at time 1. The difference with experimentation at 
time 2 is that at time 1 only correctional feedback was given, while at time 2 more extensive 
feedback was given (dynamic feedback). The kindergartners could learn more and they 
progressed further on the task. Therefore, the second measurement was more challenging 
and thus recruited more cognitive resources, such as the executive functions and grammar. 
Vocabulary also predicted performance on experimentation at time 2. This might be related 
to the linguistic nature of the dynamic feedback. Perhaps kindergartners with a larger 
vocabulary were better able to interpret the feedback and use it to improve their subsequent 
experiments. Early vocabulary has already been shown to predict recall of words and 
sentences (Marchman & Fernald, 2008). 
Domain knowledge was predicted by executive functions via grammatical abilities. To 
our knowledge, this study is the first to identify cognitive factors in domain knowledge in 
kindergarten. Verbal working memory and grammatical abilities predicted performance 
on the test of domain knowledge, as expected. The role of inhibition should be seen as a 
Individual Differences in the Development of Scientific Thinking in Kindergarten
96
supportive cognitive ability that aids in keeping the working memory from becoming too 
cluttered, as well as staying focused by inhibiting interfering stimuli and/or thoughts 
(Diamond, 2013). Other factors that relate to end of kindergarten domain knowledge are 
socio-economic status, motivation, and gender (Saçkes, et al., 2011). Saçkes et al. found a 
small-sized effect of gender (boys scored higher on the knowledge test than girls. We did 
not find gender effects on the measures of domain knowledge, experimentation or evidence 
evaluation (as revealed by additional independent samples t-tests, all p’s > .155; all d’s < .30). 
A limitation of the present study is that not the same assessment of experimentation 
abilities was used across measurements. Only correctional feedback was given at time 1 to 
prevent extensive learning effect, but more extensive feedback was given at time 2 in order for 
the kindergartners to perform optimally. The development of experimentation in kindergarten 
should be investigated further. Another limitation is that the first core component of scientific 
reasoning, namely hypothesis generation (Klahr, 2000) was not investigated. Previous studies 
have shown that it is difficult for kindergartners to generate hypothesis in accordance with the 
provided evidence (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). However, to our knowledge no further attempts 
have been made to address hypothesis generation in kindergarten. 
Implications of this study are related to science education in kindergarten. The present 
study shows that kindergartners already have some domain knowledge, know how to design 
experiments, and know how to evaluate evidence, and that these develop in kindergarten. 
Young children are curious by nature (Engel, 2009). They can use their curiosity to learn via 
self-discovery, in which extra attention should be paid to the evaluation of evidence, especially 
when the acquisition of new scientific knowledge is one of the aims. Our results showed that 
it is the domain-general ability of evidence evaluation that predicts knowledge acquisition. 
Furthermore, the role of language is pivotal in concurrence with teaching scientific thinking. 
Children can use language to structure their thoughts (Mercer, 2013) and guide their actions 
(Luria & Yudovich, 1966). Teaching language alongside scientific thinking might improve 
scientific thinking abilities, as well as providing the opportunity to practice linguistic abilities. 
A final implication is related to the balance between independency of the child versus guidance 
of the teacher. When children score lower on executive functions, they need more guidance.
To conclude, scientific reasoning abilities (i.e. experimentation and evidence evaluation) 
and domain-specific knowledge improve over time in kindergarten. Individual variation herein 
can be explained by executive functions and grammatical abilities. Vocabulary was a predictor 
of experimentation abilities. With respect to effect of domain-general scientific reasoning 
and domain-specific knowledge, evidence evaluation predicted the acquisition of domain 
knowledge. This makes evidence evaluation a relevant ability to master in order to acquire more 
domain knowledge.
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Abstract
—
The aim of the present study was to investigate experimentation abilities in 28 
kindergarten children with learning problems in comparison with 45 grade-matched 
children in mainstream education. Moreover, it was examined to what extent the 
individual variation in experimentation abilities of kindergartners with learning 
problems could be explained by cognitive (nonverbal reasoning and inhibition) and 
linguistic (vocabulary, grammar, and verbal working memory) predictor measures. The 
kindergartners with learning problems showed a developmental delay in experimentation 
abilities, but most of them were able to design multivariable experiments correctly. 
Moreover, they relied on similar abilities as kindergartners in mainstream education. 
It is concluded that learning via scientific discovery can be regarded a beneficial 
instructional method for children with learning problems, especially when they profit 
from guidance in their reasoning processes and from additional verbal instruction.
Key words: scientific reasoning, experimentation, learning 
problems, kindergarten, individual differences
Highlights:
• Kindergartners with learning problems can design multivariable experiments
• Experimentation abilities lag behind typically developing kindergartners
• Nonverbal reasoning and grammatical abilities are involved in experimentation
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Experimentation 
Abilities in 
Kindergarten Children 
With Learning Problems
—
To be prepared for the modern, technology-rich society, it is expected that students 
learn to think independently and critically. This mindset has given rise to an increase in 
expenditure on research and development with an aim to increase the number of students 
in subjects, such as science, technology, engineering, and math (OECD, 2015). This so-
called STEM education revolves around scientific reasoning abilities. Scientific reasoning 
consists of generating hypotheses, designing experiments to test them, and evaluating 
evidence to draw conclusions (Klahr, 2000). Independent learning can take place when these 
abilities are mastered. In addition, it can help students think critically about presented 
results or their origin. An important factor for self-confidence in and liking of science-
related activities is experience with hands-on experimentation (Ornstein, 2005). The more 
experience children have with hands-on experimentation, the more self-confidence and 
pleasure they show in practicing science. Therefore, science education should be accessible 
from a young age for everyone, including children with learning problems. This way, 
improvement in individual academic outcomes can be pursued by setting high standards 
for disadvantaged students, in line with the aim of the No Child Left Behind Act (Bush, 
2001). It is important that the consequences of learning problems are recognized and that 
appropriate education is provided (Fuchs & Fuchs, 2015). It is therefore relevant to identify 
the capabilities of children with learning problems, including in science education.
Children with learning problems can profit from hands-on experimentation. After 
hands-on experimentation, a group of nine- to 12-year-olds with learning problems 
remembered more about the material and applied their experimentation skills more 
easily to other situations, compared to direct instruction (Bay, Staver, Bryan, & Hale, 
1992). In other words, it is conceivable for children with learning problems to use scientific 
discovery learning in order to learn domain-specific knowledge and domain-general 
experimentation abilities. A key aspect in providing effective science instruction to 
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young children with learning problems is that it should be based on the child’s needs and 
talents (Alber-Morgan, Sawyer, & Miller, 2015). Children without learning problems in 
kindergarten can already design experiments (Van der Graaf, Segers, & Verhoeven, 2015). 
However, it is unknown whether kindergartners with learning problems can also be taught 
how to set up experiments. Additionally, it remains to be investigated whether children 
with learning problems rely on the same abilities as children without learning problems 
when designing experiments. Therefore, the present study investigated the individual 
variation in hands-on experimentation abilities of kindergartners with learning problems.
Experimentation
Experimentation abilities consist of designing and conducting experiments. The 
experiments should be designed in such a way that one can learn from the outcome 
of the experiment. Experimentation is one of the core abilities of scientific reasoning 
(Klahr, 2000). Inhelder and Piaget (1954) were sceptical on whether kindergartners 
could design multivariable experiments correctly, as they refer to themselves as 
causing the effect (Inhelder & Piaget, 1954). In a similar vein, the ability to incorporate 
a second variable in their predictions and explanations was expected to be too difficult 
(Siegler & Chen, 1998), as would be the ability to adjust their own beliefs (Wilkening 
& Huber, 2004). However, in a dynamic assessment, when kindergartners receive 
feedback based on their performance, it has recently been shown that they can learn 
how to design multivariable experiments correctly (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015). This 
shows that kindergartners can understand the control of variables strategy (CVS). 
The CVS states that to find out what the effect of a single variable is, one has to 
manipulate that variable, while controlling all other variables (Chen & Klahr, 1999). 
Individual differences
Individual variation in scientific reasoning in primary school children can be 
explained to a large extent by cognitive and linguistic abilities. An important factor in 
scientific thinking is reasoning. Verbal reasoning has been linked to the learning of CVS in 
12-year-olds (Siler, et al., 2010) and in a sample of 10- and 12-year-olds (Wagensveld, Segers, 
Kleemans, & Verhoeven, 2015). In another study, a paper-and-pencil test was used to assess 
10-year-olds’ scientific reasoning, including how to design experiments (Mayer, Sodian, 
Koerber, & Schwippert, 2014). Mayer and colleagues found that scores on this questionnaire 
were related to performance on the Tower of London, a problem-solving task in which 
planning and deductive reasoning are involved. A second cognitive ability that has been 
found to be related to scientific reasoning is inhibition. Inhibition can aid in the rejection 
of intuitively derived misconceptions (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006). This way, inhibition 
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allows children to learn to design experiments using the correct strategy (i.e., CVS).
In the linguistic domain, vocabulary has been linked to performance on an 
experimentation task. The gains on a transfer task, in which CVS also had to be applied, 
were found to be partly explained by vocabulary (Wagensveld, et al., 2015). Another 
linguistic factor, which has been shown to be related to scientific reasoning, is reading 
comprehension (Mayer, et al., 2014; Wagensveld, et al., 2015; Siler, et al., 2010). This could be 
explained by a more general comprehension skill, that underlies reading comprehension 
and the usage of complex strategies, such as CVS (Siler, et al., 2010). It should be noted that 
in these studies (Mayer, et al., 2014; Wagensveld, et al., 2015; Siler, et al., 2010) children 
were old enough to read. A proxy for reading comprehension in kindergartners might 
be grammar, as grammar is also about constructing meaning using language and 
vice versa (Jackendoff, 2002). In the case of children with learning problems, working 
memory might be a critical factor in scientific reasoning, given the limited capacity 
of the working memory of children with learning disabilities (Siegel & Ryan, 1989). 
Children with learning problems
Within the field of science, Alber-Morgan, et al. (2015), argued that children with 
learning problems should profit from the educational pursuit of excellence, just as their 
typically developing peers. This can be a challenge as adolescents with learning problems 
score lower on standardized science achievement tests than regular developing adolescents 
(Anderman, 1998). A study by Van der Steen, Steenbeek, Wielinksi, and Van Geert (2012) 
investigated the understanding of scientific concepts in three- to five-year-olds with a 
task that consisted of two different topics, namely air pressure and running balls. The 
experimenter demonstrated to the kindergartners how the materials worked. An assessment 
with scaffolding was used, which included follow-up questions depending on the child’s 
level of understanding. The results revealed that the kindergartners with learning problems 
showed comparable understanding overall to the typically developing kindergartners. 
However, the kindergartners with learning problems gave more incorrect answers in 
general and they gave fewer answers that indicated a higher level of understanding. As in 
this study the experimenter demonstrated the materials to the kindergartners and coded 
their verbal understanding, it remains to be investigated to what extent kindergartners 
with learning problems can design hands-on multivariable experiments. It might be 
the dynamic assessment that is suitable for kindergartners with learning problems. The 
instructional design should manage the cognitive loads of the students with learning 
problems when performing inquiry learning activities (Lee & So, 2015). This can be done 
by step-by-step instruction to introduce multiple concepts, by showing worked examples, 
and by keeping a clear focus on the learning objective (Lee & Son, 2015). The dynamic 
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assessment of experimentation abilities also has a step-by-step instruction by introducing 
the variables one by one (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015). In addition, the feedback consisted of a 
worked example in which the experimenter explained whether an experiment was correct 
and why. When the design of the experiment was incorrect, the experimenter also explained 
and showed how it should have been set up. Finally, the kindergartners were provided with 
clear research questions, which they were asked to answer by designing an experiment.
The present study
In summary, kindergartners can design multivariable experiments when dynamic 
feedback is given (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015). This instructional approach might have 
benefits for kindergartners with learning problems (Lee & Ko, 2015). When it is known 
whether this instructional method proves fruitful for kindergartners with learning 
problems, this method can also be used in science education of children with learning 
problems. Various cognitive and linguistic factors have been related to scientific reasoning 
of children in primary school. It remains to be investigated whether this dynamic approach 
also works with kindergartners with learning problems and which cognitive and linguistic 
factors can explain their performance on an experimentation task. Therefore, the present 
study investigated the experimentation abilities of kindergartners with learning problems 
compared to typically developing kindergartners. Moreover, individual differences 
in experimentation of kindergartners with learning problems were also investigated. 
It was expected that kindergartners with learning problems would score lower on the 
experimentation task than kindergartners in mainstream education. Furthermore, it was 
explored to what extent cognitive measures (nonverbal reasoning and inhibition) and 
linguistic measures (vocabulary, grammar, and verbal working memory) would predict 
the performance of kindergartners with learning problems on the experimentation task.
Method
Participants
A total of 73 kindergartners participated in this study. There were 28 kindergartners 
with learning problems from one elementary school for special education, and 45 
kindergartners from an elementary school for mainstream education. The average age 
of the participants with learning problems was 6 years and 4 months (SD = 11 months). 
Among them were 13 girls and 15 boys. Children without learning problems were in 
the first year of kindergarten, 14 girls and 8 boys, or the second year of kindergarten, 9 
girls and 14 boys. These kindergartners were aged 5 years and 4 months on average (SD 
= 8 months), and had already participated in a preceding study of the authors in 2015.
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All children were in the first or second year of kindergarten. This is a program of two 
years in the Netherlands before formal education starts. The special education school 
did not differentiate between these two kindergarten years. In the Netherlands, there are 
three types of primary education: mainstream education, special education for children 
with mild learning problems, and special education for children with severe learning 
problems (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur, en Wetenschap [Ministry of Education, 
Culture, and Science], 2014). In this study, kindergartners from special education schools 
for children with mild learning problems participated. These schools have the same end 
terms as mainstream schools. This means that the children with mild learning problems 
can continue their education at a regular high school. However, the children tend to 
have an extended trajectory of finishing school. An independent committee judges 
whether a child can enter special education for children with mild learning problems. 
The committee consists of at least one child psychologist (Ministerie van Onderwijs, 
Cultuur, en Wetenschap [Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science], 2016).
Comparing the two groups, the kindergartners with learning problems were 
older, t(70) = 5.53, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.34, and – as to be expected - scored lower 
on the standard score of nonverbal reasoning, t(70) = 5.19, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
1.25, than kindergartners without learning problems. Parents and/or caretakers 
were approached via the schools. They were informed about the research and 
gave consent for their children to participate in the present study.
Materials
Experimentation. To measure experimentation abilities, two wooden ramps were 
used (cf. Chen & Klahr, 1999). The kindergartners were asked to design experiments with 
the two ramps. Each ramp had four different variables, namely the weight of the ball 
(light/heavy), starting position on the slope (high/low), steepness of the slope (steep/
flat), and the surface of the slope (rough/smooth). To investigate a single variable, 
the kindergartners had to use the CVS to design experiments with multiple variables 
correctly. The kindergartners were asked to set up an experiment in order to answer a 
research question. The research question was given by the experimenter and was about 
studying the effect of one of the variables. To design an experiment, the kindergartners 
set up both ramps. Using two ramps has the advantage that the result can directly be 
seen, because one ball might roll further as the effect of manipulating a variable.
We used the same task procedure as Van der Graaf et al. (2015). This included a 
gradual build-up of the number of variables, and dynamic feedback was used. There 
were four levels of difficulty. At Level 1, the kindergartners were allowed to set only one 
variable, at Level 2 two, at Level 3 three, and at Level 4 all four variables. Whenever at 
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least one of the four experiments at one level was designed correctly, the kindergartner 
proceeded to the next level, and if not, testing was discontinued. The four experiments 
at one level each investigated a different variable. There were 16 experiments in 
total and each variable could be investigated four times (once at each level).
Regarding the dynamic feedback, the kindergartners were given a second try 
when their first design of the experiment was incorrect. When the second try was also 
incorrect, the experimenter explained that it was incorrect and why. The experimenter 
also showed how the experiment should have been designed by setting the two 
ramps correctly. Whenever a try was correct, the experimenter explained that the 
try was correct and why. This means that after every trial feedback was given.
Two scores were obtained: an experiment correct and a variable correct score. The 
experiment correct score was the sum of the correctly designed experiment, with a 
maximum score of 16. The variable correct score was the sum of the correctly set variables. 
A point was given when the variable of interest was manipulated (i.e. set up differently 
between the ramps). Additional points could be scored from Level 2 onwards for each 
variable that was not under investigation. A point was scored when such a variable was 
controlled (i.e. set up similarly between the ramps). The maximum variable correct score 
was 40. The experimentation task is valid and reliable (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015).
Nonverbal reasoning. Two versions of the same task to measure nonverbal reasoning 
were used in the present study. Since the sample of the kindergartners in mainstream 
education was tested earlier, they performed an older version of the test (Bleichrodt, 
Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1987), while the kindergartners with learning problems 
performed a newer version of the test (Resing, Bleichrodt, Drenth, & Zaal, 2012). The 
difference between the two versions was that some items were replaced with newer 
ones. Therefore, we used the standardized scores to compare the kindergartners from 
the different types of education, and we used the raw scores to analyse the individual 
differences in experimentation of the kindergartners with learning problems.
The task used was the exclusion task. An item consisted of four abstract figures of 
which three figures belonged to a single category and one of them was not a member of 
that category. The category included figures that shared a property, such as the size and 
number of the dots in the figures. The non-member then had a larger dot or an extra dot. The 
kindergartners were instructed to identify the non-member. Inductive reasoning was needed 
to identify the category and deductive reasoning has to be used to find the non-member. The 
task consisted of 30 items. In the old version, testing was discontinued if four consecutive 
items were answered incorrectly. In the new version, testing discontinued when four out of 
five consecutive items were responded to incorrectly. The raw score was the sum of correct 
responses. Reliability of both versions is good (Bleichrodt, et al., 1987; Resing, et al., 2012). 
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The standard score was the raw score adjusted for age based on a large sample of children 
to create the standard scores (Bleichrodt, et al., 1987; Resing, et al., 2012). Standard scores 
have a mean of 15 and a standard deviation of 5 (Bleichrodt, et al., 1987; Resing, et al., 2012).
Inhibition. Inhibition was measured using the Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders-task 
(Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews, & Morrison, 2009). The task consisted of two blocks. 
In the first block the kindergartners were asked to touch their head or toes, but the 
child’s task was to do the opposite. In the second block the task remained the same, but 
the shoulders and knees were added. Each block consisted of 10 items. Two points were 
given for a correct response and one point was given when the child corrected itself. 
No points were given when the response was incorrect (i.e. when the child did respond 
as asked and thus did not produce an opposite response). The maximum score was 40 
points. The task has been shown to reveal significant variability and construct validity 
with parent and teacher ratings (Ponitz, McClelland, Matthews, & Morrison, 2009). 
Vocabulary. Vocabulary was measured using the verbal meaning test (Resing, 
et al., 2012). The child had to choose one out of four figures. The correct figure 
resembled the word, which was read aloud by the experimenter. If four out of five 
consecutive items were answered incorrectly, testing was discontinued. The task 
consisted of 40 items. The score was the sum of correct responses, with a total of 
40. Reliability of the verbal meaning test is excellent (Resing, et al., 2012).
Grammar. A sentence-repetition-task was used to measure grammatical abilities 
(Verhoeven, Keuning, Horsels, & Van Boxtel, 2013). The child had to repeat the sentence, 
which was read aloud by the experimenter. An example of a sentence was: “My friend wanted 
to bike to the city yesterday”. The sentences increased in length. There were 12 sentences. 
When the sentence was repeated correctly, two points were scored. When one error was 
made, one point was given. When two or more errors were made, no points were given. 
The maximum score was 24. Reliability of this task is excellent (Verhoeven, et al., 2013).
Verbal working memory. A word-repetition-task was used to measure verbal working 
memory (Verhoeven, et al., 2013). The experimenter read a sequence of words out loud and 
the child’s task was to repeat the words in the correct sequence. The task started with two 
sequences of two words. Every two sequences, the length of the sequence increased with one 
word. There were 12 sequences in total. The final two sequences consisted of seven words. 
When four successive sequences were repeated incorrectly, testing was discontinued. 
For each correctly repeated sequence one point was scored. The maximum score was 12 
correctly repeated sequences. Reliability of this task is excellent (Verhoeven, et al., 2013).
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Procedure
The kindergartners in mainstream education only performed the experimentation 
task and the nonverbal reasoning task, while the kindergartners with learning problems 
performed all mentioned tasks. The kindergartners were tested individually, at their 
school in a quiet place. The tests were administered in two sessions of about 40 and 10 
minutes (mainstream education) or in three sessions of 20 to 40 minutes (kindergartners 
with learning problems). Sometimes there was an extra break in the sessions of the 
kindergartners with learning problems, due to devious behaviour. Each kindergartner 
was tested by a single experimenter. There was one experimenter for each school. 
Figure 5.1. The percentage of participants per group (K1, K2, and LP) and the Level at which testing was discontinued. Note. K1 = 
mainstream kindergarten year 1, K2 = mainstream kindergarten year 2, LP = kindergartners with learning problems.
Results
First, the performance on the experimentation task was analysed. Most kindergartners 
with learning problems could not design multivariable experiments correctly, while 
most kindergartners in mainstream education could, see Figure 5.1. In Figure 5.1, 
the number of participants is represented for which testing was discontinued at that 
level, because no experiments at that level were designed correctly. Level 5 was added 
as a category for kindergartners that could design experiments correctly at Level 
4, so the participants at Level 4 did not design an experiment correctly at Level 4. 
Some kindergartners with learning problems did design multivariable experiments 
correctly and about 30 % of the kindergartners with learning problems reached Level 
3 and Level 4. The difference in performance with kindergartners from mainstream 
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education was significant, t(71) = 10.39, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.25 (equal variances 
were not assumed, Levene’s F = 16.56, p < .001) for the variable correct score, and t(71) 
= 6.69, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.61 for the experiment correct score, see Table 5.1. These 
differences can be considered large, since Cohen’s d is larger than 0.80 (Cohen, 1988).
Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s r Correlations for Kindergartners with Learning problems and Kindergartners in 
Mainstream Education.
Learning
problems
Mainstream
education
M SD M SD p Cohen’s d
Variable correct score 6.11 7.09 28.71 11.49 < .001 2.25
Experiment correct score 2.14 2.41 6.82 3.17 < .001 1.61
Nonverbal reasoning1 7.32 5.57 13.61 4.64 < .001 1.25
Note. 1 Standard scores were used for this comparison.
Second, individual differences in experimentation were investigated. Experimentation 
correlated significantly with two cognitive factors, namely nonverbal reasoning and 
grammar, see Table 5.2. The correlations with inhibition and vocabulary were approaching 
significance, r(27) = .37, p = .056 and r(27) = .35, p = .072, respectively. Verbal working memory 
was the only factor that did not show (a trend towards) significance of the correlation with 
experimentation. The factors were further investigated using multiple regressions. The 
factors were expected to be positively related to experimentation. As this was a directional 
hypothesis, one-tailed tests were used to evaluate the independent variables in the 
regression (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012). To do so, the p-values of the two-tailed tests of the 
independent variables, provided by SPSS (version 19), were divided by two. The backward-
method was used to evaluate the regression models. The first model included all factors. 
Then, non-significant factors were removed from the model. This resulted in a regression 
model, adjusted R2 = .31, F(2, 24) = 6.94, p = .004, with two factors that related to experimentation, 
namely nonverbal reasoning, β = .41, t(23) = 2.32, p = .015, and grammar, β = .33, t(23) = 1.87, p = .037.
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Table 5.2
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s r Correlations.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Experimentation1 6.11 7.09 1
2 Nonverbal reasoning 17.61 8.50 .54** 1
3 Inhibition 12.61 13.38 .37† .47* 1
4 Vocabulary 22.43 7.09 .35† .44* .23 1
5 Grammar 3.93 2.70 .47* .36† .22 .35† 1
6 Verbal working memory 3.04 1.09 .27 .51** .14 .17 .55** 1
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10. 1 Experimentation was measured with the variable correct score.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate experimentation abilities 
in kindergarten children with learning problems. The results showed that they 
score lower on the experimentation task than kindergartners without special 
educational needs. Nonverbal reasoning and grammatical abilities positively related 
to experimentation abilities of the kindergartners with learning problems.
Concerning the performance on the experimentation task, the results revealed that 
kindergartners in mainstream education score better than kindergartners with learning 
problems. Still, about 30 % of the kindergartners with learning problems designed 
multivariable experiments correctly. This means that there is overlap in the range of 
performance with kindergartners without learning problems. This is in line with the 
finding that kindergartners with learning problems perform comparable to typically 
developing kindergartners, but fewer reach a higher level of understanding (Van der Steen, 
et al., 2012). This indicates that as a group, the kindergartners with learning problems 
show a slight delay in development compared to typically developing kindergartners. 
The cognitive factors that could explain variation in performance were investigated, 
because the results showed that most kindergartners could design multivariable 
experiments correctly. Nonverbal reasoning and grammatical ability explained the most 
individual variation in experimentation. Experimentation as part of scientific reasoning, 
involves various reasoning processes, such as inductive, abductive, and deductive reasoning 
(Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). It should therefore be no surprise that nonverbal reasoning related 
to experimentation. With respect to learning problems, nonverbal reasoning can be assessed 
in a screening procedure as it strongly relates to cognitive abilities, such as scientific 
reasoning in the present study. Another study has found that nonverbal reasoning is a 
predictor of later reading disabilities, even when other linguistic factors are controlled for, 
such as phonological processing (Fuchs, et al., 2012). This way, education can be adjusted 
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at an early age to the needs and talents of the students (Alber-Morgan, et al., 2015).
Based on previous studies, it was expected that linguistic abilities related 
to experimentation. The present results revealed that grammatical ability 
related to experimentation. They share two properties; recursion and transition. 
Experimentation involves the recursive application of the correct design strategy 
to the different variables, and the strategy has to be transformed into a design. 
Grammar allows us to recursively built sentences and make them endlessly long, and 
it allows us to transition between phonology and semantics (Jackendoff, 2002).
In line with a study with older children in mainstream education (Wagensveld, et 
al., 2015), the present results show correlations of nonverbal reasoning, grammar, and 
vocabulary with experimentation. Note that Wagensveld and colleagues found reading 
comprehension to be related to experimentation abilities, however, in the present study, this 
could not be assessed given the young age of the current sample. To investigate the linguistic 
involvement in experimentation, we used grammatical abilities. The only difference 
is that the present results revealed a near significant correlation of vocabulary with 
experimentation, while in typically developing children, a significant effect of vocabulary 
was found on gains in CVS usage. However, the present results should be interpreted with 
caution given the near significance of the correlations and the small sample size. It might 
be that kindergartners with learning problems did not yet know all the words that were 
used in the instruction. Although the instruction was designed to be understandable for 
kindergartners and there was feedback on their performance, the instruction may still 
have included words that are new for them. Even when words, such as the variable names, 
were learnt, vocabulary still matters, because to acquire new words young children rely 
on their already existing mental vocabulary (Werker, Fennell, Corcoran, & Stager, 2002).
Inhibition also showed a near significant correlation with experimentation. It might 
be that kindergartners use their inhibition to reject intuitively derived misconception 
(Kuhn & Franklin, 2006), such as that the ball would roll further when the surface is 
rough instead of smooth. Hence, it is easier to address the question posed, because 
their tendency to generate a desirable effect would be less. However, other factors, 
namely nonverbal reasoning and grammar, appeared to be more relevant in the present 
study. The role of inhibition should therefore be a topic for further investigation.
Verbal working memory did not relate significantly to experimentation. As was 
expected, the scores were low on this task. Kindergartners with learning problems could 
only repeat a sequence of three words correctly. Due to this floor effect, there was less 
variation that could explain performance on the experimentation task. Therefore, no 
conclusion can be drawn on the role of verbal working memory in experimentation.
Given the large similarity of cognitive factors involved in experimentation for 
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kindergartners with and without learning problems, it appears that kindergartners with 
learning problems participate in scientific discourse in a similar vein as kindergartners 
in mainstream education, but their development is simply delayed. This means that 
the kindergartners with learning problems also have additional needs in science 
education. Fortunately, various interventions have been created that can improve 
scientific reasoning abilities and the acquisition of scientific knowledge in children 
with learning problems (Alber-Morgan, et al., 2015). This would make science education 
accessible for everyone and it might allow children with learning problems to become 
proficient scientists. Another reason to start with science programs in kindergarten is 
that the children with learning-related behaviour problems fall increasingly behind 
their regular developing peers through development on key topics, such as in reading 
and mathematics (Morgan, Farkas, & Wu, 2011). Besides, some kindergartners with 
learning problems in the present study showed proficiency in experimentation. It 
shows that kindergartners with learning problems can be further educated in scientific 
reasoning, which allows them to discover and unravel scientific phenomena. In 
addition, when children produce evidence using scientific methods, they can acquire 
scientific knowledge, related to the investigated concept (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012).
Another suggestion is that the language-use should be adjusted to the level of the 
learner. The kindergartners with learning problems also rely on linguistic abilities when 
designing experiments. An example of the present study is the gradual introduction of 
the variables along with their names. It might be difficult for the children with learning 
problems to take the variables into account when they cannot name them. Children with 
learning problems have limited language abilities that can affect the efficiency of science 
learning (Parmar, Deluca, & Janczak, 1994). This result provides additional evidence that an 
adjusted instructional approach can be beneficial for children with learning problems (see 
Lee & Ko, 2015). Therefore, language use should be taken into account when teaching science. 
A limitation of the present study was the sample of kindergartners with learning 
problems. First, the sample was relatively small. Second, the sample was heterogeneous, 
with some kindergartners having a clinical diagnosis, while others were just identified 
as having learning problems. However, this can also be seen as a strength of the present 
study, as special education schools in Netherlands have such diverse classrooms. Another 
limitation is the variability on various tasks, such as the verbal working memory 
task. This could have affected the relationships between the measures. To be able to 
relate abilities to each other, there should be enough variability in both measures.
To conclude, as a group the kindergartners with learning problems in our study 
underperform compared to typically developing kindergartners. However, some 
kindergartners could design multivariable experiments correctly and the performance 
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of both groups of kindergartners did overlap. This indicates that there might be a 
developmental delay and that scientific activities that include experimentation can just 
as well be incorporated in science education of children with learning problems. The 
individual differences in experimentation abilities of kindergartners with learning 
problems can be explained by reasoning and grammatical abilities, just as in their typically 
developing peers. Learning via scientific discovery can thus be regarded a beneficial 
instructional method for children with learning problems, especially when they profit 
from guidance in their reasoning processes and from additional verbal instruction.
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Abstract
—
Serious games have unique strengths that can be used to augment science education. For 
the current study, we developed and investigated a serious game to assess kindergartners’ 
discovery of the laws of physics in the so-called Hippo app. The participants were 71 
children, aged 5 years and 5 months on average. The app consisted of three game-plays: 
slides, seesaw, and pendulum. Children were asked to set variables (such as the steepness of 
the slide) correctly in order to provide a hungry hippo with a drink or some food. Children’s 
gaming behavior was assessed via exploration and efficiency scores, and next related to 
executive control, nonverbal reasoning, and vocabulary. Exploration was defined as the 
number of actions corrected for the total playing time, efficiency as the number of correctly 
solved problems corrected for the total number of attempts. The results revealed that 
efficiency and exploration scores did not correlate significantly, indicating two distinct 
types of gaming behaviors. Both types were associated with attentional control. Mediation 
analysis showed that the relation between exploration and attentional control was mediated 
by vocabulary, while the relation between efficiency and attentional control was mediated by 
nonverbal reasoning. To conclude, kindergartners’ efficiency and exploration can be seen as 
independent game behaviors; both demanding attentional control, but mediated by verbal 
skills in the case of exploration and by nonverbal reasoning in the case of efficiency.
Key words: scientific thinking, serious games, interactive learning environments,  
individual differences, kindergarten
Highlights:
• Scientific thinking strategies can be assessed using a serious game
• Kindergartner’s gaming behavior can be subdivided in exploration and efficiency
• Vocabulary mediated between game exploration and attentional control 
• Nonverbal reasoning mediated between game efficiency and attentional control 
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Scientific thinking has become more relevant in recent years. Many countries aim 
to stimulate scientific thinking via science education in order train future researchers, 
but also to make children think critically (Osborne, 2013). Serious games may very well 
be a supportive tool in this respect (Hamari, Koivisto, & Sarsa, 2014; Morris, Croker, 
Zimmerman, Gill, & Romig, 2013), and they also allow the assessment of how children play 
them. As a case in point, a physics game may help identify exactly how young children 
discover scientific concepts. In kindergarten, there is already some knowledge of physics 
(Inhelder & Piaget, 1958), but little is known about how children gain this knowledge, 
and how individual differences can be explained. In a game-like assessment, children 
would require explorative and efficient behavior. Exploration is about where to look, while 
efficiency is about understanding what is seen (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). Both exploration and 
efficiency have been shown to foster scientific thinking, but which factors underlie these 
effects is largely unknown, especially in young children (see Legare, 2014 for a review). To 
identify the basis of exploration and efficiency, both cognitive (executive control, reasoning 
ability), and linguistic (vocabulary) factors may play a role (Wagensveld, Kleemans, Segers, 
& Verhoeven, 2015). In the present study, we therefore assessed individual differences in 
exploration and efficiency during physics gaming in kindergarten.
Serious games to enhance scientific thinking
To participate in our contemporary knowledge-based society, a broad set of skills 
and abilities are required, such as scientific thinking (Dede, 2010). Scientific thinking 
consists of scientific reasoning, i.e. domain-general skills, and scientific knowledge, i.e. 
domain-specific knowledge (Klahr, Zimmerman, & Jirout, 2011). Scientific reasoning is 
the intentional seeking of knowledge using the scientific method (Kuhn, 2004). The three 
components of scientific reasoning are: hypothesis generation, designing and conducting 
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experiments, and evaluating the evidence (Klahr, 2000). These three components allow 
people to evaluate the validity of science-related claims, and to generate new knowledge 
(Fisher, et al., 2014), which helps them to become critical and autonomic thinkers. To 
support the development of these skills, scientific activities are being undertaken in schools 
(e.g., Lorch, Lorch, Freer, Dunlap, & Hodell, 2014). Children can acquire scientific knowledge 
about specific domains via these scientific activities. An example is learning why objects 
float or sink (Hardy, Jonen, Möller, & Stern, 2006). Children can acquire this domain-specific 
knowledge via exploration and efficiency (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). Via exploration, children 
can identify what the factors are that determine the effect, such as whether a boat will float. 
Via efficient behavior, children can generate a desired effect, such as designing a boat that 
will float. These types of behavior underlie scientific thinking (Legare, 2014).
A recent approach to scientific thinking in education is the use of serious games. Games 
provide a rich learning environment and allow children to select their own choices, which 
strengthens their motivation (Morris, et al., 2013). The richness of serious games motivates 
children to process multiple, possibly interacting variables, which makes them especially 
suitable for science education (Morris et al., 2013). Just as rule discovery and induction are 
inherent to scientific thinking (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012), so are they to gaming (Greenfield, 
Camaioni, Ercolani, Weiss, Lauber, & Perucchini, 1994). The richness of serious games 
also provides an opportunity for exploration, as there is more vigorous and prolonged 
exploration of stimuli that can be described as complex (Berlyne, 1966). Another advantage 
of serious games is that they can be regarded as ongoing assessments, providing players 
with the opportunity to show what they have learned (Morris, et al., 2013). Learning is not 
linear, but multiple strategies coexist to solve a problem, which is affected by experience 
(Siegler, 2000), which seems to be the case in serious games as well. Therefore, serious games 
seem an ideal tool to assess children’s explorative behavior and problem-solving skills 
within science education.
Discovering the laws of physics
In kindergarten, children already show the ability to think scientifically, which is about 
scientific reasoning and scientific knowledge. Kindergartners can reason scientifically, 
although they have great difficulty with hypothesis generation (Piekny & Maehler, 2013). 
However, many kindergartners are able to set variables correctly in order to investigate 
one of them. While performance decreased when the number of variables increased, many 
kindergartners turned out to be able to design multivariable experiments in a study by 
Van der Graaf, Segers, and Verhoeven (2015). It has also been shown that kindergartners 
can evaluate various types of evidence (Piekny & Maehler, 2013) which indicates that they 
have the ability to obtain domain-specific scientific knowledge themselves. Indeed, young 
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children already show considerable conceptual change in the domain of physics, with or 
even without instruction (Vosniadou, 2002). In classic experiments, it has been shown that 
many young children understand some physics, such as the effect of the angle of a slope on 
how far a ball will roll (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). They also understand how weight affects the 
balance of a balance beam, although they find it difficult to identify distance to the fulcrum 
as a variable (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Siegler, 1976). Using a pendulum, young children can 
find correspondences between the length of the string and the frequency of the oscillations, 
but they do not grasp the mechanism of the pendulum completely, because they fail to 
distinguish between their own actions and the motion of the pendulum itself (Inhelder & 
Piaget, 1958).
In discovering the laws of physics, exploration is needed, as well as a certain level of 
efficiency in problem solving. Exploration is needed to identify variables and their effects, 
while efficiency is needed to solve problems in a goal-directed manner. These skills have 
been described by Klahr and Dunbar (1988) within scientific thinking as: “The successful 
scientist, like the successful explorer, must master two related skills: knowing where to 
look and understanding what is seen” (p. 2). The first skill, exploration, involves the design 
of experimental and observational methods, and the second skill, efficiency, involves the 
formation and evaluation of theory (Klahr & Dunbar, 1988). Exploration helps children 
in making their prior beliefs more explicit, and there is more exploration when evidence 
contradicts their prior belief than when evidence confirms their prior belief (Bonawitz, Van 
Schijndel, Friel, & Schulz, 2012). It has also been suggested that exploration is especially 
relevant for young children, because of its relation to curiosity (Cecil, Gray, Thornburg, & 
Ispa, 1985).
Efficiency can be defined as the ability to solve as much problems in as few possible 
attempts. Within scientific thinking, efficient behavior would imply that one has 
understood the underlying mechanisms via which a certain scientific phenomenon works, 
because one can use it more or less instantly to solve a problem. It has been shown that when 
children are provided with an explanation, they can recognize information as evidence by 
incorporating it into a causal framework (Koslowski, Marasia, Chelenza, & Dublin, 2008). 
Without this prior knowledge, children may be unable to consider new or alternative 
explanations.
Cognitive factors in exploration and efficiency
Both exploration and efficiency have been shown to foster causal reasoning, but factors 
that underlie the individual differences are largely unknown, especially for young children 
(Legare, 2014). With regard to individual differences in exploration and efficiency during a 
physics game, executive control may be a key factor. Young children use executive control 
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during scientific thinking for the rejection of intuitively derived misconceptions (Kwon 
& Lawson, 2000). Executive control has been described as consisting of an action and an 
attentional component (Diamond, 2013). Action control (also called behavioral control or 
response inhibition) is the ability to restrain one’s normal or habitual response, which 
allows children to stop and think during task performance in order to perform in a goal-
directed manner, whereas attentional control is the ability to focus on the task, or on 
aspects of it, allowing children to keep track of information and to adjust their responses 
accordingly (Cartwright, 2012). Action control may be positively related to game exploration, 
because the control of one’s own actions allows one to guide their own exploration, instead 
of randomly interacting with the game. The inhibition of automatic responses also allows 
one to think before acting, which would indicate a positive relation between action control 
and game efficiency, because one can think of a correct response. The other component of 
executive control, attentional control can help in scientific thinking by inhibiting prior 
beliefs (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006). When prior beliefs exist about the rules of the game, such 
as the effect of certain variables, this might limit exploration, as the child might think it 
already knows how the game works. Attentional control may therefore be positively related 
to game exploration. With regard to efficiency, when a counterintuitive response is required, 
the inhibition of prior beliefs helps in creating the correct response. Attentional control 
also enhances the formation of problem-solving strategies, formulating strategies and more 
(Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005). For efficient scientific discovery, problem-solving strategies 
are required (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). Attentional control is likely to enhance game efficiency 
via the formulation and use of strategies.
The relations of executive control with game exploration and efficiency may also 
be indirect, since executive functions have been found to be related to skill acquisition 
(Levefre, et al., 2013) and are therefore at the basis for young children’s learning (Diamond, 
2013). The indirect effects might be via verbal (i.e. vocabulary) and nonverbal (i.e. reasoning) 
skills. Correct experimentation has been linked to vocabulary and syllogistic reasoning 
(Wagensveld, et al., 2015). Vocabulary can help children to understand scientific principles. 
Academic vocabulary allows children to write and talk about science (Snow, 2010) whereas 
non-academic vocabulary supports the learning of new concepts (Werker, Fennell, 
Corcoran, & Stager, 2002). In the case of discovering physics with a game, the variables 
are the new concepts to be learned. Before the variables can be explored, they should be 
identified and encoded. In the visual domain, Dunbar and Klahr (2012) proposed nonverbal 
reasoning to be involved, because it allows one to discover a rule that explains a series of 
events, or extrapolate from a rule to formulate theories and yet-to-be observed phenomena. 
Indeed, nonverbal reasoning was related to correct performance on experimentation in 
kindergarten (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015). Efficient behavior when playing serious games 
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may therefore be related to reasoning abilities. Because vocabulary relates to (learning of) 
new concepts (Werker, et al., 2002) and these can aid exploration, game exploration may rely 
more on vocabulary. On the other hand, nonverbal reasoning has been shown to relate to 
performance in science (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015), and thus game efficiency may rely more 
on nonverbal reasoning.
The present study
To summarize, young children show abilities to participate in scientific discourse 
and they already have some understanding of physics. However, little is known about how 
children discover the laws of physics. In the present study, we used a serious game to assess 
this and investigated the cognitive factors involved in game exploration and game efficiency. 
The game provided children with an informal environment in which they can explore and 
have opportunities for learning (cf. Legare, 2014). The game allowed children to discover 
the laws of physics in three problem-based environments inspired by the work of Inhelder 
and Piaget (1958): a slide, a seesaw (balance beam), and a pendulum. We assessed children’s 
exploration, measured as actions per second, and efficiency, measured as proportion correct 
per attempt for each of these environments. We had the following research questions: 
1. To what extent do children show comparable exploration and efficiency scores on 
the game-plays of slides (slopes), seesaw (balance beam), and pendulum, and on the 
levels of the game-plays?
2. How does the individual variation in exploration and efficiency relate to executive 
control, reasoning ability, and vocabulary?
With respect to the first question, we expected no differences for the exploration scores. The 
exploration score was a measure of the interaction with the variables. Because each game 
had the same amount of variables, there was no reason to assume that the game-play would 
affect the exploration score. For the efficiency scores, however, we hypothesized in line with 
the studies by Inhelder and Piaget (1958) that the children would be more efficient solving 
problems with the slides, followed by the seesaw, and that they would be least efficient in 
solving problems with the pendulum. It has been shown when the number of variables 
increases, performance drops, for example when incorporating weight, besides distance, 
in kindergartner’s prediction of which side of the balance beam would go down (Siegler, 
1976). It was therefore expected that performance increased when the number of variables 
decreased as they moved to a higher game level. With regard to the second question, we 
assumed children’s exploration and efficiency scores to be unrelated, and expected that both 
scores would be predicted by executive control. In addition, we predicted that the relation 
between executive control and exploration scores would be mediated by verbal abilities and 
the relation between executive control and efficiency scores by reasoning abilities.
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Methods
Participants
The participants were 75 children from two elementary schools; 41 girls and 34 boys. The 
children were in the first or second year of kindergarten, which is a two year program in the 
Netherlands before formal education starts. The average age of the children was 5 years and 
5 months (range 4 years and 2 months to 6 years and 7 months). The children were from two 
schools. One school participated in a previous study (Authors, 2015). We asked their parents 
for active consent for the present study. The parents of 24 out of 46 children returned the 
consent letter with a positive answer. The other parents did not return the consent letter, 
although we had asked for an active “no” if they did not agree. It can be inferred that many 
just forgot to return the letter. There was no difference in the ratio of boys and girls, t(44) < 
.01, p > .999, age, t(43) = 0.41, p = .684, scores on attentional and action control, t(41) = 1.30, p = 
.202 and t(41) = 0.10, p = .918, respectively, and scores on nonverbal reasoning and vocabulary, 
t(44) = 0.66, p = .466 and t(44) = 1.21, p = .636, respectively, between children who were allowed 
to participate and those who were not. The parents of 65 children from the other school 
returned the consent letter with a positive consent. Because 14 children of this school did 
not finish all tests, due to time restrictions, the sample size of the Hippo app was 75 and 71 
children performed all tasks.
Materials
Hippo app. The Hippo app (designed by the authors in cooperation with Qlvr ®, for the 
purpose of the current study2) is a serious game, which measures children’s discovery of 
the laws of physics. The app consists of three different game-plays, which address different 
physics topics: the Slides, the Seesaw, and the Pendulum (see Figure 6.1). The goal of each 
game-play was to provide the hippo with some food or with a drink. This could be done by 
setting the variables so that the food or drink would end up in the mouth of the hippo. Before 
the games were played, children were introduced to the use of a tablet. The experimenter 
showed how the tablet worked and how to set the variables in the games. Each game 
consisted of a practice round and four levels. The number of variables, that the children 
could set, decreased with level, from four variables to one variable. All variables had five 
possible settings. 
2 The authors declare to have no financial interest in the Hippo app.
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Figure 6.1. Screenshots of the game-plays of the Hippo app: the Slides, the Seesaw, and the Pendulum. For the Seesaw in the current 
screenshot, the child can adjust four variables: the heaviness of the weight, the placement of the weight, the placement of the 
fulcrum, and the height of the hamburger.
The goal of the Slides was to slide a basket of apples into the hippo’s mouth. The variables 
of the Slides were the length of the slope, the steepness of the slope, the weight of the basket 
of apples, and the surface texture of the slope. The goal of the Seesaw was to drop a weight on 
one side of the seesaw to launch the hippo, that stood on the other side of the seesaw, into the 
air to allow the hippo near a hamburger, which he could then eat. The variables of the Seesaw 
were the heaviness of the weight, the placement of the weight relative to the fulcrum of the 
seesaw, the placement of the fulcrum, and the height at which the sandwich was hanging. 
The goal of the Pendulum was to provide the hippo with a glass of lemonade. This could be 
done by letting a weight on a string bump into a cart with a glass of lemonade on it so that 
the cart would ride near the hippo. The variables of the Pendulum were the heaviness of 
the weight, the placement of the string on the ceiling, the height of which the weight could 
swing, and the placement of the weight compared to the cart (i.e., the horizontal difference 
in distance between the weight on the string and the cart with a glass of lemonade on it).
Gaming. Whenever the hippo was provided with the food or the drink, the attempt 
was scored as correct. The app provided feedback on whether the attempt was correct 
or not. There were three possible attempts per level. When an attempt was incorrect the 
experimenter encouraged the child to try again. Whenever the attempt was correct or 
whenever three attempts were incorrect, the children proceeded to the next level. There was 
no time limit. The maximum number of correct was one per level, four per game-play, and 
twelve in total. The gaming behavior that was scored was the correct score, the number of 
attempts, the amount of actions, and the playtime. Whenever the child adjusted a variable, 
it was counted as an action. The gaming measures were all recorded in a log file. The log files 
were used for the analyses.
Game exploration. An exploration score was calculated by dividing the total amount of 
actions (M = 70.73, SD = 27.12) by the total playtime in seconds (M = 787.03, SD = 250.84).
Game efficiency. An efficiency score was calculated by dividing the total correct score  
(M = 6.35, SD = 1.98) by the total amount of attempts (M = 28.07, SD = 3.17). These efficiency and 
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exploration scores were used for the analyses.
Executive control. To assess executive control, two computer tasks were used. Flanker Fish 
was used to measure attentional control (Rueda, Posner, & Rothbart, 2005) and Hearts and 
Flowers was used to measure action control (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006). 
Each task consisted of three blocks: congruent, incongruent, and mixed. Before each block 
there was instruction and practice, except for the mixed block of the Hearts and Flowers 
task. Children were given 4000 ms to respond on the Flanker Fish task and 1500 ms on the 
Hearts and Flowers task (following Davidson, et al., 2006). Responses faster than 200 ms 
were omitted from the analyses (1.6 % for the Flanker Fish task and 1.1 % for the Hearts and 
Flowers task), because these were considered anticipatory (Davidson et al., 2006). Correct 
responses were assigned a score of one and incorrect responses or no response at all were 
assigned a score of zero.
Attentional control. Flanker Fish measured attentional control, because children had to 
resolve conflict from competing stimulation (Rueda, et al., 2005). Children had to feed the 
hungry fish that appeared on the screen by pressing a button on the same side the hungry 
fish were facing (left or right). The hungry fish was usually accompanied by four other 
fish. There were three possible configurations: the hungry fish swam to the same side as 
the flankers, the hungry fish swam to the opposite side of the flankers, or the hungry fish 
swam alone. The first block consisted of blue fish, of which the middle one was hungry. The 
children had to focus on the middle fish, while inhibiting the tendency to respond to the 
flankers. The second block consisted of pink fish, of which the flanker fish were hungry. Blue 
and pink fish alternated in the third block. The children had to switch between the rules 
that applied to the color of the fish. The first item of a block was not analyzed. This resulted 
in 16 items for the first two blocks and 44 items in the third block. The Flanker Fish task was 
reliable, Cronbach’s α = .91, Guttman’s λ2 = .92.
Action control. Action control was measured in the second task: Hearts and Flowers. 
A heart or a flower appeared either on the left or the right side of the screen. In the first 
block, hearts were presented. Children had to press the button on the same side as the heart 
appeared. The children’s performance showed ceiling effects (M = 11.01, SD = 1.40). This 
block was omitted from all further analyses. Flowers were presented in the second block. 
Children had to press the button on the opposite side as the flower appeared. In the mixed 
block, hearts and flowers alternated. The first item of the mixed block was not analyzed. This 
resulted in 12 items for the first and second block, and 32 items in the third block, mixed. The 
Hearts and Flowers task was reliable, Cronbach’s α = .85, Guttman’s λ2 = .86.
Aggregated executive control measures. To confirm that the two tasks measured different 
aspects of control, a principal components analysis (PCA) was conducted. Oblimin rotation 
was used to improve the interpretability of the components. The total number of correct 
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responses per block were entered in the PCA, i.e., Flanker Fish block 1 (M = 11.67, SD = 4.02), 
block 2 (M = 10.86, SD = 3.51), and block 3 (M = 29.40, SD = 8.36), and Hearts and Flowers block 2 
(M = 8.92, SD = 2.91) and block 3 (M = 21.07, SD = 6.35). The PCA revealed two components; one 
for each task. The first component (attentional control) showed high loadings in the pattern 
matrix on the blocks of the Flanker Fish task (.71 – .84) and it explained 51.58 % of the variance. 
The second component (action control) showed high loadings in the pattern matrix on the 
blocks of Hearts and Flowers task (.89 – .90) and it explained 19.32 % of the variance. These 
components scores were used for the analyses.
Verbal and nonverbal skills.
Nonverbal reasoning. The exclusion task (Bleichrodt, Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1987) was 
used to assess nonverbal reasoning. The stimuli consisted of four abstract figures, of which 
three belonged to one category. The children had to point to the figure that did not belong 
to the category. The category could be determined by inducing the rule that underlies the 
similarity between the figures. To identify the non-member, deductive reasoning was 
needed based on the underlying rule. When four items were responded to incorrectly, testing 
was discontinued. There were 30 items, which increased in difficulty. The score was the sum 
of correct responses. The exclusion task was reliable with Cronbach’s α = .82, and Guttman’s 
λ2 = .84.
2.2.3.2 Vocabulary. Vocabulary was assessed using the verbal meaning task (Bleichrodt, 
et al., 1987). The child had to choose one out of four figures, which resembled the word 
spoken by the experimenter. When four items were responded to incorrectly, testing was 
discontinued. There were 40 items, which increased in difficulty. The score was the sum of 
correct responses. This task was reliable with Cronbach’s α = .84, and Guttman’s λ2 = .85.
Procedure
The children were all tested individually in a quiet place within the schools. The tasks 
were administered in three sessions, each lasting 10-20 minutes. One session consisted of the 
Hippo app with game-plays being presented in a random order. In another session, executive 
control was measured. Nonverbal reasoning and vocabulary were assessed in another 
session. The sessions were administered in a random order by three experimenters with each 
child being tested by the same experimenter. 
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Results
Exploration and efficiency scores on the game-plays of the Hippo app
Table 6.1 summarizes the mean scores of the game exploration and game efficiency score, 
as well as the descriptive statistics of the cognitive factors. Note that scores on attentional 
and action control could be negative, because components scores were used. The first 
research question focused on the in-game behaviors, game exploration and game efficiency, 
as a function of game-play and level. 
Table 6.1
The Descriptive Statistics of the In-game Behaviors, Exploration and Efficiency, and the Components of Executive Control, 
Attentional Control and Action Control, and Nonverbal Reasoning and Vocabulary.
M SD Minimum Maximum
Game exploration score 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.15
Game efficiency score 0.24 0.10 0.06 0.48
Attentional control 0 1 -2.08 1.78
Action control 0 1 -2.53 1.59
Nonverbal reasoning 19.03 5.11 5 29
Vocabulary 27.59 5.99 12 37
To examine the efficiency scores on the three game-plays of the Hippo app a repeated-
measures ANOVA on the game efficiency score was conducted with game-play (Slides, 
Seesaw, and Pendulum) and level (1, 2, 3, and 4) as within-subject factors. Whenever 
sphericity could not be assumed, according to Mauchly’s W, the degrees of freedom were 
corrected using the Huynh-Feldt method. We found an interaction between game-play and 
level, F(5.70, 421.40) = 13.47, p < .001 η2p = .15 (W = .62, p = .021). This interaction was further 
investigated by comparing the game-plays per level. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni-
correction showed that performance on the Slides was higher than on the Pendulum, 
except for level 4, p = .798. This effect can be explained by the final level of the slides. A 
single variable was investigated, namely the surface of the Slides. This variable turned out 
to be most challenging conceptually. Therefore, a second ANOVA was conducted without 
level 4 to investigate the effects of game-play and level on the game efficiency score. Now 
the interaction between game-play and level was not significant, F(3.59, 265.77) = 2.42, p 
= .056, η2p = .03 (W = .65, p < .001). This effect was near significance, due to the increased 
performance on level 3 of the Pendulum, see Figure 6.2. There were main effects of game-
play, F(1.85, 136.79) = 28.97, p < .001 η2p = .28 (W = .89, p = .016), and level, F(1.85, 136.58) = 45.45, 
p < .001, η2p = .38 (W = .89, p = .015), see Figure 6.2. Both effect sizes were large (Cohen, 1988).
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Figure 6.2. The mean game efficiency score per game-play (Slides, Seesaw, and Pendulum) over 
the first three levels per game-play. The error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni-correction showed that the game efficiency score was 
higher on the Slides than both the Seesaw, p = .001, and the Pendulum, p < .001. The game 
efficiency score was also higher for the Seesaw than the Pendulum, p = .003. The main effect of 
level was linear, F(1, 74) = 88.28, p < .001, indicating that game efficiency increased with level. 
Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni-correction showed that performance was higher on level 3 
than on level 2, p < .001, and level 1, p < .001. The performance on level 2 was higher than on level 
1, p = .003. The repeated-measures ANOVA showed that both game-play and level had an effect 
on game efficiency. These results were expected based on the design of the Hippo app.
Next, a repeated-measures ANOVA was also conducted on the exploration score with 
game-play (Slides, Seesaw, and Pendulum) and level (1, 2, and 3) as within-subject factors. 
There was no interaction between game-play and level, F(6, 296) = 0.53, p = .712 η2p = .01, 
and there was no effect of game-play, F(2, 148) = 0.68, p = .508 η2p = .01. Level did affect the 
exploration score, F(6, 148) = 14.70, p < .001 η2p = .17. Post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni-
correction revealed that the exploration score was higher for level 1 compared to level 2,  
p = .001, and level 1 compared to level 3, p = .001. The exploration score of level 2 and level 3 did 
not differ significantly, p = .258.
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Individual variation in game exploration and game efficiency
The second research question focused on the relation between exploration and  
efficiency, the two scores of gaming behavior, and other cognitive factors. In Table 6.2, it 
can be seen that the correlation between exploration and efficiency was .09. We also tested 
other curves, but they also showed that game exploration and game efficiency were not 
significantly related, such as the quadratic curve, F(2, 72) = 1.38, p = .259, and the cubic curve, 
F(3, 71) = 0.91, p = .441. Therefore we studied the individual differences separately for game 
exploration and game efficiency. The cognitive factors correlated with both gaming scores, 
except for action control, see Table 6.2.
Table 6.2
Pearson’s r Correlations Between Game Exploration, Game Efficiency, Executive Control (Attentional and Action Control), 
Nonverbal Reasoning, and Vocabulary.
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Game exploration score 1
2 Game efficiency score .09 1
3 Attentional control -.03 .32** 1
4 Action control .15 .07 .44** 1
5 Nonverbal reasoning .14 .39** .44** .23* 1
6 Vocabulary .37** .35** .50** .24* .55** 1
Note. ** p < .01, * p < .05.
Next, mediation analyses were conducted on the game exploration and efficiency 
scores. Attentional and action control, as part of executive control, were hypothesized 
to be the basis on which other skills are acquired. They were, therefore, the independent 
variables, and nonverbal reasoning and vocabulary were the mediators. The mediation effect 
was considered significant when the 95 % bias-corrected confidence interval (CI) did not 
include zero. This effect was calculated using 50000 bootstrap-samples. The other effects 
were calculated using ordinary least squares regression (Hayes, 2013). Unstandardized 
coefficients were used.
In both mediation models, there was a significant indirect effect. Regarding game 
exploration, vocabulary mediated the effects of attentional control and action control, 
ab = 0.0039, CI = [0.0012, 0.0085], see Figure 6.3. In contrast, regarding game efficiency, 
nonverbal reasoning mediated the effects of attentional control and action control, ab = 
0.0078, CI = [0.0003, 0.0233], see Figure 6.4. Attentional control related significantly to both 
vocabulary, a = 2.3068, t(68) = 3.24, p = .002, and nonverbal reasoning, a = 1.6571, t(68) = 2.68, 
p = .010, while action control did not, p = .171 and p = .225, respectively. Vocabulary did relate 
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to game exploration, b = 0.0017, t(66) = 3.23, p = .010, while nonverbal reasoning did not, p = 
.454. Nonverbal reasoning’s relation with game efficiency was near significant, b = 0.0047, 
t(66) = 1.80, p = .076. While this path of nonverbal reasoning to game exploration was not 
significant, the mediation effect via nonverbal reasoning was significant, because is also 
included the paths from attentional and action control to nonverbal reasoning. Vocabulary 
did not relate to game efficiency, p = .263.
Figure 6.3. Mediation model of executive control, nonverbal reasoning, vocabulary, and game exploration. Total effects (i.e., c’) 
are between brackets. The significant mediator is printed in bold. The mediation model was significant, R2 = .17, F(4, 66) = 3.34, p = 
.015. Note. * p < .05, † p < .10. 
Figure 6.4. Mediation model of executive control, nonverbal reasoning, vocabulary, and game efficiency. Total effects (i.e., c’) are 
between brackets. The significant mediator is printed in bold. The mediation model was significant, R2 = .20, F(4, 66) = 4.07, p = 
.005. Note. * p < .05, † p < .10.
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Discussion
The present study set out to investigate game exploration and game efficiency in relation 
to executive control, vocabulary, and nonverbal reasoning. Our first result was that game 
exploration depended on the level of the game-play only and that game efficiency related to 
both the type of game-play and the level of the game-play, as expected. It is therefore feasible 
to assess children’s exploration and efficiency in scientific thinking using a serious game. 
In addition, we found the scores for game exploration and efficiency were not significantly 
related. Therefore, we investigated individual differences separately. Our final result was 
that attentional control predicted both game exploration and game efficiency. We found the 
relation between game exploration and attention control to be mediated by vocabulary, and 
the relation between game efficiency and attention control by nonverbal reasoning.
The first result was that the in-game behaviors were related to the level of the game-play. 
There was less exploration and more efficiency when the level increased. An increase in 
level meant a decrease in the number of variables. When there are fewer variables, it seemed 
easier to solve the game-play. This result is in line with other studies on scientific reasoning 
that found that performance depends on the number of variables. When kindergartners 
have to predict and explain what side of a balance beam would go down, their performance 
decreases when they have to incorporate distance (to the fulcrum), besides weight, in 
their predictions and explanations (Siegler, 1976). Another study on scientific reasoning of 
kindergartners found that children design fewer experiments correctly when the number of 
variables they have to set increases (Van der Graaf, et al., 2015). The level of the game-play also 
related to game exploration. When there were fewer variables, there was less exploration. 
This is in line with the design of the game-plays. When there are fewer variables, there are 
fewer possibilities to interact with the game, which results in less exploration. Also, the 
levels with fewer variables were easier to solve, as revealed by the effect of game efficiency. 
Another aspect of the app was that there were three different game-plays, the slides, the 
seesaw, and the pendulum. The present results showed that the game-play of the slides 
was easiest, followed by the seesaw, and that the pendulum was most difficult. The slides 
were expected to be easiest, because conceptual understanding of the slides is present 
in kindergartners (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Inhelder and Piaget (1958) also described the 
development of understanding on the seesaw, which, just as Siegler (1976) showed, is 
difficult for kindergartners, as they experience difficulties in identifying distance to the 
fulcrum as a variable. In their descriptions of the physics topics, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) 
made clear that complete understanding of the pendulum emerges latest. 
Furthermore it is interesting to note that exploration and efficiency turn out to represent 
independent game behaviors. Although it has been proposed that exploration resolves 
ambiguity, seemingly in order to start discovering explanations for unusual or unexpected 
Discovering the Laws of Physics with a Serious Game in Kindergarten
138
events (Legare, 2014), the present results showed that there can be exploration without the 
need for solving the problem (or explaining what is happening). In a similar vein, there can 
be efficient behavior without attempting to explore all possibilities.
With respect to individual variation, game exploration was related to attentional control 
and vocabulary. Attentional control can be relevant for exploration, since it enhances 
formulation of strategies necessary to try out differential aspects of the game (Fernyhough 
& Fradley, 2005) and to selectively process stimuli (Hopfinger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000). 
The effect of attentional control on game exploration was indirect through vocabulary, 
which can be explained by the fact that vocabulary may stimulate talking about science 
(Snow, 2010). In the current study, it might have aided in the formulating of an exploration 
strategy or in the representation of new concepts during exploration (Werker, et al., 2002).
With regard to game efficiency, both attentional control and nonverbal reasoning were 
involved. The fact that game efficiency requires the coordination and combination of several 
aspects of the game, such as settings of the variables and previous outcomes explains that 
the game was likely to be cognitively challenging and thus demanding of resources of the 
attentional control system to maintain goal-directed behavior (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, 
& Calvo, 2007). Attentional control can also be seen as highly relevant for the generation of 
the right problem-solving strategies during game behavior (Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005). 
Besides attentional control, nonverbal reasoning related to game efficiency. Many types of 
reasoning have been found to be involved in scientific thinking, such as nonverbal reasoning 
(Van der Graaf, et al., 2015), syllogistic reasoning (Wagensveld, et al., 2015), and general fluid 
ability (Mayer, Sodian, Koerber, & Swippert, 2014). As Dunbar and Klahr (2012) have shown, 
reasoning helps in extrapolating rules to yet-to-be observed phenomena in order to generate 
a response, and that the inference of rules requires reasoning in order to adjust response to 
the problem to be solved.
What is left for discussion is the absence of significant relations between action control 
and the in-game behaviors, between nonverbal reasoning and game exploration, and 
between vocabulary and game efficiency. Regarding action control, it has been proposed that 
it could help in stopping automatic responses (Ponitz, McClelland, Jewkes, Connor, Farris, 
& Morrison, 2008). However, it seems that the discovery of physics was an engaging task, 
which does not stimulate automatically responding. This notion is in line with the finding 
of Van de Sande, Segers, and Verhoeven (2015) that autonomous and explorative games can 
engage children for relatively long time periods, before they tend to go off task. They found 
off-task behavior to be related to action control. For nonverbal reasoning, it makes sense 
that this is not directly needed to explore a game, since exploration is unconstrained and 
would therefore need no rules or formulation of rules. In contrast, exploration does require 
mental representations of new scientific concepts, in which vocabulary can aid (Snow, 
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2010). Game efficiency was about correctly responding in few attempts. In order to solve 
the physics problems, there was no need to verbalize the variables and/or their effects. The 
children had to use their own logic to set the variables and to adjust responses given the 
observed effects (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). This is not to say that language does not play a role 
in scientific thinking, as vocabulary was correlated with game-efficiency. An interesting 
finding is that vocabulary and nonverbal reasoning did correlate with action control, which 
can be explained by the supportive role of action control in task performance. Action control 
allows children to control their action, so that children can behave according to the task 
demands. However, these relations were no longer significant in the mediation models, 
where attentional control was controlled for. Attentional control, therefore, seems to be a 
more relevant factor in vocabulary and nonverbal reasoning, which can be explained by the 
fact that most children can control their actions.
A limitation on the present study is that the initial and subsequent knowledge of 
the physics topics have not been assessed. While kindergartners’ in-game behavior was 
decomposed, their learning gains were not investigated. Learning gains might be present 
if the game is used as an intervention tool to teach children about the process of discovery 
and manipulating variables, and about the underlying physics by observing the simulated 
result. It would be interesting to study how much children learn from this game and how 
experience with the game might affect learning gains. Another limitation is that previous 
experience with gaming and/or with tablet use was not assessed. The children were 
introduced to the tablet and to the game, but this might have been easier to understand 
for children with higher levels of digital literacy. Next to including these measures, a 
suggestion for future research would be to include a measure of curiosity, as curiosity can 
drive exploration, even when apparently more urgent situations would require a (efficient) 
response (Berlyne, 1966). 
An important implication for educational practice is that children, as young as four to 
six years old, can use a serious game to discover the laws of physics. This way, kindergartners 
can already be engaged in science education. A serious game can provide a rich and 
informal learning environment for these young children (cf. Morris, et al., 2013). Such an 
environment may challenge the children to manipulate variables and observe the results in 
order to explore the effects of the variables and/or to solve the problems. This confirms that 
exploration and efficiency can be assessed with a serious game (cf. Legare, 2014). Another 
practical implication is that it can be assessed how children at kindergarten level approach a 
serious game about physics. The present study made it clear that children differed in the way 
they discovered the laws of physics and also in their efficiency in doing so. This supports 
the notion that both exploration and efficiency can be assessed in an informal scientific 
discovery learning context (cf. Bonawitz et al., 2012).
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Two implications followed from the design of the game. Three different game-plays 
were used, namely the slide, the seesaw, and the pendulum. Each had three levels, which 
differed in the number of variables. Since no interaction was found between game-play and 
level, it means that the same cognitive principles hold between the game-plays. Whenever 
the number of variables changed (i.e. a change in level), it affected performance, no matter 
what type the game-play was. The second implication is that variables should be introduced 
gradually. When all variables were free to manipulate, performance was relatively low. 
This suggests that children should be introduced to the variables one by one, so they can be 
encoded and used in their discovery.
To summarize, game exploration related to the level of game-play, and game efficiency 
related to both the level of game-play as the game-play (slides, seesaw, and pendulum). 
From a scientific thinking point of view, this study was the first to relate exploration and 
efficiency to each other and to other cognitive factors. From a developmental point of 
view, this study extended the increasing acknowledgement of young children’s abilities. 
To conclude, serious games can be used to investigate how children approach scientific 
activities, i.e., exploration versus efficiency. Attentional control is a key cognitive factor in 
exploration via vocabulary and to efficiency via nonverbal reasoning in discovering the laws 
of physics with a serious game.
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General Discussion
—
The aim of the present dissertation was to study scientific thinking of kindergartners. 
There were three central research questions. First, what are the capabilities of 
kindergartners in scientific thinking and how does it develop? Second, what are the 
cognitive factors that support scientific thinking and discovery? This final chapter consists 
of a review of the results of this dissertation and a discussion of them in relation to theories 
about scientific thinking. In addition, limitations of the present dissertation will be 
addressed and suggestions for future research will be proposed.
Development of Scientific Thinking Revisited
The capabilities of kindergartners in scientific thinking were assessed. In Chapter 2, a 
new tool to investigate experimentation abilities was developed and validated. Most studies 
on scientific thinking have studied older children, possibly because young children tend to 
make mistakes in scientific thinking (Wilkening & Huber, 2004). Therefore little is known 
about kindergartners experimentation abilities. In line with the propositions of Vygotsky 
(1978) suggestions have been made to change the assessment to gain insights in the full 
potential of the child. Such an assessment is called dynamic assessment and it allows for the 
child the learn during assessment as there is feedback based on its performance (Tzuriel, 
2000). In line with this theory on assessment, in Chapter 2 it was shown that it is feasible to 
investigate kindergartners’ experimentation abilities. Most kindergartners could design 
experiments correctly with up to three variables.
To follow up on the assessment of experimentation abilities, evidence evaluation was 
also assessed. In line with previous research (Piekny & Maehler, 2013), the kindergartners 
in Chapter 3 were able to evaluate various types of evidence. The development of scientific 
thinking was investigated longitudinally in Chapter 4. Inhelder and Piaget (1958) studied 
scientific thinking in different age groups. They found an increase in the ability to use the 
scientific method in order to find things out, such as what affects how far a ball can roll 
down a slope. Other studies confirm that older children are better in designing experiments, 
drawing conclusions, and acquire knowledge using the scientific method (see Zimmerman, 
2007 for a review). Chapter 4 confirms this development in a longitudinal study, where the 
growth of kindergartners’ scientific reasoning was revealed in experimentation, evidence 
evaluation, and domain knowledge.
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Scientific thinking consists on the one hand of domain-specific content knowledge, 
such as what is gravity, and on the other hand domain-general process skills, such as 
what conclusion can be drawn based on the given evidence. The relations between these 
two were studied in Chapter 4. While there were some correlations between scientific 
reasoning (i.e. experimentation and evidence evaluation) and domain knowledge, the 
relations were not significant when cognitive factors were controlled for. However, the 
acquisition of domain knowledge was predicted by evidence evaluation. This means that 
using domain-general skills, in this case evidence evaluation, can lead to the acquisition 
of domain-specific content knowledge. This result is in contrast with a previous study 
that found experimentation abilities to predict domain knowledge (Edelsbrunner, Schalk, 
Schumacher, Stern, 2015). The difference in results might be explained by the inclusion of 
evidence evaluation in our study. It appears to be more relevant to know what conclusions 
can be drawn from the evidence in order to acquire domain knowledge than to know how 
to design an experiment. This does not mean that experimentation is not relevant in this 
regard, because evidence can be obtained via experimentation.
Concerning the dimensionality of scientific reasoning, it has been proposed that there 
are three components: hypothesis generation, experimentation, and evidence evaluation 
(Klahr, 2000). However, there is debate about whether these components form a single 
dimension or that they are separate components that are unrelated. In Chapter 3, we showed 
that experimentation and evidence evaluation are unrelated. When other cognitive factors 
are controlled for they do not predict each other, see Chapter 4. Moreover, acquisition of 
domain knowledge was predicted by evidence evaluation and not experimentation in 
Chapter 4. This all suggests that the components of scientific reasoning are unrelated. 
However, other studies showed that scientific reasoning was an unitary construct (Mayer, 
Sodian, Koerber, & Schwippert, 2014; Koerber, Mayer, Osterhaus, Schwippert, & Sodian, 
2015). There are two main differences that might explain these results. First is the type 
of task used. While we use hands-on materials to study the children’s abilities, other 
studies use questionnaires to investigate the same abilities. Answering a questionnaire 
might depend on other abilities, as well, for example reading comprehension (Mayer, et 
al., 2014). This might affect how the dimensionality of the core components of scientific 
reasoning emerges. The second difference is the age of the participants. The present 
dissertation focused on kindergartners (age 4 to 6 years old), but other studies mainly study 
children aged 10 years and/or older (Koerber, et al., 2015; Mayer, et al., 2014; Wagensveld, 
Segers, Kleemans, & Verhoeven, 2014). Given these results, age is proposed to affect the 
dimensionality of the core components of scientific reasoning. As children grow older, 
they acquire more knowledge and they know more about what they know. This proficiency 
and metacognition can allow children to become aware of the interrelations of the core 
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components of scientific reasoning. The core components are assumed to be related, 
because a hypothesis already includes a comparison, which can be used to be tested in an 
experiment. Next, the experiment provides the evidence based on which conclusions can 
be drawn. Finally, when the generated evidence was inconclusive a new experiment can be 
designed and the evidence might as well lead to new questions and hypotheses. In other 
words, scientific reasoning is a cyclic process (Kuhn, 2004).Scientific reasoning might 
emerge as an unidimensional construct at a later age, when children understand the cyclic 
nature of it.
Individual Differences in Scientific Thinking
We identified specific cognitive factors that related to experimentation and evidence 
evaluation (two core components of scientific reasoning) in Chapter 3. As was predicted by 
the research on executive functions (Diamond, 2013), we found the executive functions to 
support the acquisition of new skills, such as scientific reasoning. The executive functions 
were assumed to be the building blocks of young children’s learning, as they structure 
and guide thoughts and behavior (Diamond, 2013). The executive functions were therefore 
used as independent variables, which effects could be mediated by other abilities, such 
as grammar. Chapter 3 adds to the existing research that executive functions also appear 
relevant in scientific reasoning. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from Chapter 3 is that scientific reasoning 
relies on language. In Chapter 3, the spatial measures did not relate to scientific reasoning, 
while grammar was an important predictor of scientific reasoning. In addition vocabulary 
predicted performance on the experimentation task, as revealed in Chapter 4. First, this 
does not mean that spatial abilities do no relate to scientific reasoning at all. It should be 
noted that the type of task used can make a difference, for example spatial abilities did relate 
to performance on a questionnaire about the various components of scientific reasoning 
(Mayer, et al., 2014). Another aspect is that the knowledge one has (obtained) can be used to 
design new objects that fulfill specific requirements. This is the engineering perspective, 
which has been found to be related to spatial abilities (Uttal & Cohen, 2012). Second, this 
finding shows that basic scientific reasoning abilities, such as designing unconfounded 
experiments, do rely on language. One important role language can play is to allow 
children to talk about science, which supports understanding of scientific concepts (Snow, 
2010). Language allows us to do this because language can enable analogies that allow for 
greater complexity of thought (Clark, 2004). Analogies are part of scientific reasoning; 
hypotheses can be generated using analogy, and results can be explained using analogies 
(Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). Scientific reasoning seems to require more complex and abstract 
representations, such as the concept of an unconfounded experiment. Complexity also 
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depends on the learner. Children, as learners, use language to structure their reasoning 
(Mercer, 2013). This way, complex processes can be understood and subsequently be guided 
by verbalizing it. In other words, children can use language to control their actions (Luria & 
Yudovich, 1966).
The final component of scientific thinking of which we studied the individual 
differences was domain knowledge. Chapter 4 showed that domain knowledge was predicted 
by the executive functions and grammar. Domain knowledge is part of scientific thinking; 
domain knowledge might aid in the generation of hypotheses (Klahr, Triona, & Williams, 
2007) and as shown in Chapter 4 evidence evaluation predicts the acquisition of domain 
knowledge. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that domain knowledge is predicted by the 
same abilities as its domain-general counterpart of scientific thinking, namely scientific 
reasoning. However, just as in the multiple component model of working memory (Baddeley, 
2012), a distinction can be made between fluid abilities and crystallized knowledge. In this 
model the fluid abilities make sure that knowledge can be acquired and crystallized in long-
term memory. Therefore, the memory, unification, and control (MUC) model by Hagoort 
(2005; 2013) can explain the role of executive functions and grammar with regard to domain 
knowledge. In the MUC model the memory component consists of stored knowledge, such 
as the word class (verb, noun, etc.). The unification component “refers to the integration 
of lexically retrieved information into a representation of multi-word utterances” (p. 416; 
Hagoort, 2005). Finally, there is the control component, that can be seen as an attentional 
control system that helps in choosing the correct word or language, or that makes sure 
one waits for his or her turn in conversation. The analogy with the present dissertation is 
that the executive functions consist of a control system, namely inhibition. In addition, 
information can be kept active and manipulated in verbal working memory. It is these two 
components of executive functions that predicted domain knowledge. These effects were 
indirect, via grammar. Grammar then can play the role of unifying lexicalized patterns, 
which can next be stored in long-term memory. In this case, this is the long-term memory 
of the specific domains, which includes vocabulary and the underlying principles of the 
physics in that domain.
When the abilities are mastered to conduct research, i.e. scientific reasoning, 
independent learning can take place. In science education, children could be given the space 
to learn independently as an instructional method, see Chapter 2. It would therefore be 
relevant to know the abilities in science learning of the children, so that it is known whether 
letting children conducting their own research is an effective method for all children. 
We investigated experimentation abilities of children with learning problems in Chapter 
5. The results show that kindergartners with learning problems had more difficulties in 
designing unconfounded, multivariable experiments than kindergartners without learning 
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problems. Interestingly, some kindergartners with learning problems were as proficient 
in experimentation as their typical developing peers. Moreover, the ability to design 
unconfounded experiments was related to grammatical abilities and nonverbal reasoning. It 
is important to note that reasoning processes are inherent to experimentation abilities and 
scientific reasoning in general (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012). Therefore, this finding indicates that 
kindergartners with learning problems experiment in the same way as typically developing 
kindergartners. In Chapter 2, it was shown that nonverbal reasoning related to both 
experimentation and evidence evaluation in typically developing kindergartners. Another 
confirmation of the notion that the kindergartners with and without learning problems 
approach experimentation similarly, is the result that grammar related to experimentation 
in both groups. Therefore, it can be concluded that the instructional method of scientific 
discovery can also be used for children with learning problems. However, their development 
appears to be delayed, because they are less proficient in experimentation compared to 
kindergartners without learning problems.
Besides abilities, children bring their attitudes and strategies to scientific activities. 
Siegler (2000) proposed that children learn various strategies to solve problems and 
that these various strategies can coexist. Within science learning two strategies were 
identified with respect to discovery, namely exploration and efficiency (Legare, 2014). In 
Chapter 6, these two strategies were identified using a physics app. An assumption made 
by Legare (2014) was that exploration and efficiency work in tandem. Efficiency can lead 
to more targeted exploration and exploration can lead to efficient problem solving. This 
assumption was tested in Chapter 6. We did not find a relation between exploration and 
efficiency. This suggests that there were two separate strategies in exploring the laws of 
physics. Some kindergartners explored a lot and did not show much efficient behavior and 
vice versa. It might be, at this young age, that it is difficult to extrapolate explorations to a 
yet-to-be observed phenomenon, i.e. the correct solution. Indeed, this so-called inductive 
reasoning is an ability that children gradually acquire and relies on processing speed and 
working memory (Kail, 2007). The identification of two strategies or approaches is in line 
with the distinction between two control states: flexibility and persistence (Hommel, 
2015). Flexibility is about promoting and maintaining mental and behavioral flexibility. 
Persistence is about maintaining action goals. Flexibility of action control can lead to more 
explorative behavior and persistence in maintaining action goals can lead to more efficient 
behavior. Hommel (2015) supports this claim with neurological data. The distinction 
between flexibility and persistence is related to two different pathways in the brain: the 
nigrostriatal pathway supporting flexibility and the mesofrontal pathway supporting 
persistence. It appears that there are differences between individuals in these control states, 
but that individual can also switch between control states (Hommel, 2015). Chapter 6 shows 
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that the differences between individuals can also be seen in kindergarten children who use 
an app to discover the laws of physics. In addition, individual differences were revealed. It 
appeared that both exploration and efficiency were related to attentional control, but not to 
behavioral control. Serious games have benefits, such as motivating aspects (Morris, Croker, 
Zimmerman, Gill, & Romig, 2013), which can prevent children to wander off. Therefore, 
behavioral control was not needed. Still the game appeared cognitively challenging, which 
can explain the involvement of attentional control (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007). The effects of attentional control were indirect, with vocabulary mediating the effect 
on exploration and nonverbal reasoning mediating the effect on efficiency. Vocabulary 
seems to play a role in exploration via the representation of new concepts (Werker, Fennell, 
Corcoran, & Stager, 2002) and it allows for talking about science (Snow, 2010). The effect 
of nonverbal reasoning on efficiency reveals the importance of reasoning processes in 
scientific thinking (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
The present dissertation should be seen as a first investigation of what kindergartners 
are capable of with regard to scientific thinking. In comparison with older children, 
some limitations apply with respect to testing. Questionnaires cannot be filled in as 
kindergartners cannot read, which limits the present dissertation’s generalizability to other 
age groups. As one of the first to study evidence evaluation, Piekny and Maehler (2013) found 
that kindergartners could evaluate various of types of evidence correctly. As a consequence 
of their finding, the present dissertation limited the investigation of evidence evaluation to 
the task they used. However, there are various types of evidence and various ways to present 
them. Evidence evaluation could be examined in a broader manner in future research. 
Eventually, argumentation should be part of the assessment of scientific reasoning, in which 
students use evidence to create arguments (Kuhn, 2015). Another suggestion is to investigate 
hypothesis generation in more detail. While it has been shown that kindergartners have 
problems generating hypothesis (Piekny & Maehler, 2013), the present dissertation did not 
address what kindergartners do understand of hypotheses or about generating them.
A third limitation related to the performance on the dynamic assessment of 
experimentation in senior kindergarten. It is a new tool that was shown to be indicative of 
kindergartners experimentation abilities, but it is not known whether this tool can be used 
in older children. First, the performance was already good in senior kindergarten; therefore 
ceiling scores can be expected in, or soon after, first grade. Second, as children learn to use 
the CVS, increasing the number of variables should not increase the difficulty of designing 
unconfounded experiments. Therefore, it would be interesting to find out when children 
can use the CVS with any number of variables and what they might learn next. Children can 
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learn to interpret interaction effects (Siegler & Atlas, 1976). The next step would be to let 
children form hypotheses about interactive patterns and let them design experiments to 
investigate interactions (note the plural of experiment, as multiple experiments are needed 
to study interaction effects).
A final suggestion is to investigate whether children can be triggered to use a more 
explorative or more efficient approach when discovering the laws of physics. It has been 
shown that people can switch between those approaches (Hommel, 2015). However, this has 
been shown with more restricted tasks, such as Stroop or Simon tasks, and with an adult 
population.
Implications and conclusion
It should be recognized what kindergartners are capable of regarding scientific 
reasoning. They know how to design multivariable experiments and they can evaluate 
various types of evidence correctly. This should be taken into account when educating these 
young children. It is possible to use discovery learning as an instructional method from a 
young age on. However, these young children also profit from structure in the task, such 
as the gradual introduction of the variables of the experimentation task in Chapter 2. This 
is in line with beneficial effects of task structuring on comprehension of experimentation 
(Lazonder & Wiskerke-Drost, 2014). Another suggestion is to allow kindergartners to 
make mistakes. Mistakes are also part of scientific discourse, which gives researchers the 
opportunity to be surprised, to explore and learn. Kindergartners should also be given the 
chance to learn from their actions. It has already been shown that children learn the CVS 
slightly better when the instruction incorporates examples of invalid experiments versus 
examples of valid experiments (Lorch, Lorch, Freer, Dunlap, & Hodell, 2014). Finally, as 
young children are trying out ways to use language to structure their reasoning (Clark, 
2004), the addition of hands-on learning might prove fruitful in the development of 
children’s scientific thinking.
A recurrent finding of the present dissertation is the involvement of executive functions 
in scientific thinking. We found the executive functions to predict grammar, vocabulary, 
experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain knowledge (Chapter 3 and 4). Attentional 
control is an ability related to executive functions, as both involve inhibition and working 
memory (Cartwright, 2012). In Chapter 6 it was shown that attentional control relates 
to vocabulary, nonverbal reasoning, exploration, and efficiency. This implies that when 
kindergartners learn they rely on their executive functions; therefore, they should be given 
the space to use and practice their executive functions in the classroom. Some kindergartners 
might lag behind their peers in their executive functions, but they still can perform scientific 
activities, such as experimentation, when proper guidance is provided (see Chapter 2).
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To conclude kindergartners have the capabilities to think scientifically, which includes 
experimentation, evidence evaluation, and domain knowledge. Scientific thinking 
improves during kindergarten and it depends on executive functions and linguistic 
abilities. These factors also play a role in discovering the laws of physics using a serious 
game and in experimentation of kindergartners with learning problems.
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Wereldwijd besteden landen extra geld aan het onderwijs om het aantal studenten 
aan technische opleidingen te vergroten en om de kwaliteit van het technisch onderwijs 
te verbeteren (OECD, 2015). Dit wordt veroorzaakt door de recente technische innovaties, 
waardoor meer goed opgeleide werknemers nodig zijn. Om het onderwijs te verbeteren is 
een focus nodig op de wetenschappelijke vaardigheden en de wetenschappelijke kennis 
van de leerlingen. Deze vaardigheden en kennis stellen mensen in staat om zelfstandig 
en kritisch te kunnen denken. Het blijkt dat ervaring met wetenschappelijke activiteiten 
op school, zoals experimenten uitvoeren, het vertrouwen in het eigen vermogen vergroot 
en dat leerlingen wetenschap leuker gaan vinden (Ornstein, 2005). Daarom is het van 
belang dat leerlingen zo vroeg mogelijk met wetenschap in aanraking komen. Dit kan 
leiden tot meer en betere studenten aan technische opleidingen. Het wetenschappelijk 
denken van leerlingen is onderzocht bij basisschoolkinderen (Zimmerman, 2007), maar 
weinigen hebben de kleuterleeftijd (van 4 tot 6 jaar) onderzocht (e.g., Piekny & Maehler, 
2013). Het huidige proefschrift beschrijft meerdere studies naar het vermogen om 
wetenschappelijk te denken en de ontwikkeling daarvan in de kleuterleeftijd. Ook wordt 
de invloed van verschillen in andere vaardigheden tussen de kleuters meegenomen.
Wetenschappelijk Denken
Het wetenschappelijk denken bestaat uit inhoudelijke kennis, zoals de kennis dat 
planten water, licht, lucht, en de juiste temperatuur nodig hebben om te groeien, en uit 
vaardigheden om onderzoek te doen, zoals de vaardigheid om een degelijk experiment op 
te zetten. Bij de inhoudelijke kennis kan er onderscheid gemaakt worden tussen bepaalde 
vakken, zoals scheikunde, natuurkunde, biologie, etc.. Bij de vaardigheden zijn er grofweg 
drie vaardigheden te onderscheiden, namelijk het bedenken van hypothesen, het opzetten 
en uitvoeren van experimenten, en het conclusies trekken aan de hand van de resultaten 
(Klahr, 2000). Bedenken van hypothesen gaat over het maken van een voorspelling. De 
voorspelling gaat over de uitkomst van het experiment, bijvoorbeeld: “Ik verwacht dat een 
zware bal sneller een helling afrolt dan een lichte bal”. Het opzetten en uitvoeren van een 
experiment draait om de goede opzet van het experiment, zodat van de uitkomst geleerd kan 
worden. Een voorbeeld is het onderzoeken van het gewicht van een bal, waarbij minimaal 
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twee ballen worden vergeleken, een zware en een lichte bal. Om te leren van de uitkomst 
is het belangrijk dat andere variabelen gelijk worden gehouden, zoals de steilheid van de 
helling. Gelijk houden betekent dat ze hetzelfde blijven, dus in dit voorbeeld even steile 
hellingen. Tot slot is er de vaardigheid om de juiste conclusie te trekken aan de hand van 
de resultaten. Als de resultaten laten zien dat één bal verder is gerold, kan geconcludeerd 
worden waardoor dat kwam, bijvoorbeeld omdat die bal zwaarder was (conclusief bewijs). 
Echter is soms het bewijs niet eenduidig; soms wijst het grootste gedeelte van de bewijzen 
één kant op, maar is er een klein deel dat een andere conclusie suggereert. Dit wordt 
suggestief bewijs genoemd. Soms kan er geen conclusie getrokken worden omdat evenveel 
bewijs een conclusie ondersteunt als dat er bewijs is die het tegenspreekt (inconclusief 
bewijs). De vaardigheden om aan de hand van de resultaten/bewijzen de juiste conclusie te 
trekken wordt bewijs evalueren genoemd. Van de drie vaardigheden van wetenschappelijk 
denken is gebleken dat kleuters geen goede hypothesen kunnen bedenken (Piekny 
& Maehler, 2013). Daarom richt het huidige onderzoek zich op de wetenschappelijke 
kennis en de vaardigheden om te experimenteren en bewijzen te evalueren.
Individuele Verschillen in Wetenschappelijk Denken
Het onderzoek naar wetenschappelijk denken bij kinderen heeft veelal de kleuters 
genegeerd, wellicht omdat de weinige onderzoeken ernaar beperkingen in hun kennis en 
vaardigheden lieten zien (Wilkening & Huber, 2004). Daarom is voor het huidige onderzoek 
een nieuwe methode ontwikkeld om inzicht te krijgen in de experimenteervaardigheden 
van kleuters (Hoofdstuk 2). Hiervoor hebben we twee dezelfde knikkerbanen gebruikt 
met beide vier variabelen, die gemanipuleerd konden worden. De bal kon van de helling 
rollen en werd afgeremd op een vlak gedeelte met drempels. Zo konden de kleuters 
direct zien welke bal verder was gerold. De knikkerbanen zijn vaker gebruikt als 
materiaal om het experimenteren te meten (e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999). Wat nieuw was 
in het huidige onderzoek was de methode om de taak aan te bieden. Deze zogenaamde 
dynamische toetsing was toegespitsts op de kleuterleeftijd: er was materiaal wat ze zelf 
konden instellen (in tegenstelling tot een vragenlijst of interview), de variabelen van 
de knikkerbanen werden expliciet geïntroduceerd door ze te benoemen en de kleuters 
mochten er even aan zitten, er was een stapsgewijze opbouw in het aantal variabelen 
van één naar vier, en er was feedback op hoe goed ze het op dat moment deden. De 
conclusie van het onderzoek was dat kleuters vaardig genoeg zijn om experimenten 
op te zetten met meerdere variabelen. Dit betekent dat de kleuters wisten dat ze 
maar één variabele mochten aanpassen en dat ze de andere variabelen gelijk moesten 
houden. Op deze manier kon geleerd worden van de uitkomst van het experiment.
Vervolgens is het bewijs evalueren onderzocht. Overeenkomstig met eerder onderzoek 
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(Piekny & Maehler, 2013), bleek dat kleuters in staat zijn om verschillende types bewijs 
te evalueren (Hoofdstuk 3). Niet alle kleuters waren even goed in het wetenschappelijk 
denken (Hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5). Om die individuele verschillen te verklaren hebben 
we de samenhang met andere vaardigheden onderzocht in Hoofdstuk 3. De visueel-
ruimtelijke vaardigheden bleken niet samen te hangen met experimenteren of bewijs 
evalueren, maar de executive functies en het talige vermogen wel. De executieve functies 
zijn een soort regelaar van ons denken en doen. Het bestaat uit grofweg drie onderdelen; 
inhibitie, werkgeheugen, en flexibiliteit. Inhibitie is de zelfcontrole, zodat afleidende 
gedachten genegeerd kunnen worden of zodat impulsief gedrag gecontroleerd kan worden. 
Werkgeheugen bestaat uit het onthouden en bewerken van informatie, die in gedachten 
wordt gehouden. Flexibiliteit is het vermogen om de aandacht te verdelen of te verleggen, 
bijvoorbeeld tussen twee taken. In de kleuterleeftijd blijken de executieve functies van 
belang bij het opdoen van kennis en allerlei vaardigheden (Diamond, 2013). Daar is het 
wetenschappelijk denken geen uitzondering op. Van het talige vermogen zijn grammaticale 
vaardigheden en de woordenschat onderzocht. Beide voorspelden het wetenschappelijk 
denken. Taal is belangrijk bij kleuters in het leren, omdat kleuters nog naar manieren zoeken 
om hun gedachten te structureren en daarbij is taal een middel (Mercer, 2013). De speciale rol 
van grammatica kan uitgelegd worden door de rol die het speelt bij taal. Grammatica stelt 
ons in staat om van klanken naar betekenis te gaan en andersom. Hierbij heeft grammatica 
twee eigenschappen: het verzorgt de overgang tussen twee soorten informatie, klanken 
en betekenis, en het is recursief (Jackendoff, 2002). Dit laatste betekent dat er onderdelen 
herhaaldelijk binnen andere onderdelen geplaatst kunnen worden. Dit stelt mensen in 
staat om eindeloos lange zinnen maken, door bijzinnen te plaatsen binnen zinnen, maar 
ook door bijzinnen te plaatsen binnen bijzinnen, etc. Deze eigenschap zien we ook terug 
bij het wetenschappelijk denken als het resultaat omgezet wordt in een conclusie of als 
een plan van aanpak omgezet wordt in een ontwerp van een experiment en andersom.
De Ontwikkeling van Wetenschappelijk Denken
In Hoofdstuk 4 zijn de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 gereproduceerd, namelijk dat 
de executieve functies en het talig vermogen betrokken zijn bij het wetenschappelijk 
denken. Daarnaast lieten de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 4 zien dat kleuters ook beter 
worden in experimenteren en bewijs evalueren naarmate ze ouder worden. Met 
andere woorden: op 5-jarige leeftijd konden de kleuters gemiddeld meer goede 
experimenten opzetten en meer juiste conclusies trekken dan op 4-jarige leeftijd. 
Daarnaast was de inhoudelijke, wetenschappelijke kennis onderzocht. Ook hierbij 
bleek ook dat kleuters gemiddeld meer weten naarmate ze ouder worden. Het laatste 
aspect van Hoofdstuk 4 was het uitzoeken of wetenschappelijke vaardigheden 
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en kennis elkaar beïnvloeden. De conclusie is dat het evalueren van bewijs een 
positieve invloed had op de ontwikkeling van wetenschappelijke kennis, oftewel 
als een kleuter goed bewijs kon evalueren kon hij/zij ook meer kennis opdoen.
Een andere conclusie, die aan de hand van Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 kan worden getrokken, is dat 
het wetenschappelijke denken uit losse vaardigheden bestaat. Op latere leeftijd vormen de 
vaardigheden meer een geheel, omdat de kwaliteit van het experimenteren dan samenhangt 
met de kwaliteit van het bewijs evalueren (Mayer, Sodian, Koerber, & Schwippert, 2014). 
Uit het huidig onderzoek bleek dat dit niet geldt voor kleuters. Het kan zijn dat op latere 
leeftijd de kinderen pas beseffen wat de samenhang is tussen de vaardigheden van 
het wetenschappelijk denken, omdat die vaardigheden dan meer ontwikkeld zijn.
Experimenteren van Kinderen met Milde Leerproblemen
Een van de doelen van het wetenschap en techniekonderwijs is dat alle kinderen 
betrokken worden. Dit betekent dat ook kinderen met milde leerproblemen betrokken 
worden bij wetenschappelijke activiteiten in de klas. In Nederland is voor kinderen met 
milde leerproblemen het speciaal basisonderwijs (SBO) ingericht. Het SBO is voor kinderen, 
die niet in het regulier onderwijs meekomen, maar de problemen zijn niet dusdanig dat 
ze speciaal onderwijs nodig hebben. Na het afronden van het SBO, krijgen de kinderen 
toegang tot een middelbare school, net als bij het regulier onderwijs. In Hoofdstuk 5 zijn 
de knikkerbanen gebruikt om het experimenteren te meten en zijn een aantal andere 
vaardigheden ook getoetst bij kleuters in het SBO. Het bleek dat de kleuters binnen het 
SBO lager scoren op het experimenteren en de andere vaardigheden dan kleuters in het 
regulier onderwijs. Een interessante bevinding was dat een deel van de kleuters in het 
SBO goede experimenten kon opzetten met meerdere variabelen. Hierbij waren dezelfde 
vaardigheden betrokken als bij kleuters in het regulier onderwijs, namelijk nonverbaal/
logisch redeneren en grammatica, en in mindere mate inhibitie en woordenschat. Dit leidde 
tot de conclusie dat kleuters in het SBO op dezelfde manier experimenteren als kleuters 
in het regulier onderwijs, maar dat de kleuters in het SBO zich langzamer ontwikkelen.
Het Ontdekken van Natuurkundige Wetten met een app
Een ander verschil tussen de kleuters is de strategie, die ze gebruiken, om iets uit 
te zoeken. Het blijkt dat kinderen meerdere strategieën gebruiken om problemen op te 
lossen en dat die strategieën naast elkaar kunnen bestaan (Siegler, 2000). Binnen het 
wetenschappelijk denken wordt er een onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee strategieën, 
namelijk verkenning en efficiëntie (Legare, 2014). In Hoofdstuk 6 werden beide 
strategieën onderzocht tijdens het gebruik van een natuurkunde app. De kleuters konden 
natuurkundige principes ontdekken bij een glijbaan, een wipwap, en een slinger. De taak 
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was om deze materialen zo in te stellen dat er een drankje of een hapje aan een nijlpaard 
gegeven kon worden. De resultaten toonden dat verkenning en efficiëntie niet samenhangen; 
dus er waren kleuters die veel verkenden en weinig efficiënt gedrag lieten zien en andersom. 
Het kan zijn dat de bevindingen tijdens het verkennen nog niet doorgetrokken konden 
worden naar efficiënt gedrag. Wellicht dat op een latere leeftijd wel een verband gevonden 
wordt. Interessant is de overeenkomst van dit resultaat met de rol van twee verschillende 
routes in het brein (Hommel, 2015). De ene route zou voor persistentie zorgen, wat 
aansluit bij efficiënt gedrag, terwijl de andere route voor flexibiliteit zorgt, wat aansluit 
bij verkenning. Het blijkt dat het gebruik van deze routes tussen mensen verschilt, 
maar ook dat mensen zelf tussen de twee routes kunnen wisselen (Hommel, 2015).
Het gebruik van de twee strategieën tijdens het spelen van de app hing samen met 
de vaardigheid om de aandacht te controleren en niet met de vaardigheid om het gedrag 
te controleren. In andere woorden des te hoger de kleuters gemiddeld scoorden op het 
controleren van de aandacht, des te vaker de twee strategieën werden gebruikt. Aandacht 
was nodig omdat de app uitdagend was. De uitdaging bestond uit de vele informatie op 
het scherm die gebruikt werd om een probleem op te lossen. Dit zorgde er ook voor dat 
de kleuters betrokken en gemotiveerd waren en daardoor minder hun gedrag hoefden te 
controleren. De effecten van aandachtscontrole op verkenning en efficiëntie waren indirect. 
De resultaten lieten zien dat kleuters die beter waren in het controleren van hun aandacht, 
beter scoorden op woordenschat en dat kleuters die beter scoorden op woordenschat 
ook meer verkennend gedrag lieten zien. Deze resultaten kunnen verklaard worden door 
de rol van woordenschat bij associatief vermogen. Het is makkelijker om concepten te 
gebruiken als ze aansluiten bij al bestaande concepten. Daarom konden variabelen in de 
app makkelijk verkend worden. Het indirecte effect van aandachtscontrole op efficiëntie 
ging via nonverbaal/logisch redeneren. De rol van nonverbaal/logisch redeneren bij 
efficiëntie kan verklaard worden door de algemene rol van redeneren bij wetenschappelijk 
denken. Redeneren is inherent aan wetenschappelijk denken (Dunbar & Klahr, 2012).
Suggesties Voor Toekomstig Onderzoek
In de toekomst zou het bewijs evalueren uitgebreider gemeten kunnen worden. 
Omdat er eerder is getoond dat een specifieke taak bleek te werken (Piekny & Maehler, 
2013), is er in het huidige onderzoek niet uitgezocht of kleuters ook andere soorten 
bewijzen of met andere materialen tot de juiste conclusie komen. Een vaardigheid, die 
bij het bewijs evalueren ook betrokken is, is argumentatie. Mocht er onenigheid zijn 
over de te trekken conclusie, kan er een overeenstemming bereikt worden als er goed 
geargumenteerd wordt (Kuhn, 2015). Een zelfde soort suggestie geldt voor het bedenken 
van hypothesen. Uit eerder onderzoek bleek dat kleuters dit niet kunnen (Piekny & 
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Maehler, 2013), maar er zou wel gezocht kunnen worden naar manieren om het hypothesen 
stellen te meten, die beter aansluiten bij de kwaliteiten en beperkingen van kleuters.
Een andere suggestie is het onderzoeken van meer ingewikkelde effecten aan de hand 
van experimenten, zoals een interactie-effect (Siegler & Atlas, 1976). Bij een interactie-effect 
wordt de uitkomst bepaald door twee variabelen, waarbij het effect van één variabele afhangt 
van de andere variabele. Een voorbeeld is dat een zware bal sneller van een helling rolt dan 
een lichte bal, als de helling glad is, maar dat de ballen even ver rollen als de helling stroef is.
Suggesties Voor de Onderwijspraktijk
Een van de belangrijkste bevindingen van het huidige onderzoek is dat kleuters al 
kunnen experimenteren en conclusies trekken aan de hand van resultaten. Daarom 
zouden kleuters al op een onderzoekende manier kunnen leren. Onderzoekend leren kan 
als lesmethode gebruikt worden in school. Het sluit ook aan bij de nieuwsgierigheid van 
jonge kinderen (Engel, 2009). Wat betreft het opdoen van vakinhoudelijke kennis, bleek 
het bewijs evalueren een voorspeller. Dit betekent dat de kleuters ook inhoudelijke kennis 
opdoen als ze hun vermogen om bewijzen te evalueren weten te benutten. Als het doel van 
de les is om inhoudelijke kennis op te doen, dan kan er extra aandacht besteed worden 
aan het evalueren van bewijzen. Een correcte conclusie leidt ook tot de kans om kennis 
op te doen. Ook zou de taal om te praten over onderzoek gestimuleerd kunnen worden 
tijdens het onderzoek doen. Het talige vermogen bleek namelijk te voorspellen hoe goed 
de kleuters waren in het experimenteren en bewijs evalueren en niet de ruimtelijk-visuele 
vaardigheden. Aan de hand van de huidige resultaten kan gesteld worden dat taal relevant 
is voor exacte vakken, omdat er een verband was met de kwaliteit van het onderzoek doen 
en de hoeveelheid inhoudelijke kennis die werd vergaard. Ook voor rekenen, om precies te 
zijn een voorloper van rekenen, namelijk getalbegrip, bleek taal een belangrijke voorspeller 
(Kleemans, Segers, & Verhoeven, 2011). Een andere suggestie is voor de onderwijspraktijk in 
het SBO. Deze kleuters hebben milde leerproblemen en het wetenschappelijk denken blijkt 
ook achter te lopen ten opzichte van hun normaal ontwikkelende vriendjes. Daarom zou 
het beter te zijn om te wachten tot de kinderen in het SBO wat ouder zijn om onderzoekend 
leren als lesmethode te gebruiken. Als het zo ver is, zouden de wetenschappelijke 
activiteiten op dezelfde manier aangeboden kunnen worden als bij kinderen in het regulier 
onderwijs, omdat de huidige resultaten suggereren dat de kinderen op dezelfde manier 
onderzoeken opzetten en uitvoeren. Een nuancering hierbij is dat er ook kleuters in het 
SBO waren, die net zo goed experimenteerden als kleuters in het regulier onderwijs. 
Daarom zou het nuttig zijn om hen ook te confronteren met wetenschappelijk denken 
en het proces van onderzoek doen, zodat die kwaliteiten erkend kunnen worden.
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Conclusie
De wetenschappelijke vaardigheden van kleuters zouden erkend moeten worden, 
omdat zij door hun vaardigheden zelfstandig kunnen leren. Dit kunnen ze doen door zelf 
experimenten op te zetten en uit te voeren en vervolgens de resultaten te beoordelen om tot 
de juiste conclusie te komen. Zo leren ze bijvoorbeeld dat een zware bal (meestal) eerder van 
een helling af is gerold dan een lichte bal. Dit zou zelfs gekoppeld kunnen worden aan de 
onderliggende natuurkundige principes van zwaartekracht, want het effect van de zware 
bal zou beter met het begrip massa beschreven kunnen worden dan het begrip gewicht.
De kleuters bleken te profiteren van de nieuwe methode bij de experimenteertaak. 
Daarom is het van belang om de kleuters te begeleiden als ze nog niet capabel genoeg zijn 
om zelfstandig te kunnen experimenteren. Dit wordt ook bepaald door de executieve 
functies van de kleuters. Als ze zichzelf goed kunnen sturen zowel qua gedachten als 
gedrag, kunnen ze ook meer leren over het opzetten van experimenten, het evalueren van 
bewijs, en het leren van de uitkomsten van een experiment. Daarnaast bleek meerdere 
malen in het huidige proefschrift dat taal een rol speelt bij wetenschappelijk denken. Dit 
betekent dat het stimuleren van taal gecombineerd met wetenschappelijke activiteiten 
in de klas. Op die manier ondersteunen taal en wetenschappelijk denken elkaar.
Concluderend kan gesteld worden dat kleuters de capaciteiten hebben om 
wetenschappelijk te denken, wat bestaat uit experimenteren, bewijs evalueren, 
en inhoudelijke kennis. Wetenschappelijk denken verbetert naarmate de 
kleuters ouder worden en het wetenschappelijk denken is afhankelijk van de 
executieve functies en talige vaardigheden. Deze factoren spelen ook een rol in 
het ontdekken van natuurkundige principes aan de hand van een app en ze spelen 
ook een rol bij het experimenteren van kinderen met milde leerproblemen.
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